Hall v. Holder

Decision Date08 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-8374,95-8374
Citation117 F.3d 1222
Parties11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 120 E.K. HALL, Sr., Rev.; David Walker; U.S. Donalson; Richard Harris; Willie Aates; Wilson C. Roberson, Rev.; NAACP Chapter of Cochran, Bleckley County, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jackie HOLDER; Robert Johnson; Charles Killebrew; Lonnie Barlow; Ben Jessup; C.C. Crooms; Willie Basby; Billy Ray Godfrey; T.C. Greer; William J. Lucas; Freddie White; Wayne Rogers; Wayne Tripp; Sonja Curtis; J. Larry Williams, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Christopher Coates, Washington, DC, Neil Bradley, Mary Wyckoff, Laughlin McDonald, Atlanta, GA, for appellants.

R. Napier Murphy, Melisa L. Bodnar, Murphy & Sibley, PC, Macon, GA, W. Lonnie Barlow, Cochran, GA, for Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, and KRAVITCH and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge:

Bleckley County, Georgia has had a single-commissioner government since its creation in 1912. In this case, we must decide whether such a system violates the equal protection rights of African-American citizens by diluting their ability to vote. We hold that the governmental structure was neither enacted nor maintained with a discriminatory purpose. Thus, we affirm the district court.

I.

This case has a long procedural history. Several black citizens filed suit in 1985, alleging that Bleckley County's single-commissioner government diluted their voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 Consequently, they sought a court order creating a multi-member commission, with the members elected from single-member districts.

The district court ruled that the existing voting scheme satisfied § 2, as interpreted in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). It also held that appellants did not state a constitutional claim, having "failed to provide any evidence that Bleckley County's single member county commission is the product of original or continued racial animus or discriminatory intent." Hall v. Holder, 757 F.Supp. 1560, 1571 (M.D.Ga.1991).

A panel of this court reversed. It concluded that the district court's factual determinations that Bleckley County voting was not racially polarized and that black citizens were not politically cohesive were clearly erroneous. Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1569-74 (11th Cir.1992). In light of these conclusions and other trial evidence, it held that the single-commissioner government violated § 2, and enjoined further elections for commissioner until the district court fashioned an appropriate remedy. Having decided the statutory issue, the panel bypassed the constitutional question. Id. at 1567 n. 6.

The Supreme Court reversed. A plurality of the Court reasoned that it was impossible to assess dilution in this case because there was no readily identifiable alternative government to which Bleckley County's system reasonably could be compared. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 878-82, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2585-86, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). In view of the wide range of government sizes in Georgia, the plurality held that "[t]here is no principled reason why one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for comparison." Id. at 881, 114 S.Ct. at 2586. The Court remanded to this court for resolution of the constitutional issue, and, in turn, we remanded to the district court to enable it to consider the potential effect on the equal protection issue of the Supreme Court's decision. The district court reaffirmed its prior order, stating that it saw no reason to "revisit" the equal protection issue, and appellants filed a timely appeal.

Subsequently, several registered Bleckley County voters moved to intervene in the suit, seeking dissolution of the prior injunction barring future elections and requesting that we order a special election. The movants assert that the injunction was issued to help remedy the § 2 violation, but that the Supreme Court's decision on the § 2 issue mooted the injunction. They further allege that the county has held no elections for commissioner since 1988; the 1992 election was stayed by this court and the 1996 election was not held apparently because the injunction had not been dissolved.

II.

