Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Gray

• Decision Date: 27 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 56, Sept. Term, 2013,No. 18, 26, Sept. Term, 2014,56, Sept. Term, 2013,18, 26, Sept. Term, 2014
• Citation: 444 Md. 227,118 A.3d 995
• Parties: ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. Melissa Donnelle GRAY.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

444 Md. 227

118 A.3d 995

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

v.Melissa Donnelle GRAY.

No. 56, Sept. Term, 2013

No. 18, 26, Sept. Term, 2014

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 27, 2015.

JaCina N. Stanton, Assistant Bar Counsel (Glenn M. Grossman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.

No argument on behalf of Respondent.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J.,^* HARRELL, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, and IRMA RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion

GREENE, J.

Bar Counsel asks this Court to review the misconduct of an attorney with a rather lengthy history with the attorney disciplinary process. Indeed, this case represents the fourth opportunity for us to consider an appropriate sanction for Melissa D. Gray (“Respondent” or “Gray”), who is currently indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. See Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Gray, 421 Md. 92, 25 A.3d 219 (2011) (“Gray I ”) (entering reprimand by consent for violations of Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC” or “Rule”) 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b) ); Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Gray, 433 Md. 516, 72 A.3d 174 (2013) (“Gray II ”) (ordering sixty day suspension for violations of MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(e), and 8.1(b)); Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Gray, 436 Md. 513, 83 A.3d 786 (2014) ( “Gray III ”) (imposing sanction of indefinite suspension from the practice of law for violations of MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.2, and 8.1(b)).

In the instant case, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16–751(a), directed Bar Counsel to file three Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Gray on October 23, 2013, June 2, 2014, and July 10, 2014, respectively. These petitions arise out of Respondent's representation of four individuals in separate divorce matters: Pazura v. Pazura; Lafalaise v. Pierre; Garner v. Garner; and Antonelli v. Antonelli. On Petitioner's motion, these complaints were consolidated by this Court on September 9, 2014.

Petitioner charged Respondent with numerous MLRPC violations, specifically Rules 1.1 (Competence),¹ 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer),² 1.3 (Diligence),³ 1.4 (Communication),⁴ Rule 1.5 (Fees),⁵ Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property),⁶ 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation),⁷ Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters),⁸ and Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).⁹ Respondent was also charged with violations of Maryland Rules 16–604 (Trust account—Required deposits),¹⁰ 16–606.1 (Attorney trust account record-keeping),¹¹ and 16–609 (Prohibited transactions).¹² Lastly, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating Section 10–306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (“BOP”) of the Maryland Code (Misuse of trust money).¹³

We referred the instant matters to Judge Susan Souder of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for an evidentiary hearing and to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Md. Rule 16–757. Respondent failed to respond to any of the above-mentioned petitions. Following Respondent's failure to respond, an Order of Default was entered by the hearing judge on September 22, 2014. After conducting a hearing, which Respondent failed to appear for, on November 3 and 5, 2015 Judge Souder issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which she found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated, collectively, MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a), Maryland Rules 16–604, 16–606.1, and 16–609, and BOP § 10–306.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Concluding that Respondent had violated (1) MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) in the Pazura matter; (2) MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) in the Lafalaise matter; and (3) MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a), Maryland Rules 16–604, 16–606.1, and 16–609, and BOP § 10–306 in both the Garner and Antonelli matters, Judge Souder issued the following:

PAZURA V. PAZURA: FINDINGS OF FACT

* * *

Respondent became a member of the Maryland Bar on June 14, 1988. On August 15, 2013, the Court of Appeals suspended Respondent from the practice of law in Maryland for a period of sixty days, effective September 15, 2013. On January 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended Respondent from the practice of law in Maryland, effective thirty days from the date of its opinion. Respondent therefore remains indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.

Respondent represented Miranda Pazura in connection with her divorce case, Pazura v. Pazura in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. After Ms. Pazura retained Respondent in October 2008, Respondent advised her to withdraw $83,700 from a home equity line of credit. Respondent did not explain to Ms. Pazura what the potential ramifications of this act could be.

