E.B. v. Verniero, 96-5132
| Citation | 119 F.3d 1077 |
| Decision Date | 04 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-5132,No. 96-5416,96-5416,No. 96-5132,96-5132,s. 96-5132 |
| Parties | E.B., (A Fictitious Name) v. Peter VERNIERO * , Attorney General of the State of New Jersey; Charles R. Buckley, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor; James Mosley, Chief of Police of the City of Englewood, New Jersey. Peter Verniero*, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Appellant inW.P., et al., Individually and as Representatives of a Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) and 23 (b)(2), v. Peter VERNIERO ** , Attorney General of New Jersey; Jeffrey S. Blitz, Atlantic County Prosecutor; Charles R. Buckley, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor; Stephen G. Raymond, Burlington County Prosecutor; Joseph F. Audino, Acting Camden County Prosecutor; Stephen D. Moore, Cape May County Prosecutor; Neil S. Cooper, Acting Cumberland County Prosecutor; Clifford J. Minor, Essex County Prosecutor; Harris Y. Cotton, Gloucester County Prosecutor; Carmen Messano, Hudson County Prosecutor; Sharon B. Ransavage, Hunterdon County Prosecutor; Maryann K. Bielamowicz, Mercer County Prosecutor; Robert W. Gluck, Middlesex County Prosecutor; John Kaye, Monmouth County Prosecutor; W. Michael Murphy, Jr., Morris County Prosecutor; Daniel J. Carluccio, Ocean County Prosecutor; Ronald S. Fava, Passaic County Prosecutor; Ronald A. Epstein, Salem County Prosecutor; Melaine B. Campbell, Acting Somerset County Prosecutor; Dennis O'Leary, Sussex County Prosecutor; Edward Neafsey, Acting Union County Prosecutor; John J. O'Reilly, Warren County Prosecutor. W.P., et al., Individually and as Representatives of a Class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) Appellants in |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
John J. Gibbons, Lawrence S. Lustberg, James E. Ryan (Argued), Crummy, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, Newark, NJ, Michael Z. Buncher, Edward Barocas, Office of Public Defender Special Hearings Unit, Trenton, NJ, Attorneys for Appellants W.P., et al., Individually and as Representatives of a Class Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) No. 96-5416.
Jane D. Plaisted, Office of County Prosecutor, Essex County, Newark, NJ, Attorney for Appellees Blitz, Buckley, Raymond, Audino, Moore, Cooper, Minor, Cotton, Messano, Ransavage, Bielamowicz, Gluck, Kaye, Murphy, Carluccio, Fava, Epstein, Campbell, O'Leary, Neafsey, and O'Reilly No. 96-5416.
BEFORE: BECKER, STAPLETON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1081
II. THE MEGAN'S LAW SCHEME .............................................. 1081
III. THE PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ............................................... 1087
IV. THE ROOKER"FELDMAN ISSUE ............................................ 1090
V. THE EX POST FACTO AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUES ........................ 1092
A. The Artway Standard ............................................ 1093
B. The Impact Of Ursery And Hendricks ............................. 1093
C. Legislative Purpose ............................................ 1096
D. Objective Purpose .............................................. 1097
E. Effects ........................................................ 1101
F. Satisfaction Of The Artway Test ................................ 1105
VI. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ISSUES ................................... 1105
A. Deprivation Of A Liberty Interest .............................. 1105
B. Standards For Determining The Process Due....................... 1106
C. Allocation Of The Burden Of Persuasion ......................... 1107
D. Extent Of The State's Evidentiary Burden ....................... 1110
VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 1111
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven year old child, was abducted, raped, and murdered near her home. The man who confessed to Megan's murder lived in a house across the street from the Kanka family and had twice been convicted of sex offenses involving young girls. Megan, her parents, local police, and the members of the community were unaware of the accused murderer's history; nor did they know that he shared his house with two other men who had been convicted of sex offenses.
By October 31, 1994, New Jersey had enacted the Registration and Community Notification Laws, Pub.L.1994, Chs. 128, 133 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to 7-11) as part of a ten-bill package collectively referred to as "Megan's Law." This legislation required registration by those who had committed certain designated crimes involving sexual assault and provided for the dissemination of information about those required to register. Other states followed suit with their own versions of Megan's Law and Congress passed a statute requiring a state program of registration and notification as a condition of receiving certain federal funds. By May of 1996, forty-nine states had adopted sex offender registration laws and thirty-two states maintained some form of community notification program.
We have before us challenges to the constitutionality of the notification requirements of New Jersey's Megan's Law based on the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The issues before us are difficult but relatively narrow. We are not called upon to decide whether Megan's Law can constitutionally be applied to one who has committed one of the designated sex crimes after its enactment. Nor, of course, is it our responsibility to determine whether the policy judgments reflected in Megan's Law are prudent ones.
We hold that (1) the notification requirements of Megan's Law do not constitute state inflicted "punishment" on Tier 2 and Tier 3 registrants for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses; (2) the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution forecloses New Jersey from placing the burden of persuasion on the registrant in a proceeding challenging a Tier 2 or Tier 3 classification and notification plan; and (3) the Due Process Clause requires the state at such a proceeding to shoulder the burden of justifying the classification and notification plan by clear and convincing evidence.
II. THE MEGAN'S LAW SCHEME
Public reaction to Megan's murder was intense, and New Jersey's governor and legislature responded quickly. By August 15, 1994, two weeks after the discovery of Megan's body, bills providing for registration and community notification had been introduced in the General Assembly. Two weeks later, the General Assembly declared the bills an "emergency," allowing them to bypass committee and be passed the same day.
In the Senate, no registration or notification bills had been introduced as of August 29, 1994. However, the Law and Public Safety Committee held a hearing upon pending legislation that pre-dated Megan's Law and would have required victim notification on the release of offenders. In connection with its consideration of that legislation, the Committee received testimony and/or written reports from, inter alia, the American Civil Liberties Union, municipal officials, inmates, state and federal legislators, and the Attorney General on issues related to sex offender registration and community notification. Registration and community notification bills identical to their General Assembly counterparts were introduced in the Senate on September 12, 1994. After hearing testimony from the ACLU, the New Jersey Coalition of Crime Victims, and corrections officials on September 26, 1994, the Senate Law and Public Safety Committee revised the bills by: (1) supplementing the list of crimes which require registration, 1 (2) directing the Attorney General to consult with a twelve-member Advisory Council of experts to establish guidelines concerning the risk of reoffense, (3) identifying certain factors material to the determination of risk of reoffense, and (4) narrowing the scope of community notification. The Committee then favorably reported the amended versions to the Senate, see Senate Law & Pub. Safety Comm., Statement to Substitute for Senate Bill No. 14 & Assembly Bill No. 85 (N.J. Sept. 26, 1994), which approved the bills on October 3. The General Assembly followed suit by debating and approving the revised bil...
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