U.S. v. High

Decision Date21 July 1997
Docket Number94-8230,Nos. 94-8151,s. 94-8151
Citation117 F.3d 464
Parties11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 216 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George W. HIGH, Sr., Virginia C. High, Defendants-Appellants. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert L. WARD, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

William A. Morrison, Jones, Morrison & Womach, Atlanta, GA, for George W. High, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.

Michael Abbott, Atlanta, GA, for Virginia C. High, Defendant-Appellant.

Kent Alexander, U.S. Atty., Henry Allen Moye and Amy Levin Weil, Asst. U.S. Attys., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 94-8151.

Janice A. Singer, Atlanta, GA, for Robert L. Ward, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Henry Allen Moye, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 94-8230.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

In this multiple-object cocaine distribution and possession case, we affirm the appellants' convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy, but we reverse the appellants' convictions for conspiracy to launder drug proceeds, structure currency transactions and defraud the United States, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994).

Appellants George High, Virginia High and Robert Ward appeal their convictions and sentences on charges arising from a complex drug conspiracy. Among other things, the Highs contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on Count One of the indictment--conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy. All the appellants contend that the district court gave an erroneous jury instruction which requires reversal of their convictions on Count Thirteen of the indictment--a multiple-object conspiracy to launder drug proceeds, structure currency transactions

and defraud the United States. We affirm the Highs' convictions on Count One, and reverse the appellants' convictions on Count Thirteen. 1

BACKGROUND
A. District Court Proceedings

On December 10, 1992, a grand jury indicted George High, Virginia High and Robert Ward along with a number of other alleged coconspirators, charging that they were involved in a complex drug conspiracy. In a thirty-nine count indictment, Count One charged the Highs and others (not including Ward) with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Count Thirteen charged the Highs, Ward and others with engaging in a multiple-object conspiracy to launder drug proceeds, structure currency transactions and defraud the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 371.

On September 21, 1993, the Highs and Ward (and one other alleged coconspirator) proceeded to trial together. The jury returned guilty verdicts against the Highs on Count One and against the Highs and Ward on Count Thirteen. The jury also returned guilty verdicts against George High on weapons charges, against Virginia High on money laundering charges, and against both the Highs on substantive charges of structuring currency transactions. 2 The district court sentenced the Highs to ninety-seven month terms of incarceration, and Ward to a forty-one month term of incarceration. The Highs and Ward filed timely appeals challenging their convictions and/or sentences, although George High did not appeal his conviction on weapons charges.

B. The Drug Conspiracy

The drug conspiracy took place primarily in Atlanta, Georgia, during a period from at least 1987 until mid to late 1992. The conspiracy involved a large number of cocaine wholesalers who were connected in a vertically and horizontally integrated cocaine distribution network operating in the metropolitan Atlanta area. The conspiracy also involved the cocaine wholesalers' "legitimate" business associates who used their enterprises to help the cocaine wholesalers convert large drug cash flows into goods, services and other assets. According to the government, some of the cocaine wholesalers had a particularly extensive--and ultimately illegal--relationship with George and Virginia High, who owned and operated a commercial and residential real estate business, and Robert Ward, who brokered automobiles.

At trial, the government introduced evidence that at various levels of the distribution chain the cocaine wholesalers realized profits of between $1,000 and $10,000 in cash on the sale of each kilogram of cocaine. According to trial witnesses, the cocaine wholesalers then sought out "legitimate" business associates to help convert this cash into other, more useful types of assets, such as real At trial, the government introduced voluminous evidence of the illicit relationship between the Highs and the cocaine wholesalers. In particular, the government presented evidence that George High, High Realty's "broker," and Virginia High, a High Realty sales associate, purchased several properties for the cocaine wholesalers and structured the purchase transactions in manners that concealed the source of the money used to buy the property, and circumvented the currency transaction reporting requirements contained in 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). On one occasion in 1989, for instance, George High helped cocaine wholesaler Sims Jinks purchase a residence in DeKalb County, Georgia. Jinks supplied George High with $35,000 in cash that George High converted into five separate cashier's checks to make the down payment on the residence. Jinks and George High made the remaining $45,000 in payments on the residence directly to the seller in cash at the High Realty office.

estate and automobiles. George and Virginia High, owners and operators of High Realty, allegedly served as two such business associates for the cocaine wholesalers.

A year later, Virginia High helped Jinks purchase another residence. As before, Jinks provided $35,000 in cash for the down payment, and Virginia High obtained five cashier's checks to make the down payment to the seller. Jinks paid the remaining $200,000 owed on the balance of the mortgage in cash over a fourteen-month period of time. Although Jinks owned the residence, it was purchased in Virginia High's name. When the government arrested Jinks and notified Virginia High that it intended to seize the residence, Jinks and the Highs executed deeds transferring title of the residence to Jinks. This allowed Jinks to mortgage the property and obtain a large line of credit, depriving the government of much of the residence's seizure value.

The government presented evidence showing that the Highs received and dealt with hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash derived from the unlawful activities of several cocaine wholesalers. In addition to helping the cocaine wholesalers make purchases, the Highs also managed some of the cocaine wholesalers' properties and maintained the landscape of those properties.

The government also introduced evidence that Ward operated as an automobile broker for one of the cocaine wholesalers. On one occasion in 1989, for instance, Ward purchased a $32,000 Cadillac automobile for the mother of one cocaine wholesaler. Ward received cash for the automobile from the cocaine wholesaler and then converted the cash into cashier's checks--all in amounts less than $10,000. Ward purchased the automobile in his own name, and then later transferred title to the cocaine wholesaler's mother. At trial, the cocaine wholesaler testified that he paid Ward $1,000 as a commission for purchasing the automobile. Ward also purchased a number of other high-priced automobiles at the direction of the cocaine wholesalers, often keeping the automobiles titled in his own name even though they actually belonged to various cocaine wholesalers.

ISSUES

We discuss two issues: (1) whether sufficient evidence supports the Highs' convictions on Count One for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy, and (2) whether the district court's erroneous instruction on the elements of the structuring offense in the multiple-object conspiracy of Count Thirteen warrants a reversal of the appellants' convictions on that count.

DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Count One Charge

Whether sufficient evidence supports the Highs' convictions on Count One is a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 983, 136 L.Ed.2d 865 (1997). In so doing, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury's verdict. We will uphold the jury's verdict if a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the evidence establishes the Highs' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir.1995). To sustain a conspiracy conviction, we must conclude that a reasonable factfinder could determine that (1) an agreement existed among two or more persons; (2) that the defendant knew of the general purpose of the agreement; and (3) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the agreement. United States v. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir.1995). Because a conspiracy is generally secretive, a reasonable factfinder may infer its existence from the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223, 108 S.Ct. 2883, 101 L.Ed.2d 917, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861, 109 S.Ct. 158, 102 L.Ed.2d 129 (1988). When, as here, a conspiracy conviction may be...

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