117 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1938), 35804, Ryan v. City of Warrensburg

Docket Nº35804
Citation117 S.W.2d 303, 342 Mo. 761
Opinion JudgeHYDE
Party NameJohn I. Ryan, Appellant, v. City of Warrensburg, a Municipal Corporation, J. R. Rothwell, J. R. Garrison, Francis Berkey, L. B. Johnson, Harry W. Davis, J. S. Kenney, Jack Werling, Joe Chambers, Harry Iseminger
AttorneyRichard C. Southall for appellant. J. R. Garrison, G. A. Stultz and J. R. Rothwell for respondents.
Judge PanelHyde, C. Ferguson, C., absent; Bradley, C., concurs.
Case DateMay 26, 1938
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri

Page 303

117 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1938)

342 Mo. 761

John I. Ryan, Appellant,

v.

City of Warrensburg, a Municipal Corporation, J. R. Rothwell, J. R. Garrison, Francis Berkey, L. B. Johnson, Harry W. Davis, J. S. Kenney, Jack Werling, Joe Chambers, Harry Iseminger

No. 35804

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 26, 1938

Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court; Hon. Leslie A. Bruce, Judge;

Affirmed.

Richard C. Southall for appellant.

(1) Appellant, under the facts in suit, is entitled to equitable relief. Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997; Clarkson v. Laiblan, 178 Mo.App. 708, 161 S.W. 663; Cape Girardeau v. Smith, 61 S.W.2d 231; State ex rel. v. Hall, 297 Mo. 594, 250 S.W. 65; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S.W. 565; Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo. 154, 238 S.W. 443; Boland v. Ross, 120 Mo. 208, 25 S.W. 524; Phelps v. Scott, 30 S.W.2d 75; McDaniel v. Lee, 37 Mo. 204; Waddle v. Frazier, 245 Mo. 391, 151 S.W. 87; Real Estate Co. v. Collonious, 63 Mo. 290; Woolum v. Tarpley, 196 S.W. 1127; State ex rel. v. Mulloy, 62 S.W.2d 731; Park Trans. Co. v. Highway Comm., 60 S.W.2d 389; Dennig v. Graham, 59 S.W.2d 702; Sec. 800, R. S. 1929; James v. Bailey, 30 S.W.2d 126. (2) Respondents are estopped in equity to deny appellant the right to do that for which respondent city issued him a license. Union Depot Co. v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. 393; Peterson v. Kansas City, 23 S.W.2d 1048; Montevallo v. School District, 268 Mo. 217, 186 S.W. 1078; Hannibal & St. J. Ry. v. Marion County, 36 Mo. 294; City of Mountain View v. Tel. Exchange, 294 Mo. 623, 243 S.W. 153. (3) The actions of respondents constitute actionable libel. Sec. 4366, R. S. 1929; Seested v. Post Pub. Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1052; Cook v. Globe Ptg. Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332; Sternes v. St. J. H. & P. Co., 22 S.W.2d 73; affirmed 331 Mo. 44; Brown v. Publishers, 213 Mo. 655, 112 S.W. 474; Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139; Cook v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480; Carpenter v. Hamilton, 185 Mo. 603, 84 S.W. 863. (4) Actions of respondents and the ordinance under which they claim authority, as applied to appellant, are not authorized by law. Secs. 7259, 7260, 7261, R. S. 1929; State ex rel v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 256 S.W. 475; St. Louis v. Transfer Co., 256 Mo. 476; Rhodes v. Moll Groc. Co., 95 S.W.2d 837; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 634; Moler v. Whisman, 243 Mo. 571, 147 S.W. 986; Black's Dictionary (2 Ed.), p. 836. (5) Actions of respondents are not authorized by the inherent police power. 12 C. J., sec. 412, pp. 904, 921; State ex rel. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 256 S.W. 475; Gunning v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 200, 137 S.W. 961; St. Louis v. Dreisoner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 999; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 634; Nigro v. Kansas City, 27 S.W.2d 1030; State ex rel. v. Schwartz, 82 S.W.2d 63. (6) The actions of respondents violate appellant's rights guaranteed to him by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Missouri 14th Amend., Sec. 1, U.S. Const., Art. II, Secs. 21, 30, Mo. Const.; Ives v. Bailey, 319 Mo. 474, 5 S.W.2d 50; Ex parte Davidson, 321 Mo. 370, 13 S.W.2d 40; Davidson v. Lill, 35 S.W.2d 944; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 634; Union Cemetery Assn. v. Kansas City, 252 Mo. 466, 161 S.W. 261; Kays v. Versailles, 22 S.W.2d 184; St. Joseph v. Georgetown Lodge, 11 S.W.2d 1082; St. Louis v. Atlantic Quarry, 244 Mo. 479, 148 S.W. 948; 43 C. J., 252; State ex rel. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. 721; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861. (7) The ordinance in suit, as applied to appellant, is unreasonable. In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404; Stegmann v. Weeke, 279 Mo. 131, 214 S.W. 137; Davidson v. Lill, 35 S.W.2d 944; City of Salem ex rel. v. Young, 142 Mo.App. 160, 125 S.W. 857; City of Monett v. Campbell, 204 S.W. 32; City of Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo.App. 365; City of Carthage v. Block, 139 Mo.App. 386, 123 S.W. 483; St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 256 S.W. 489; State ex rel. v. Davis, 302 Mo. 307, 259 S.W. 80.

