Harkreader v. Vernon County

Decision Date25 February 1909
Citation116 S.W. 523,216 Mo. 696
PartiesHARKREADER v. VERNON COUNTY.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Rev. St. 1899 § 8104 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 3848), requiring jails to be kept in a good and sufficient condition, contemplates connection with sewers and with water pressure of public service mains when practicable; and, where a county refuses to furnish such pressure for a plumbed jail, the sheriff may compel reimbursement for expense on that account.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; W. W. Graves, Judge.

Action by John T. Harkreader against Vernon county. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, whence the cause was transferred. Affirmed.

A. J. Smith, for appellant. Homer M. Poage and Scott & Bowker, for respondent.

LAMM, P. J.

This case is twin to Ewing v. Vernon County (opinion just handed down, not yet officially reported) 116 S. W. 518, and was argued and submitted with that case. Mr. Harkreader was sheriff of Vernon county. He sues in three counts: On the first, for his outlays ($246.15) for gas and water service in the county jail; on the second, for outlay ($18) for stamps used in his official business; and on the third, for outlay ($72) for janitor service in his office at $2 per month— all which several sums he paid out because of the refusal of the county court to supply such water, gas, janitor service, and stamps, and for which he demanded and was refused reimbursement. The case went on change of venue to Henry county, and was there tried before a jury, Judge Graves presiding. From a judgment following a verdict on each count, Vernon county appeals. Any facts material to vital questions raised will appear in connection with their determination.

1. Respondent insists that the bill of exceptions is out of the case because the record proper does not show a motion for a new trial was filed, and does not show time was given to file a bill of exceptions after the trial term; the bill being filed subsequently. But, as in the Ewing Case, the appeal inadvertently went to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. While lodged there, an abstract was filed by appellant, and briefs were filed on both sides. Such abstract invited the point raised. However, when the case came here, in due time an additional abstract was filed. We shall consider both, and, taken together, they show a motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and that leave was given to file a bill of exceptions, and that said bill was filed within the leave granted. Hence, as was done in the Ewing Case, so let it be done here. The point is disallowed to respondent.

2. The same points made in the Ewing Case relating to filing and overruling motions to make more specific and to strike out are made here. The pertinent record conditions on those motions are the same in this as in that case, mutatis mutandis. Therefore, for the reasons assigned there, the points are disallowed to appellant here.

3. Moreover, the interpretation given to the statutes construed in the Ewing Case, the reasoning employed to support the decision, and the result reached, are in point in the case at bar. Those reasons and interpretations will not be restated, and that case should be read and taken with this. Having reached that conclusion, the judgment should be affirmed out of hand, without more, were it not for certain assignments of error seeking further consideration presently. Such new assignments do not concern the use of stamps for the official correspondence of the sheriff, nor the necessity of, and liability for, janitor service for the sheriff's office in the courthouse, but concern the first count. Therefore there is no call for a reconsideration of the liability of the county for stamps or janitor service.

The sheriff's office was not only entitled to janitor service as a public office, under the doctrine of the Ewing Case, but it was used as a jury room and for the convenience of witnesses summoned in cases in which rules were made separating witnesses. We do not deem such use as accentuating the county's liability, but the evidence is of some sentimental value in pointing to the decent treatment due those called upon to perform the duties of good citizenship. It is argued that the sheriff's bill for stamps and janitor service should have been audited and allowed by the circuit court. But we are pointed to no provisions of the statute requiring a preliminary auditing, or viséing, of claims by the circuit court when such claims do not arise out of some order made by that court or in some matter that court has statutory supervision of. A lawsuit, where issues are framed on pleadings and submitted to a jury under instructions of the circuit court, and a result reached under the solemnities of the law, is an audit of the very highest order. In the absence of an express statute requiring a preliminary or another audit, we shall not hold that one was necessary. The instructions asked by defendant on the second and third counts were peremptory ones to find against plaintiff. The instructions given for plaintiff on those counts are not objected to as incorrect propositions of law, provided plaintiff was entitled to recover at all. Therefore, the instructions need no consideration, and what is said in the Ewing Case relating to stamps and janitor service is conclusive on those counts. Accordingly, the judgment will be affirmed as to them.

4. The case made on the first count is this: Plaintiff, as sheriff and ex officio jailer, resided in the jail. It was a stone building, built in days when there were no public sewers in the city of Nevada and no public service corporations furnished gas or water. There fell a time when it was modernized and enlarged, and when plumbing was put in connecting the sinks, bathtubs, washbowls, flushing tanks, commodes, urinals, etc., with the public service water mains and with the public sewer and the lighting plant; the same corporation furnishing both water and gas. At a certain time...

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  • Maxwell v. Andrew County
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • January 4, 1941
    ... ... expenses lawfully incurred. Secs. 11514, 11518, R. S. 1929; ... Boone County v. Todd, 3 Mo. 140; Ewing v. Vernon ... County, 216 Mo. 681, 116 S.W. 518; Harkreader v ... Vernon County, 216 Mo. 696; Motley v. Pike ... County, 233 Mo. 42, 135 S.W. 39; ... ...
  • Rinehart v. Howell County
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 25, 1941
    ... ... own funds and have reimbursement therefor." County ... of Boone v. Todd, 3 Mo. 140; Harkreader v. Vernon ... County, 216 Mo. 696; Buchanan v. Ralls County, ... 283 Mo. 10, 222 S.W. 1002; Ewing v. Vernon County, ... 216 Mo. 681; Saylor v ... ...
  • Thompson v. City of Malden
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 5, 1938
    ...speak only through its records, and ex officio, verbal understandings with county judges are not valid and binding. Harkreader v. Vernon County, 216 Mo. 696, 116 S.W. 523; Sanderson v. Pike County, 195 Mo. 598, 93 S.W. 942; State ex Inf. Mayfield ex rel. Cook v. A. L. Dougan, 305 Mo. 383, 2......
  • Mead v. Jasper County
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 4, 1929
    ...The circuit court had jurisdiction. Kansas City Sanitary Co. v. Laclede Co., 269 Mo. 397; Ewing v. Vernon Co., 216 Mo. 681; Harkreader v. Vernon Co., 216 Mo. 696; Sec. 9506, R.S. 1919; Givens v. Davies Co., 107 Mo. 603; Sears v. Stone Co., 105 Mo. 236; State ex rel. v. Hill, 206 Mo. 214; Ke......
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