Jenkins v. Medford
| Citation | 119 F.3d 1156 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1650,96-1650 |
| Parties | Steven Douglas JENKINS; David Chris Bossard; William Martin Buckner; Robert Calvin Davis; Elmeda Miller Foster; Jimmy Lynn Hungerford; Linda Cook McDaniel; Randy Lee Moss; Sandy Hoglen Moss; Kimberly Diann Shelton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Bobby Lee MEDFORD, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Buncombe County, North Carolina, Defendant-Appellant, and Reliance Insurance Company, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Defendant. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Southern States Police Benevolent Association, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Incorporated, Amici Curiae. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
ARGUED: William Alfred Blancato, Bennett & Blancato, L.L.P., Winston-Salem, NC, for Appellant. C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., Goldsmith & Goldsmith, P.A., Marion, NC, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Tony Seaton, Lee P. Herrin, Johnson City, TN, for Appellees.
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL, WIDENER, K.K. HALL, MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, WILKINS, NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge DONALD S. RUSSELL wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINSON, Judge WIDENER, Judge NIEMEYER, Judge WILKINS, Judge HAMILTON, Judge LUTTIG, and Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge ERVIN wrote a dissenting opinion. Judge DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ wrote a dissenting opinion.
Bobby Lee Medford ("Medford") was elected sheriff of Buncombe County, North Carolina, in November 1994. The plaintiffs in this action were deputy sheriffs, serving as employees. Shortly after his election, he dismissed several deputy sheriffs, particularly the plaintiffs-appellees ("deputies") in this case. These deputies filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. They asserted that they were dismissed for failing to support Medford's election bid, for supporting other candidates, and for failing to associate themselves politically with Medford's campaign. They also filed a pendent claim under state law.
Medford responded by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 1 In the brief supporting his motion, Medford asserted, inter alia, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that Medford's motion be granted because the deputies had failed to state a claim. The magistrate judge also recommended that Medford be afforded qualified immunity.
The deputies objected to the magistrate's report and recommendation, and the district court declined to adopt it. The district court denied Medford's motion to dismiss, and also rejected the magistrate's recommendation of qualified immunity for Medford. Furthermore, the district court believed that Medford's entitlement to qualified immunity might rest on factual issues not yet before the court, and so ruled that "the Court cannot now determine whether [Medford] is entitled to a qualified immunity defense."
Our first step is to determine our jurisdiction over this appeal. Normally, a denial of a motion to dismiss is not appealable, because it is not a final order as contemplated under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When a district court denies a motion to dismiss that is based on qualified immunity, however, the action is a final order reviewable by this court. 2 The policy underlying the defense of qualified immunity supports our exercise of jurisdiction at this point. The defense exists to "give government officials a right, not merely to avoid 'standing trial,' but also to avoid the burdens of 'such pretrial matters as discovery.' " 3 When a district court denies qualified immunity at the dismissal stage, that denial subjects the official to the burdens of pretrial matters, and some of the rights inherent in a qualified immunity defense are lost. 4 In this case, the district court refused to rule on the question of qualified immunity, reasoning that because Medford had not yet filed an answer, he had not asserted the defense of qualified immunity. The district court was incorrect. Qualified immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss. 5 The district court's refusal to consider the question subjected Medford to further pretrial procedures, and so effectively denied him qualified immunity.
We review a denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de novo. 6 We accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, and view those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 7 In this case, the complaint and amended complaint allege the following facts that are relevant to this appeal: on and before December 5, 1994, the deputies were employed in law enforcement positions in the Buncombe County sheriff's department; Medford ran against Walter Hipps in May, 1994, in the Republican primary; Medford won that election, and ran for sheriff against the incumbent, Charles Long, in an election held on November 8, 1994; during the campaign, Medford promised his supporters either jobs or promotions in the sheriff's department; the deputies worked for or otherwise supported Medford's opponents, but always on their own time, and never at work; each deputy was terminated by Medford on December 5, 1996, the date Medford took office as the newly-elected sheriff; Medford made no attempt to assess the abilities of any of the deputies; and, Medford replaced each deputy with someone politically loyal to Medford.
The district court ruled that the facts alleged in the amended complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law. 8 Medford argues on appeal, as he did in the court below, that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the deputies have not alleged a violation of a "clearly established" right; he is immune from suit under the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the pendent state law claim should be dismissed. The deputies assert that by firing them, Medford deprived them of "their rights to freedom of association and to political belief, speech and expression, and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law." 9
De novo review allows us to conduct an overall inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint to determine whether the deputies have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 10 When reviewing a claim of qualified immunity, we consider whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutional right. If the complaint shows that the plaintiff has not suffered such a deprivation, the defendant is entitled to dismissal of the claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 11 These steps help "weed out insubstantial § 1983 claims" without subjecting the defendant to the burdens of pretrial preparations. 12 We believe the dispositive issue in this case is whether the deputies' dismissals deprived them of any constitutional right. We therefore turn to an examination of the applicable law.
Today, we are again asked to determine when a public employee may properly be dismissed because of political affiliation. Over the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has issued four significant opinions on this issue. 13 Despite the Court's guidance, lower courts have issued "conflicting and confusing" opinions. 14 It is clear, however, that "[a] State may not condition public employment on an employee's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights." 15 Further, "[a]bsent some reasonably appropriate requirement, government may not make public employment subject to the express condition of political beliefs or prescribed expression." 16
The deputies' complaint is properly analyzed under the reasoning developed in Elrod v. Burns 17 and Branti v. Finkel. 18 The wholesale dismissal of deputies who campaigned for the losing candidate reveals that the newly-elected sheriff "elevate[d] political support to a job requirement." 19 This implicates the constitutional analysis of political patronage as developed in the Elrod-Branti line of cases. 20 In 1976, in Elrod, the Court declared patronage dismissals unconstitutional, because the practice limited political belief and association, and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Court created a narrow exception to give effect to the democratic process. The Court allowed patronage dismissals of those holding policymaking positions, reasoning that this exception would, in part, advance the important government goal of assuring "the implementation of policies of [a] new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate." 21
Four years later, in Branti, the Court recognized that the labels used in Elrod ignored the practical realities of job duty and structure, and so modified the test: "[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." 22 Simply put, Branti modified the test in Elrod by asking if "there is a rational connection between shared ideology and job performance." 23
This court, in Jones v. Dodson, 24 had its first opportunity to apply the Elrod-Branti exception to dismissals based on campaign activity. Dodson considered the claims of two Democratic deputy sheriffs, who alleged they were dismissed by the sheriff, a Republican, because of their political affiliations and expressions. 25 The panel held that "if [the deputy's] discharge was...
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