Cabral v. Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc.

Citation118 F.3d 1363
Decision Date08 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-16476,95-16476
Parties, 1998 A.M.C. 275, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5378, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8726 Robert CABRAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEALY TIBBITS BUILDERS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Christopher P. McKenzie, Honolulu, HI, for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael Formby, Alcantara & Frame, Honolulu, HI, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii; Samuel P. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-00126-SPK.

Before: FLETCHER, WIGGINS, T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:

Robert Cabral was injured while he was working as a crane operator aboard a crane barge on a construction project in Pearl Harbor. He sued his employer under the Jones Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of his employer on the ground that Cabral was not a "seaman" under the Jones Act. Cabral appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court's judgment for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

From July 14, 1993 to May 31, 1994, Cabral was employed by Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc. ("Healy"). Cabral worked on a variety of land-based and sea-based projects during this period. From June 1, 1994 to August 14, 1994, Cabral did not work for Healy. On August 15, 1994, Healy hired Cabral to work as the crane operator for a Healy construction project at the Ford Island Ferry in Pearl Harbor. The project involved removing and replacing "mooring dolphins" at the ferry. A mooring dolphin is a timber pile driven into the bottom of the harbor that cushions the ferry during landing.

Cabral was assigned to operate the crane aboard Barge 538. Between August 15, 1994 and the date of the accident, Cabral spent approximately ninety percent of his work time aboard Barge 538 operating the vessel's crane. Barge 538 is approximately 160 feet long and 50 feet wide. It has a raked bow and stern, drawing about five feet of water at the stern and four at the bow. Although the barge is not self-propelled, it can be moved up to 500 feet by manipulating its anchor lines. The United States Coast Guard inspects Barge 538 annually to ensure seaworthiness and compliance with safety standards. The barge has been used on various construction projects throughout the Honolulu area and as far away as the Philippines. Although Barge 538 can serve other purposes, it is primarily a crane barge. To serve that primary purpose, it has a 360-degree, 125 foot crane permanently welded to its deck.

On the weekend of September 24 and 25, 1994, Barge 538 was temporarily relocated to another part of the harbor to take soil samples. This soil sampling project did not require the use of the barge's crane, so Cabral was not aboard. The barge was returned to the Ford Island project on the afternoon of the 25th. When Cabral reported for work on the morning of Monday, September 26, 1994, he slipped and fell on the barge's gangway, suffering an injury to his lower back. He brought this action under the Jones Act against Healy.

The district court granted summary judgment in Healy's favor, holding that Cabral was not entitled to "seaman" status because his connection with Barge 538 "was at best transitory." Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in favor of Healy on Cabral's complaint.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Healy. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171, 116 S.Ct. 1261, 134 L.Ed.2d 209 (1996). We must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Cabral, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Id. Whether Cabral was a seaman when he slipped and fell on Barge 538's gangway is a mixed question of law and fact. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Graham, 86 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, summary judgment is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion regarding Cabral's seaman status. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S 337, 356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 818, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991).

The Jones Act provides a cause of action to any "seaman" who suffers personal injuries in the course of his employment. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688. Unfortunately, what seems a fairly simple inquiry-whether a particular employee is a "seaman" for purposes of the Jones Act-has been anything but for the various federal courts which have grappled with the issue, including our own. With the Supreme Court's recent decision in Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997), the Jones Act "seaman" inquiry has reached our nation's highest court three times already this decade, a remarkable record for any area of the law.

We begin our attempt to navigate the perils of the "seaman" inquiry with the second of these cases, Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) ("Latsis "). There, the Supreme Court formulated a two-part test for determining whether an employee should be treated as a "seaman" under the Jones Act:

[T]he essential requirements for seaman status are twofold. First, as we emphasized in Wilander, "an employee's duties must 'contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.' " ... Second, ... a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.

Latsis, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (quoting Wilander, 498 U.S. at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817-18) (emphases added). The Court explained that the latter requirement was designed to separate sea-based maritime workers from land-based employees "who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea." Id.

Healy does not dispute that Cabral meets the first part of this test; Cabral's duties as a crane operator unquestionably contribute to Barge 538's function as a crane barge. We turn, then, to the second part of the Latsis test, and consider whether Cabral had a connection that was substantial in terms of duration and nature to a vessel in navigation.

Assuming that Barge 538 was a vessel in navigation, the district court concluded that Cabral's connection with Barge 538 was not substantial in terms of duration and nature. The district court emphasized that Cabral's assignment to Barge 538 was temporary, noting that the barge was simply a platform upon which he happened to be performing his work as a crane operator. As a result, the district court granted summary judgment in Healy's favor.

In Papai, the Supreme Court had to decide whether summary judgment should be granted against a Jones Act plaintiff who had been hired to perform a one-day painting job aboard the defendant's tugboat. John Papai was hired out of a union hiring hall by the owner of the Point Barrow to do a one-day painting job on the tug's housing structure. While he was painting, he injured his knee when he fell from a ladder. Papai had worked for the Point Barrow 's owner on twelve previous occasions in the two-and-a-half months before his injury. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the...

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