Wiggin v. Heywood
| Decision Date | 22 October 1875 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | David Wiggin & another v. C. H. Heywood & others |
Hampden. Bill In Equity, filed January 4, 1875, against C. H Heywood, Francis Cogin, Robert B. Johnson and Jones S. Davis alleging the following facts:
On January 28, 1871, Jones S. Davis, being the owner of certain real estate in Holyoke and Chicopee, mortgaged it to the defendant Heywood to secure payment of $ 7500 on demand, with interest at seven per cent. On January 13, 1873, all the right, title and interest of Davis in said real estate was attached upon a writ against him in favor of the defendant Cogin, in an action of contract upon a promissory note for $ 1000, signed by said Davis and payable to Cogin on demand. The writ was duly entered in court, and the action was pending at the filing of this bill. On January 15, 1873, the plaintiffs caused all the right, title and interest of Davis in said real estate to be attached upon a writ in their favor, which was duly entered in court, and upon which a judgment for $ 1387.46 damages and $ 46.26 costs, was rendered December 5, 1874, in their favor, and execution issued December 10, 1874.
On April 7, 1874, the defendant Heywood, for breach of condition and in pursuance of a power of sale in the mortgage, sold the mortgaged premises for $ 10,400, of which amount, after retaining all sums secured by the mortgage, together with interest and all costs and expenses, a surplus of $ 4000, or thereabouts, remained in his hands. Demand was made by the plaintiffs upon Heywood for satisfaction of the execution in their favor out of the surplus remaining in his hands, except so much as might be needed to satisfy such judgment as Cogin might recover. This demand was refused, Heywood alleging that the money belonged to and was claimed by the defendant Johnson, to whom Davis made a mortgage of said land on April 7, 1873, to secure payment of $ 5500 on demand, which sum was unpaid. The prayer of the bill was for payment of said money to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of their judgment and execution, and for general relief.
The defendants demurred to the bill for want of equity. The case was heard and reserved by Colt, J., on the bill and demurrer for the consideration of the full court.
Demurrer overruled.
W. S. B. Hopkins, for the defendants. The plaintiffs acquired no higher or greater rights in the property than Davis had when the attachment took place. Drake on Attachment, § 223.
At the time of the attachment, the land was subject to a mortgage, which constituted a paramount incumbrance thereon. This incumbrance included an irrevocable power to sell the whole estate and turn it into money. Gardner v. Barnes, 106 Mass. 505. At the time of the levy, all the interest of the mortgagor or assignee of the equity had been converted into money under the provisions of that paramount incumbrance, and could no longer be considered as real estate. As the attachment had imposed a lien for thirty days after judgment on real estate only, that lien cannot be enforced on money. To hold money, a new attachment is required. The officer's return holds land only as subject to seizure for thirty days. A creditor's remedy at law in such a case is limited to attachment by trustee process or otherwise, before the money is paid over. If he has his judgment, he can commence a new suit on this; or, if not, he can abandon his old suit and commence anew. He has, however, an equitable remedy analogous to the statutory provisions fixing the relations of an attaching creditor to personal property which is subject to mortgage, namely, he may bring his bill to redeem, and, by paying off and taking an assignment of the paramount incumbrances, protect and utilize his lien.
The decisive objection to the maintenance of this bill, however is that the case presents a conversion, and the money cannot be treated as real estate. Even if the case were capable of being brought within the doctrine of equitable conversion, that would not avail the plaintiffs, because there is a conversion in the lifetime of the owner of the equity. It passes at once to the personal representatives of the owner of the equity, and the widow is defeated of her dower in it. Leigh & Dalzell on Conversion, 87. Varnum v. Meserve, 8 Allen...
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