Commonwealth v. Costley
| Decision Date | 21 June 1875 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. James H. Costley. James H. Costley v. Commonwealth |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
February 16, 1875 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]
Norfolk. James H. Costley was indicted for murder, in one count, as follows:
Trial before Wells and Devens, JJ., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:
Before the jury were empaneled, the defendant moved to quash the indictment, "because there is no allegation that the pistol named therein as the weapon with which the homicide was committed was had or held by the defendant at the time of the commission of the offence in his, the defendant's, hand or hands." This motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted.
At the trial, there was evidence tending to show that the dead body of Julia Hawks was found on May 24, 1874, at the bottom of Fore River, so called, near the bridge crossing the same, in East Braintree, about one hundred rods from Weymouth Landing. The body was in the channel of the river, about four feet down stream from the draw of the bridge, and about six feet from the abutment of the draw towards the centre of the stream. The head was wrapped in a carriage robe, folded double, and tied tightly with a rope about her neck, and a tailor's goose, weighing twenty-four pounds, and inclosed in a gunny bag, was attached with another rope to her neck. The carriage robe was not perforated.
There was also evidence tending to show that on or about May 8, 1874, the defendant brought from Hanover to Boston a valise, which the government contended contained this carriage robe, goose, rope and gunny bag, and that on May 9 the defendant left the valise and contents at Riedell's stable, in Van Rensselaer Place, in Boston; that it remained there until May 13, and that while it was there it was observed and lifted by various persons in the stable. There was no other evidence of the contents of the valise than the weight of it, which was claimed to be unusual.
On the examination of Riedell and others connected with his stable, a valise was exhibited to the jury, and the witnesses asked as to the identity and weight of the valise in court as compared with the one left at the stable, and they testified that they resembled each other in appearance and weight.
On the fourth day of the trial, a constable of the Commonwealth was called by the government, and was permitted to testify, against the objection of the defendant, that he had been present during all the trial, and had had sole charge of a valise which he exhibited, and that it was one and the only one which had been used in evidence. He was then asked what were the contents of the valise, if he knew, when the previous witnesses testified.
The defendant's counsel, disclaiming any imputation of wrong intention on the part of the constable or the attorneys for the Commonwealth, objected that this was a device in the nature of a trick, unprecedented and irregular; that the contents of the valise were not known to either of those witnesses; that it was a device to give credibility to their judgment, and their judgment might have been much affected by a knowledge of what was in the valise; that there was much better evidence of what the contents were at the time by exhibiting them when each of the witnesses was on the stand; that the government was now resorting to a narrative of something that was not done in the presence of those witnesses, not with their knowledge, nor with the knowledge or consent of the defendant's counsel, who, if they had known what was going on, might have looked at the condition of things, and have cross-examined each witness in relation to the matter.
The court said that the proceeding did not appear to be of a character to be designated as a trick; and that it would have been competent, of course, to have opened the valise at the time, and shown what was in it; but it was not incompetent to show what was in it by this witness, who had the valise, and put the various contents in it, and knew what was there; and ruled that it was competent for this evidence to be put in at this point. The defendant excepted to this ruling.
The constable then, at the request of the district attorney, testified what articles were in the valise at the time, and proceeded to put them in; and was permitted, in order to repel everything which tended to show that there had been a trick, and, against the objection of the defendant's counsel, to testify that he did not communicate the contents of the valise to either of the other witnesses before he went upon the stand, and that within his knowledge neither of them was aware of the contents of the valise; that the contents were put into the valise, before they testified, by himself and by his own direction; and that it did not at the time contain any other articles except those which he had pointed out.
The same witness was also, under the objection of the defendant, allowed to testify that on one occasion, and one only, he had travelled by carriage road from the stable in Van Rensselaer Place, Boston, by the way of Neponset Bridge, to Quincy, and from Quincy to Weymouth Landing, by the road passing over the bridge where the body was found; that the road from the stable to Neponset was very thickly settled; that from Neponset to the bridge a portion of the country was very open, and the houses in some places half or three quarters of a mile apart; that between Quincy and the bridge there were a good many woods on the road; and that he had been over and examined the whole country within a radius of four or five miles of the bridge. The defendant excepted.
Several other witnesses, against the objection of the defendant, were permitted to state and describe the different roads from the stable to the different points on the Neponset River, and from the river to the bridge in question, and that in some places the country was thickly settled, and in others sparsely settled and with woods; and to this the defendant excepted.
There was evidence on the part of the government tending to show, that at about half past six on the evening of May 13, the defendant hired a horse and buggy at Riedell's stable above referred to, saying that he was going to Weymouth Landing; that he drove away from there between that time and seven o'clock, alone, taking with him a valise as above stated, and two other parcels; that he returned at about one o'clock in the morning of May 14, alone; that it was about five miles from the stable, by the nearest route, to the line of Norfolk County at the Neponset River, and about six miles further to Weymouth Landing; that the deceased was last seen alive in Boston, on Washington Street, near Chester Square, not in company with the defendant, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, and then said that she was going to Weymouth Landing, to be gone two months; and there was no evidence tending to show by which of the several routes from the stable to the Neponset River, or from Neponset River to Weymouth Landing, the defendant went, if he went at all, to Weymouth Landing.
It also appeared in evidence, that from the place where the body was found to the line of Plymouth County the distance varied, according to the road taken, from two and a half to three and a half miles, and that by the road leading from there to Hanover, in Plymouth County, where both the defendant and the deceased had lived up to about May 1, and the defendant also, except when temporarily absent, up to May 26, the time of his arrest, the distance to the Plymouth County line was about three miles.
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