Boggetta v. Burroughs Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 December 1962
• Docket Number: No. 3,3
• Parties: Velma BOGGETTA (Widow), Martin Boggetta (Deceased), Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BURROUGHS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 980

118 N.W.2d 980

368 Mich. 600

Velma BOGGETTA (Widow), Martin Boggetta (Deceased), Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BURROUGHS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 31, 1962.

LeVasseur, Werner & Mitseff, Detroit, for appellant.

Rothe, Marston, Mazey, Sachs & O'Connell, Detroit, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

BLACK, Justice (for dismissal of appeal).

I adopt the ensuing statement of facts from a memorandum submitted by Justice Kavanagh to other members of the Court under date of December 20, 1961. The memorandum was prepared for consideration by the Court of defendant's then pending application for leave to appeal. It concluded with recommendation that the application be denied. The writer agreed then and agrees now with such recommendation. ¹ The adopted facts:

'Martin Bogetta began work at 4:00 p. m., on August 20, 1960, at defendant's Plymouth plant. At approximately 6:00 p. m., he collapsed. He was taken to a hospital and was pronounced 'dead on arrival.'

'On December 5, 1960, a petition for dependency benefits was filed by the widow. On May 24, 1961, the widow filed a petition for interrogatories requesting that, pursuant to Rule 7 of the rules of practice of the workmen's compensation department and the statutes of the State of Michigan, the defendant Burroughs Corporation be ordered to supply complete and correct answers to the following questions:

'1. Type of work performed by Mr. Bogetta.

'2. Type of work being done in August, 1960.

'3. Names, addresses and phone numbers of co-workers of Mr. Bogetta during August, 1960.

'4. Names and addresses of Mr. Bogetta's supervisors.

'5. Temperature and variance therein under which Mr. Bogetta was working in August of 1960.'

The appeal board, reversing the hearing referee's denial of plaintiff's 'petition for interrogatories,' held as follows:

'The defendant should furnish the information requested. Nothing is asked which could conceivably prejudice the defendant. Nothing is asked which, if answered, would even tend to establish a case for or against either the plaintiff or defendant. All that is asked is for information which would enable the plaintiff widow to inquire into the facts which might or might not establish her rights to compensation. Without a chance to inquire she has nothing even though something may be there. The information necessary to a proper inquiry is peculiarly and possibly exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant. If plaintiff is not given such information she will not have had a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

'The defendant says that Rule No. 7 of the workmen's compensation department's rules of practice does not provide for such interrogatories and that the plaintiff's petition, therefore, cannot be granted. Rule 7 reads:----

"At the hearing in any case, the hearing referee may call witnesses and order the production of books, records, including hospital records, accounts and papers which he deems necessary for the purpose of making an award.'

'Rule 7 provides that the referee may do certain things but it does not say that he cannot do anything else. Rule 7 was not intended as, and does not purport to be, an exclusive list of prerogatives of a hearing referee in a workmen's compensation proceedings.

'Section 8, Part III of the workmen's compensation law provides that a referee assigned to any hearing 'shall make such inquiries and investigations as it (he) shall deem necessary.' This is broad general language consistent with the intent and purpose of the law and placing ultimate responsibility in the hearing officer to make such inquiries and investigations as may be necessary to determine whether or not an injured worker is entitled to benefits under the law. We do not believe the referee's responsibility to investigate is limited to personal detective work on his part. It is broad enough to require the answering of interrogatories requested by one of the parties if such answers are necessary to a proper inquiry into the facts.'

As in Lucas v. Ford Motor Co., 299 Mich. 280, 283, 300 N.W. 87 (followed on this point in Dodge v. General Motors Corp., 316 Mich. 425, 429, 25 N.W.2d 579), this application for leave 'was improvidently allowed.' The reason is that the statute authorizes certiorari to review only 'questions of law involved in any final decision or determination' of the appeal board (C.L.1948, § 413.12). For amplification, see the Lucas Case, 299 Mich. at 283, 300 N.W. 87. For that reason, also for reason that no court should assume to interfere with administration by the appointed administrators of this remedial act unless and until such administrators arrive at some reviewable decision of finality, I would dismiss the appeal and remand the record to the department for further proceedings. Plaintiff should have costs.

