Adkins v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr.

Decision Date30 July 2015
Docket NumberNo. 712, Sept. Term, 2014.,712, Sept. Term, 2014.
Citation32 A.D. Cases 385,224 Md.App. 115,119 A.3d 146
PartiesTracey L. ADKINS v. PENINSULA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

John B. Stolarz, Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Randi K. Hyatt (J. Garrett Wozniak, Kollman & Saucier, PA, on the brief), Timonium, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: LEAHY, FRIEDMAN, RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR., Ret'd, Specially Assigned, JJ.

Opinion

LEAHY, J.

In this appeal, we address an employer's duty under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”), Maryland Code (1984, 2014 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article (“SG”) §§ 20–601 to 20–609, to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee seeking reassignment to another position for which he or she is otherwise qualified. In 2011, the employee in this case, Appellant Tracey L. Adkins, learned that she needed surgery to remedy a tear and deformation in her left hip. At the time, Ms. Adkins was employed by Appellee Peninsula Regional Medical Center (“PRMC”) as a storekeeper. Following her surgery, Ms. Adkins could no longer perform the largely physical tasks of the storekeeper position because her surgeon placed her on a sedentary work restriction. Ms. Adkins exhausted her initial leave to which she was entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. PRMC then granted Ms. Adkins 14 weeks of additional FMLA leave, and advised her to begin applying for other positions. Meanwhile, PRMC filled Ms. Adkins's storekeeper position, and Ms. Adkins began applying to numerous vacant positions at PRMC. She was rejected from each one.

In February 2012, following expiration of her extended leave, PRMC terminated Ms. Adkins's employment. PRMC also rejected Ms. Adkins from additional positions to which she applied following termination. Ms. Adkins then filed a lawsuit against PRMC in February 2013 in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the MFEPA. The case did not proceed to trial because the circuit court granted PRMC's motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that although Ms. Adkins had a disability within the meaning of the MFEPA, she was not otherwise qualified for any of the vacant positions to which she applied and did not request an accommodation from PRMC. Ms. Adkins filed a timely appeal,1 presenting seven questions for our review, which we have consolidated and rephrased for clarity:

I. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of PRMC based on its conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Ms. Adkins was an otherwise “qualified individual with a disability” or whether she requested an accommodation?
II. Did the circuit court err by failing to address Ms. Adkins's argument that PRMC failed to engage Ms. Adkins in an “interactive process” to determine a reasonable accommodation for her disability?
III. Did the circuit court err in failing to conclude that the demand by PRMC's Director of Materials Management, Scott Phillips, that Ms. Adkins be returned to full duty constituted a “100 percent healed” requirement that amounted to per se disability discrimination?
IV. Did the circuit court err when it denied Ms. Adkins's motion to compel and the amendment thereto?

We hold that when an employee with a disability is no longer able to perform the essential functions of a formerly-held position, the employee may still be a “qualified individual with a disability” under MFEPA entitled to reassignment to a vacant position if the employee can establish that he or she can perform the essential functions of that position, with or without reasonable accommodation. We also hold that once an employer is on notice that an employee has become disabled, the employer is required to assess the capabilities of the disabled employee to determine whether the employee is “otherwise qualified” for the same or another vacant position, and to determine what reasonable accommodation may be made without undue hardship to the employer, including reassignment. We conclude that when viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Adkins, the evidence contained in the record on motion for summary judgment reflected genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Ms. Adkins: (1) provided adequate notice to PRMC of her disability and need for an accommodation; (2) was assessed by PRMC to determine whether she could perform the essential functions of another vacant job; (3) could perform the essential functions of the inventory control coordinator position for which she applied; and (4) could perform the essential functions of another vacant job at PRMC. In addition, although we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Adkins's motion to compel the personnel files she requested, we conclude that the court did abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Adkins's motion to compel production of relevant vacant positions at PRMC available during the time period in question, as this information was directly relevant to Ms. Adkins's prima facie case alleging failure to accommodate. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

BACKGROUND

The instant case arrives in this Court following the circuit court's grant of summary judgment; therefore, the following facts are assembled from the pleadings and documents attached to the summary judgment motion and response. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Adkins as the nonmoving party. Jones v. Mid–Atl. Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676, 766 A.2d 617 (2001).