After Ms. Pazura withdrew this money on Respondent's advice, the Circuit Court entered a temporary restraining order, preventing Ms. Pazura from using the funds. Respondent consented to an order requiring the funds to be held in her escrow account. As a consequence of this order, the $83,700 was not available to Ms. Pazura to pay for her living expenses.

Although Ms. Pazura promptly tendered a check for $83,700 to Respondent, Respondent did not deposit this check in her escrow account until several months later.

In addition, Respondent failed to file timely responses to discovery requests, resulting in the imposition of sanctions against Ms. Pazura. Respondent also failed to file discovery requests on behalf of Ms. Pazura until long after the discovery deadline in the case had elapsed. Respondent therefore failed to obtain information regarding Ms. Pazura's husband's financial status.

Respondent also failed to return Ms. Pazura's telephone calls seeking the status of her case. Respondent did not keep Ms. Pazura informed of the status of the case and did not provide Ms. Pazura with copies of pleadings, correspondence, and court orders.

Respondent also failed to prepare for trial. She did not obtain expert witnesses, including a vocational rehabilitation expert or a forensic accountant, to testify at trial.

Finally, while Respondent received letters from the Office of Bar Counsel requesting that she respond to Ms. Pazura's complaint, Respondent failed to submit a substantive written response to these inquiries of Bar Counsel.

PAZURA V. PAZURA: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner alleges that Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”): 1.1 (“Competence”), 1.3 (“Diligence”), 1.4 (“Communication”), 1.15 (“Safekeeping Property”), 8.1(b) ( “Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters”), and 8.4 (“Misconduct”).

The court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated each of these Rules except MLRPC 1.15.

With respect to MLRPC 1.1 and 1.3, Respondent's failure to pursue Ms. Pazura's case demonstrated a lack of both competence and diligence. The same lack of thoroughness and preparedness that demonstrates Respondent's violation of MLRPC 1.1 also demonstrates her lack of the diligence required of her by MLRPC 1.3.

Respondent failed to communicate adequately with Ms. Pazura as is required by MLRPC 1.4. Respondent failed to return Ms. Pazura's telephone calls, did not keep Ms. Pazura informed of the status of her case, and did not provide Ms. Pazura with copies of pleadings, correspondence, or court orders. Accordingly, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) and 1.4(b).

Furthermore, by failing to respond to inquiries from Bar Counsel, Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(b).

Because Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b), she also violated MLRPC 8.4(a).

However, this court does not find that there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15. While Respondent failed promptly to deposit the check she received from Ms. Pazura in her escrow account, this failure does not constitute a failure to keep client property separate from the lawyer's property. Petitioner presented no evidence that Respondent ever commingled any funds from Ms. Pazura's check with Respondent's own funds. Petitioner also presented no evidence that Respondent placed Ms. Pazura's funds in an account other than an escrow account. Rather, Petitioner's sole allegation with respect to a violation of this Rule is that Petitioner did not promptly deposit the check she received from Ms. Pazura. While promptly depositing such a check in an escrow account certainly constitutes good practice, nothing in MLRPC 1.15 mandates the prompt deposit of such funds. Therefore, the Court does not find that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15 in the matter of Pazura v. Pazura.

LAFALAISE V. PIERRE: FINDINGS OF FACT

* * *

Respondent represented Pensione Lafalaise in a divorce case in which Mr. Lafalaise had previously been represented by other counsel. A judgment of divorce had already been entered in the case, but issues regarding marital property had not yet been resolved by the court.

Respondent entered her appearance on behalf of Mr. Lafalaise on July 28, 2011. On April 25, 2012, the court listened—in open court—to the outlining of a consent agreement disposing of issues relating to marital property. This agreement required the parties to prepare appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (“QDROs”) to effectuate the division of the parties' retirement benefits. In addition, the agreement required Mr. Lafalaise's ex-wife to convey certain real property to Mr. Lafalaise.

On May 30, 2012, Respondent wrote to the court, requesting that a written order be entered to formalize the consent agreement placed on the record in the previous month. The court entered a written order on that same date.

Following this date, Respondent failed to take any additional steps towards obtaining the real property which was to be conveyed to Mr. Lafalaise or towards insuring the execution of the required QDROs.

Furthermore, throughout the course of her representation of

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