Since the issue did arrive here and is fully briefed, we may and probably should note agreement with the appeal board's view of the statutory authority of the workmen's compensation department. The hearing referee had full authority, by the statute quoted in the appeal board's ruling, to require that the defendant disgorge the requested information.

KAVANAGH, SOURIS, SMITH and ADAMS, JJ., concurred with BLACK, J.

CARR, Chief Justice.

It is undisputed in this case than on August 20, 1960, Martin Boggetta was an employee of the defendant at its Plymouth plant. He began work at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on his regular shift, at approximately 6 o'clock he collapsed, was taken to a hospital, and his death occurred prior to his arrival there. Under date of December 5, 1950, his widow made application to the workmen's compensation department of the State for hearing and adjustment of claim for compensation resulting from a personal injury, or disablement for an occupational disease, on the date of death. The cause of such injury or disablement was stated as follows:

'Subjected to extreme heat, heavy lifting and unusual exertion.'

Following the submission of the application counsel for Mrs. Boggetta filed a petition requesting that defendant employer be ordered, pursuant to Rule 7 of the rules of the compensation department, to answer the following questions:

'1. Type of work performed by Mr. Boggetta.

'2. Type of work being done in August, 1960.

'3. Names, addresses and phone numbers of co-workers of Mr. Boggetta during August, 1960.

'4. Names and addresses of Mr. Boggetta's supervisors.

'5. Temperature and variance therein under which Mr. Boggetta was working in August of 1960.'

Defendant moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that there was no authority, either by statute or rule, therefor. The matter came on for hearing before the referee to whom it was assigned, and the legal question at issue was argued at some length. The referee, in passing on the matter, called attention to the specific language of Rule 7, which reads as follows:

'At the hearing in any case, the Hearing Referee may call witnesses and order the production of books, records, including hospital records, accounts and papers which he deems necessary for the purpose of making an award.'

Pointing out that the information sought by counsel under their petition was designed to permit the making of a prima facie case the referee concluded that it was unauthorized by the rule quoted. He further expressed the opinion that the statement in the rule, 'the hearing in any case', referred to a hearing on the merits of a claim, and that said rule provided for the submission of proofs before the referee with reference to the granting of an award.

From the order of the referee denying the plaintiff's petition an appeal was taken to the workmen's compensation appeal board, which disagreed with the referee's interpretation of Rule 7 and held that authority granted the referee was broad enough to authorize the issuance of an order requiring the answering of interrogatories requested by one of the parties to the proceeding. An order was entered accordingly, and, on leave granted, defendant has appealed.

In substance the question at issue is whether the statute ¹, or the rule purportedly adopted pursuant thereto, grants authority to the workmen's compensation department, or administrative officers thereof, to require either party to a proceeding of the nature here involved to answer written interrogatories submitted for the purpose of enabling the opposing party to prepare of the submission of proofs at the hearing on the merits. Under the statute and prior decisions of this Court the burden of establishing a claim for compensation rests upon one seeking the award. La Duke v. Consumers PowerCo., 299 Mich. 625, 1 N.W.2d 16; Amamotto v. J. Kozloff Fish Co., 317 Mich. 641, 27 N.W.2d 118. It is obvious that if the defendant in such a proceeding may be required to make a discovery of the nature here sought at the request of the plaintiff, such requirement may also be imposed as to the latter. In other words, if the appeal board was correct in its decision the rule as so announced must work both ways. An order requiring a discovery, either by a court or by an administrative board, must be specifically authorized. Such power is not inherent in its nature. When resort thereto is permitted the procedure established for the protection of the parties must be observed.

It may not be claimed that the workmen's compensation act grants general authority to the administrative officials of the workmen's compensation department to make discovery orders, in advance of hearing, to permit either party, or both, to prepare therefor. Provision is made for certain limited discovery proceedings but not of the nature of the information sought to be obtained by the interrogatories involved in the instant proceeding. Part II, § 19, of the act (...