Coe v. Town of Errol

• Decision Date: 25 January 1886
• Citation: 6 S.Ct. 475,116 U.S. 517,29 L.Ed. 715
• Parties: COE v. TOWN OF ERROL. Filed
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

6 S.Ct. 475

116 U.S. 517

29 L.Ed. 715

COE v. TOWN OF ERROL.

Filed January 25, 1886.

In September, 1881, Edward S. Coe filed a petition in the supreme court of New Hampshire, for the county of Coos, against the town of Errol, for an abatement of taxes, and therein, among other things, alleged that on the first of April, 1880, he and others, residents of Maine and Massachusetts, owned a large number of spruce logs that had been drawn down the winter before from Wentworth's location, (in New Hampshire,) and placed in Clear stream, and on the banks thereof, in the town of Errol, county of Coos, New Hampshire, to be from thence floated down the Androscoggin river to the state of Maine, to be manufactured and sold; and that the selectmen of said Errol for that year appraised said logs for taxation at the price of $6,000, and assessed thereon state, county, town, and school taxes, in the whole to the amount of $120, and highway taxes to the amount of $60. A further allegation made the same complaint with regard to a lot of spruce logs belonging to Coe and another person, which had been cut in the state of Maine, and were on their way of being floated to Lewiston, Maine, to be manufactured, but were detained in the town of Errol by low water. Similar allegations were made with regard to logs cut the following year, 1880, and drawn from Wentworth's location, and part of them deposited on lands of John Akers, and part on lands of George C. Demeritt, in said town of Errol, to be from thence taken to the state of Maine; and also with regard to other logs cut in Maine, and floated down to Errol on their passage to Lewiston, in the state of Maine, and both which classes of logs were taxed by the selectmen of Errol in the year 1881. The petition also contained the following allegations, to-wit: 'Said Coe further says that said logs, of both years, so in the Androscoggin river, have each year been taxed as stock in trade in said Lewiston to said Coe and Pingree, and said Coe claims and represents that none of said logs were subject to taxation in said Errol, for the reason that they were in transit to market from one state to another, and also because they had all been in other ways taxed. That said Androscoggin river, from its source to the outlet of the Umbagog lake, in the state of New Hampshire, through said state and through the state of Maine, to said Lewiston, is now, and for a long time has been, to-wit, for more than twenty years last past, a public highway for the floatage of timber from said lakes and rivers in Maine, and from the upper waters of said Androscoggin river, and its tributaries in New Hampshire, down said river to said Lewiston, and has been thus used by the petioner and his associates in the lumber business for more than twenty years last past.'

Without further pleading, the parties made an agreed case, the important part of which is as follows, to-wit: 'It is agreed that the facts set forth in the petition are all true except what is stated as to the taxation of the logs as stock in trade in Lewiston, Maine; and, if that is regarded by the court as material, the case is to be discharged and stand for trial on that point. It is agreed that, upon this petition, the legality of the taxation is intended to be brought before the court for adjudication, and all formal objections to the proceedings in the town meeting, etc., and all other matters of form, are waived, and we submit the matter to the court for a legal adjudication as to whether or not any or all of the taxes shall be abated. And it is agreed that for many years the petitioner and his associates in the lumber business have cut large quantities of timber on their lands in Maine, and floated them down the said lakes and rivers in Maine, and down the Androscoggin river to the mills at said Lewiston; and timber thus cut has always lain over one season, being about a year, in the Androscoggin river, in this state, either in Errol, Dummer, or Milan; and the timber referred to in this petition as having been cut in Maine had lain over in Errol since the spring or summer before the taxation, according to the above custom.'

Upon this case the supreme court of New Hampshire, in September term, 1882, adjudged as follows, to-wit: 'Now, at this term, the said questions of law having been fully determined in said law term, and an order made that that portion of said tax assessed upon the logs cut as aforesaid in said state of Maine be abated, and that the tax assessed upon all of said logs cut in the state of New Hampshire be sustained, and said order having been fully made known to the parties of this case, and become a part of the record thereof, it is therefore ordered and decreed by the court that there be judgment in accordance with said order made at said law term, without costs to either party.'

The petitioner took a bill of exceptions, setting forth the agreed case, and stating, among other things, the points raised on the hearing before the supreme court of New Hampshire, and the decision of that court thereon, as follows: 'On said hearing the petitioner claimed that said taxes named in the petition, and the statutes of this state, under the provisions of which said taxes were assessed, were illegal and void, because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this state are in violation of and repugnant to, the general provisions of the constitution of the United States; because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this state are in violation of and repugnant to, that part of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of the United States which provides that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states;' because said taxes were assessed in violation of, and said statutes of this state are in violation of and repugnant to, those parts of section 8 of art. 1 of the constitution of the United States which provide that 'the congress shall have power * * * to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,' and section 10 of said article 1, which provides that 'no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."

Henry Heywood, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 520-523 intentionally omitted] S. R. Bond, for defendant in error.

BRADLEY, J.

The case is now before us for consideration upon writ of error to the supreme court of New Hampshire, and the same points that were urged before that court are set up here as grounds of error.

The question for us to consider, therefore, is whether the products of a state (in this case timber cut in its forests) are liable to be taxed like other property within the state, though intended for exportation to another state, and partially prepared for that purpose by being deposited at a place of shipment, such products being owned by persons residing in another state.

We have no difficulty in disposing of the last condition of the question, namely, the fact (if it be a fact) that the property was owned by persons residing in another state; for, if not exempt from taxation for other reasons, it cannot be exempt by reason of being owned by non-residents of the state. We take it to be a point settled beyond all contradiction or question that a state has jurisdiction of all persons and things within its territory which to not belong to some other jurisdiction, such as the representatives of foreign governments, with their houses and effects, and property belonging to or in the use of the government of the United States. If the owner of personal property within a state resides in another state, which taxes him for that property as part of his general estate attached to his person, this action of the latter state does not in the least affect the right of the state in which the property is situated to tax it also. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities on a point so elementary. The fact, therefore, that the owners of the logs in question were taxed for their value in Maine as a part of their general stock in trade, if such fact were proved, could have no influence in the decision of the case, and may be laid out of view.

We recur, then, to a consideration of the question freed from this limitation. Are the products of a state, though intended for exportation to another state, and partially prepared for that purpose by being deposited at a place or port of shipment within the state, liable to be taxed like other property within the state? Does the owner's state of mind in relation to the goods,—that is, his intent to export them, and his partial preparation to do so,—exempt them from taxation? This is the precise question for solution.

This question does not present the predicament of goods in course of transportation through a state, though detained for a time within the state by low water or other causes of delay, as was the case of the logs cut in the state of Maine, the tax on which was abated by the supreme court of New Hampshire. Such goods are already in the course of commercial transportation, and are clearly under the protection of the constitution. And so, we think, would the goods in question be when actually started in the course of transportation to another state, or delivered to a carrier for such transportation. There must be a point of time when they cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law, and begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose, in which they commence their final movement for transportation from the state of their origin to that of their destination. When the products of the farm or the forest are collected, and brought in from the surrounding country to a town or...