A. Ms. Adkins's Employment at PRMC

Located in Salisbury, Maryland, PRMC is an advanced tertiary care facility that houses 288 licensed beds and is staffed by approximately 2,669 individuals. Ms. Adkins began her career at PRMC in March 2005 as a storekeeper in the Materials Management Department, which is, in part, responsible for inventorying and stocking medical supplies and equipment. In this role, Ms. Adkins was responsible for delivering supplies to various floors of the hospital, organizing supplies in the supply room, and checking expiration dates of materials. Six months later, she was transferred to the Heart Center Inventory Control, more commonly known as the “Cath Lab,” as an inventory control assistant. This position was also in the Materials Management Department. Ms. Adkins held this position for several years, until September 2010, when the position was “cut,” and she was transferred back to the storekeeper position. She retained this position until her termination on February 25, 2012—the event which spawned the underlying lawsuit.

B. The Events Leading up to Surgery

At some point during her tenure as storekeeper, Ms. Adkins began to experience pain in her hip. This pain intensified in early April 2011, when Ms. Adkins, while at her home, stood up and felt a painful pull in her groin area. She sought treatment at PRMC's emergency room and took a few days off from work. When she returned to work, Ms. Adkins continued to experience significant pain, but still managed to complete her tasks. After a return trip to the emergency room on May 10, 2011, her doctor advised that she should stop working. Determined to keep working, on May 23 she received a steroid injection in her hip, which alleviated the pain, and she returned to her post the next day. Ms. Adkins's superiors, Scott Phillips (director of materials management services) and Pat Stevenson (control stores inventory control coordinator), were apprised of these events.

Despite the steroid treatments, Ms. Adkins's pain did not subside. She was ultimately diagnosed with a tear in the joint of her left hip as well as a hip deformation in her hip socket. She was scheduled to have surgery—an arthroscopic acetabuloplasty

, labral repair, and femoroplasty—by orthopedic surgeon Jason Scopp, M.D., on August 25, 2011. In anticipation of her surgery, Ms. Adkins notified her supervisors and filled out paperwork (dated July 21, 2011, but received by PRMC on August 11, 2011) to obtain leave under the FMLA. Her paperwork indicated that her leave would begin on August 25, 2011, and that she would return to work on or about October 6, 2011.

In a letter dated August 11, 2011, PRMC approved Ms. Adkins's FMLA leave request. The letter further explicated Ms. Adkins's rights under the FMLA. The letter explained that her approved 12–week leave under the FMLA would expire on November 17, 2011, and that so long as she returned by that date, she would be returned to her job or an equivalent one. The letter also advised that she would have to obtain a work evaluation from the Employee Health Office before resuming work.

C. Ms. Adkins Undergoes Surgery and Begins 12–Week FMLA Leave

Ms. Adkins continued working full-time until she underwent surgery in August 2011 and began her 12–week FMLA leave.2 Unfortunately, her pain intensified following the surgery, and her doctors advised that the time for recovery could range from six months up to a year.

On October 3, 2011, while still out on FMLA leave, Ms. Adkins met with James Bunk, another superior, who was the supply chain operations manager of the Materials Management Department. She advised him that she was meeting her surgeon on October 10 for a follow-up and that she hoped to learn, at that time, when she could return to work. Following the appointment, Ms. Adkins received a letter from her surgeon advising that she would be unable to return to work until November 7, 2011. Ms. Adkins delivered this documentation to PRMC's Employee Health Office and Mr. Bunk.

On November 7, 2011, Ms. Adkins returned to work as scheduled and met with a nurse at the Employee Health Office. There, Ms. Adkins advised that she would be unable to fulfill her job responsibilities on that day. She explained that she experienced increased pain when bending, lifting, and squatting, and that she would not be able to stand for long periods of time. PRMC, in turn, did not clear Ms. Adkins for work. The “Employee...

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