J. R. Garrison, G. A. Stultz and J. R. Rothwell for respondents.

By Section 7259, of the Enabling Act of 1925, the Legislature empowered cities, towns, and villages to regulate and restrict the use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes. Sec. 7259, R. S. 1929. The city council of the respondent, city, had power and authority to divide the city into districts of such number, shape, and area as it deemed best suited, in enacting the ordinance complained of, and in each district regulate and restrict the use of buildings, structures, or land for trade, industry, residence, and other puposes. Sec. 7265, R. S. 1929. Complying with the Enabling Act, the city council of respondent, city, enacted Chapter XIII, the revised zoning ordinance complained of. The wisdom, or expediency of enacting Chapter XIII, establishing business and manufacturing districts, and a comprehensive residence district, and in Section 431, of the ordinance, excluding from the residence district so established, any kind or character of business or manufacturing, except rooming and boarding houses, was for the city council to determine in the exercise of its legislative judgment. State ex rel. Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 388; Fourcade v. City and County of San Francisco, 288 P. 934. In enacting Chapter XIII, it was not necessary to recite the fact that the ordinance was referable to the police power. State v. Cantrell, 179 Mo. 245; Little River Drain. Dist. v. Railroad Co., 236 Mo. 94; 43 C. J. 562; Young v. St. Louis, 43 Mo. 492; Kiley v. Forsee, 57 Mo. 390. It is contended by appellant that the operation of his barber shop at 206 South Washington Street, in the zoned residence district, will not cause any of the things the Enabling Act and the ordinance were designed to prevent, but if appellant is allowed and permitted to maintain and operate his business of barbering in his residence, other business more or less objectionable will follow, and the benefit of the ordinance to the public will be destroyed. State ex rel. Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63. Appellant held his property subject at all times to the valid exercise of the police power of the city, and the fact that he procured a merchant's license after his arrest, gave him no additional vested right. State ex rel. Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 145 N.E. 265. The ordinance in question rests upon a rational basis of classification and applies alike to all persons residing in the zoned residential district of the city, and because in enforcing the ordinance, appellant may suffer hardship, does not render the ordinance void as to him. The private interest is always subordinate to the public good. The ordinance complamed of does not deprive appellant of any property, or property right, nor does it deny him the equal protection of the law. It merely restricts appellant, like all others in the zoned residence district, to the use of his property for residence purposes. State ex rel. Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179; Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 640; State ex rel. v. Harper, 182 Wis. 153; Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 478.

Hyde, C. Ferguson, C., absent; Bradley, C., concurs.

OPINION

HYDE

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[342 Mo. 765]...

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