Bleckley County was carved out of Pulaski County in 1912. The racial composition of the county is 22% African-American, 77% white, and 1% other. Since its creation, Bleckley County has been governed by a single commissioner, chosen every four years in an at-large county-wide election. Voting is racially polarized in Bleckley County. Although the district court found insufficient evidence of bloc voting, this court previously concluded that minority candidates' lack of success and, indeed, lack of candidacy, together with significant non-expert trial evidence that white Bleckley Countians would not vote for a black candidate, supported a finding of racial polarization. See 955 F.2d at 1571 ("The individual and collective experiences of these black leaders reveal that, as a practical political matter, blacks are unable to sponsor candidates for Bleckley County's sole commissioner office because such candidacies are futile."). 2

According to appellants, the foregoing facts--an overwhelming white majority that votes as a bloc and the single-member nature of the office--combine with the mechanics of the election process and Bleckley County's past discrimination against black citizens to compel the conclusion that the single-commissioner office was conceived and is retained with a racially invidious purpose. Noting that a constitutional cause of action required proof of an intent to discriminate, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the district court found no equal protection violation because there was no direct evidence of intent. 757 F.Supp. at 1569. 3

We conclude that the district court circumscribed its review of the trial evidence too narrowly. The kind of proof demanded by the district court is, obviously, the most useful in an equal protection challenge; however, it is rarely the case that those with intent to discriminate will announce their purpose. Consequently, the Supreme Court repeatedly has stressed that intentional discrimination can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the challenged governmental action, where the facts are sufficiently compelling. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) ("Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."); Davis at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 2048-49 ("an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another"). 4

Voting rights cases are amenable to a circumstantial proof approach. In Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982), the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' conclusions that Burke County, Georgia's system of electing its Board of Commissioners at large was maintained with a discriminatory purpose. Even absent direct evidence of intent to dilute minority votes, the Court found that the courts below properly considered the extensive circumstantial evidence of illegal purpose. It specifically endorsed the district court's consideration of the factors outlined in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976) (per curiam), but also noted that the district court rightly did not confine its analysis to those factors. Rather, the trial judge considered all relevant evidence of intent, consistent with the dictates of prior cases, particularly Arlington Heights. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 618-23, 102 S.Ct. at 3276-78.

Lodge 's endorsement of both Zimmer and Arlington Heights provides a list of factors which, although not exclusive, are instructive in any equal protection voting rights challenge. The Lodge Court viewed the following Zimmer factors as relevant to discriminatory intent: (1) minority access to any candidate selection ("slating") process; (2) the degree to which government officials are responsive to minority needs; (3) the justification for the electoral system; (4) past discrimination and its effect on present-day political participation; (5) the size of electoral districts; (6) the existence of a majority-vote requirement; (7) in elections for multi-member offices, whether single-shot voting is permitted; and (8) the existence of geographic subdistricts. Id. at 623-27, 102 S.Ct. at 3279-80. The Lodge Court also found that three other facts "bear heavily on the issue of purposeful discrimination," including: (9) the percentage of minority citizens and voters in the jurisdiction; (10) racial polarization in voting; and (11) the degree of minority electoral success. Id. at 623, 102 S.Ct. at 3278-79. Additionally, after Lodge, courts must heed Arlington Heights 's attention to legislative and administrative history when evaluating a challenged electoral system, and pay particular attention to the circumstances surrounding a particular decision and deviations from the normal decision-making process. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. 1491, 1502-03, 137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997) (noting applicability of Arlington Heights in voting dilution cases).

Because the district court did not make the requisite searching inquiry into the facts attending the adoption and maintenance of the single-commissioner system, we do not accord its...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Burton v. City of Belle Glade
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • June 25, 1999
    ...court] to find a discriminatory purpose behind every statute passed during regrettable periods of [a state's] past." Hall v. Holder, 117 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (11th Cir.1997). Nevertheless, Appellants point to three pieces of historical evidence. First, the City's housing ordinances mandated r......
  • Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • February 10, 2012
  • Green Party of Ga. v. Kemp
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • March 17, 2016
    ...political parties. The rights of the voters are significant and accordingly a remedy must be imposed immediately. Hall v. Holder, 117 F.3d 1222, 1231 n. 18 (11th Cir.1997) (“The right to vote is ... a right of paramount constitutional significance, the violation of which permits federal cou......
  • Ala. State Conference of N.A. for Advancement of Colored People v. Merrill
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • February 5, 2020
    ...not shown that African Americans were denied access to this process or that it was designed "to winnow out candidates." Hall v. Holder, 117 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs produced no evidence that African Americans are unable to compete in either party's nominating process or ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT