Ctry. Club Etc. v. Ctry. Club Christian Ch.

• Decision Date: 02 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. WD 61418.,WD 61418.
• Citation: 118 S.W.3d 185
• Parties: COUNTRY CLUB DISTRICT HOMES ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondent, National Trust For Historic Preservation and Historic Kansas City Foundation, Amicus Curiae, Homes Associations of the Country Club District, Amicus Curiae, v. COUNTRY CLUB CHRISTIAN CHURCH, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

118 S.W.3d 185

COUNTRY CLUB DISTRICT HOMES ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondent National Trust For Historic Preservation and Historic Kansas City Foundation, Amicus Curiae Homes Associations of the Country Club District, Amicus Curiae, v. COUNTRY CLUB CHRISTIAN CHURCH, Appellant.

No. WD 61418.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

September 2, 2003.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied October 28, 2003.

Neil Shortlidge, Overland Park, KS, Curtis Woods, co-counsel, Kansas City, for appellant.

Sam Colville, Overland Park, KS, for respondent.

Michael M. Burke, Daniel R. Cofran, Kansas City, for amicus curiae.

Before ELLIS, C.J., BRECKENRIDGE and HOLLIGER, JJ.

PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.

Country Club Christian Church appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Country Club District Homes Association and several residents of Hampstead Gardens,¹ a subdivision within the County Club District, (collectively "the Association"). The trial court ruled in favor of the Association on its petition to enjoin the Country Club Christian Church ("the Church") from building parking lots on its property in violation of a covenant restricting use of the property to "private residence purposes." The Church raises two points on appeal. First, the Church claims that the trial court erred in enjoining it from constructing parking lots because the restrictive covenant encumbering its property does not bar construction of church parking lots under the ruling in Fitzwilliam v. Wesley United Methodist Church, 882 S.W.2d 343 (Mo.App.1994). Second, the Church argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from building parking lots because changed circumstances preclude the enforcement of the restrictive covenant. This court finds that building church parking lots would violate the restrictive covenant and the Church has not proven that the changed conditions warrant not enforcing the restrictive covenant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Church owns and occupies several lots within the Hampstead Gardens subdivision, a portion of the Country Club District, in Kansas City. The Association is a not-for-profit Missouri corporation that oversees the Country Club District.

In 1999, the Church proposed to construct parking lots on three of the lots it owns within the Hampstead Gardens subdivision: Lot 11, Block 6; Lot 8, Block 10; and Lot 9, Block 10. In response to the Church's proposal, the Association filed a petition to permanently enjoin the Church from building parking lots on its property. The Association claimed in its petition that the building of parking lots would violate the restrictive covenant covering Hampstead Gardens, which includes the provision that "[n]one of said lots shall be improved, used nor occupied for other than private residence purposes[.]"² This covenant restricted all but the west fifty feet of Lot 9, Block 10, which had been freed to be used for Church purposes, and the east fifteen feet of the west sixty-five feet of Lot 9, Block 10, which, in 1951, had been freed for the purpose of building a driveway for the church building, but was expressly prohibited from being used for parking. The Association subsequently filed a motion for "partial summary judgment," asserting that the construction of the parking lots would violate the restrictive covenant.

The Church then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In its motion, it admitted that the lots on which it proposed to build parking lots are encumbered by the "private residence purposes" restriction. It claimed, however, that under Missouri law, church uses, including accessory uses like a parking lot, are authorized and expected in residential districts. Alternatively, the Church asserted that the restrictive covenant should not be enforced against it because of changed conditions. Both of the parties stipulated that they presented all of the evidence they would present at trial and requested that the trial court determine the case on the merits.

On April 12, 2002, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the Association. The trial court found that the language of the restrictive covenant encumbering the property was unambiguous and requires "that none of the lots can be improved, used or occupied for other than private residence purposes, to the exclusion of all other uses." The court also found that the Church's evidence of changed conditions was insufficient because it offered "no substantial evidence of any changes in the character of Hampstead Gardens or the Country Club District such as would have diminished the value these restrictions have upon other property within the subdivision." Instead, the Church's evidence "principally pertains to changes in the church going habits and practices of church members and the resulting changes in the needs of churches, generally." Therefore, the trial court held that the construction of parking lots would violate the restrictive covenant and permanently enjoined the Church from building parking lots on its property encumbered by the restrictive covenant. This appeal follows.³

Standard of Review

Although the parties titled their cross-motions as "motions for summary judgment," they both stipulated that they presented all of the evidence they would present at trial and requested that the trial court determine the case on the merits. As such, this court's review is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). McBee v. Gustaaf Vandecnocke Revocable Trust, 986 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo. banc 1999). The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32.

In its brief on appeal, the Church claims that because the trial court ruled the case strictly upon the record, this court "may review the facts and the law anew without deference to the Circuit Court's findings below." In support of this position, the Church cites Bauer v. Bauer, 97 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Mo.App.2002). Contrary to this argument, however, Bauer does not provide that when a trial court rules a case strictly upon the record, this court may review its findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo. Instead, Bauer states, "[w]hile an appellate court normally defers to the trial court's credibility determinations,... such is not the case here where the trial court did not hear the evidence or observe the witnesses but ruled the case strictly upon the transcript, which is now before this court." Id. (internal citations omitted). Bauer deals only with the standard of appellate review for credibility determinations. Here, the Church is not arguing that the trial court made incorrect credibility determinations, but instead it is claiming that the trial court misapplied the law in interpreting the restrictive covenant and its finding regarding the changed circumstances is against the weight of the evidence. Thus, Bauer has no application to this case.

Construction of Parking Lots Would Violate Restrictive Covenant

In its first point, the Church argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from constructing parking lots on its property encumbered by the restrictive covenant. Specifically, it claims that under Fitzwilliam v. Wesley United Methodist Church, 882 S.W.2d 343 (Mo.App.1994), the restriction providing that "[n]one of said lots may be improved, used nor occupied for other than private residence purposes" does not prohibit it from building church parking lots.

To determine whether the construction of parking lots would violate the covenant restricting use of the property to "private residence purposes," this court must interpret the restrictive covenant. In doing so, this court exercises de novo review. Wildflower Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Rinderknecht, 25 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Mo. App.2000). Restrictive covenants are "`regarded unfavorably'" and are "`strictly construed'" because "`[t]he law favors the free and untrammeled use of real property.'" Hall v. Koehler, 347 Mo. 658, 148 S.W.2d 489, 494 (1941) (quoting Mathews Real Estate Co. v. Nat'l Printing & Engraving Co., 330 Mo. 190, 48 S.W.2d 911, 913 (1932)). Nevertheless, restrictive covenants are also regarded as "private contractual obligation[s]" and are "`generally governed by the same rules of construction applicable to any covenant or contract.'" Wildflower Cmty. Ass'n, 25 S.W.3d at 534 (quoting Kling v. Taylor-Morley, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Mo. App.1996)). Thus, restrictive covenants, like any other covenant or contractual provisions, will be enforced where "the intention is clear." See Hall, 148 S.W.2d at 494.

This court determines the intention of the parties "from the language used, and in the light of the entire context of the instrument containing the restrictions." Andrews v. Metro. Bldg. Co., 349 Mo. 927, 163 S.W.2d 1024, 1028 (1942). "The intent must be gathered, not from one clause but from the four corners of the instrument." Id. "Where the language of a restriction as to the use of property is clear and unambiguous, its meaning must be given effect, and it is neither necessary nor proper to inquire into the surrounding circumstances for aid in its construction." Hickey v. Greengard, 176 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo.App.1944).

Missouri courts, on several occasions, have interpreted a residential restriction similar to the one at issue in this case. In Barnes v. Anchor Temple Association, 369 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Mo.App.1963), the Eastern District of this court decided whether a restrictive covenant prevented the building of a parking lot for Anchor Temple Association. The restrictive covenant stated that "[n]o building other than a private dwelling house, and the stable and outbuildings appurtenant thereto, shall be erected on any said lots, nor shall any lot or part thereof be used or occupied for any but private...