Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 95-1487
| Decision Date | 18 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1487,95-1487 |
| Citation | 119 F.3d 1437 |
| Parties | 120 Ed. Law Rep. 158, 97 CJ C.A.R. 1232 Wilfred KEYES, individually and on behalf of Christi Keyes, a minor; Christine A. Colley, individually and on behalf of Kris M. Colley, and Mark A. Williams, minors; Irma J. Jennings, individually and on behalf of Rhonda O. Jennings, a minor; Roberta R. Wade, individually and on behalf of Gregory L. Wade, a minor; Edward J. Starks, Jr., individually and on behalf of Denise Michelle Starks, a minor; Josephine Perez, individually and on behalf of Carlos A. Perez, Shiela R. Perez and Terry J. Perez, minors; Maxine N. Becker, individually and on behalf of Dinah L. Becker, a minor; Eugene R. Weiner, individually and on behalf of Sarah S. Weiner, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Congress of Hispanic Educators, an unincorporated association; Montbello Citizens' Committee, Inc.; Arturo Escobedo and Joanne Escobedo, individually and on behalf of Linda Escobedo and Mark Escobedo, minors; Eddie R. Cordova, individually and on behalf of Renee Cordova, and Barbara Cordova, minors; Robert Pena, individually and on behalf of Theresa K. Pena and Craig R. Pena, minors; Robert L. Hernandez and Margaret M. Hernandez, individually and on behalf of Randy R. Hernandez; Roger L. Hernandez, Russell C. Hernandez, Rachelle J. Hernandez, minors; Frank Madrid, individually and on behalf of Jeanne S. Madrid, a minor; Ronald E. Montoya and Naomi R. Montoya, individually and on behalf of Ronald C. Montoya, a minor; John E. Dominguez and Esther E. Dominguez, individually and on behalf of John E. Dominguez, Mark E. Dominguez and Michael J. Dominguez, minors; John H. Flores and Anna, individually and on behalf of Theresa Flores, Joni A. Flores and Luis E. Flores, minors; Moore School Community Association, and Moore School Lay Advisory Committee; Citizens Association for Neighborhood Schools, an unincorporated association, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO; the Board of Educati |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Gordon G. Greiner, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO (Dennis D. Parker, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York City, on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Michael H. Jackson, Semple & Jackson, Denver, CO (Phil C. Neal, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, Chicago, IL, on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees.
Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, State of Colorado, Denver, CO (Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, Denver, CO, and William E. Thro, Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, Denver, CO, on the briefs), for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee State of Colorado.
Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Since 1969 the United States District Court for the District of Colorado has maintained jurisdiction over School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado ("the School District"), for the purpose of eliminating de jure segregation in the Denver schools. This appeal arises from the district court's 1995 decision to terminate its jurisdiction over the School District, finding the School District had eliminated the vestiges of de jure discrimination to the extent practicable. Appellants Wilfred Keyes and others 1 ("Appellants") do not appeal the termination of jurisdiction, but rather appeal the district court's decision insofar as it opined upon the constitutionality of Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution ("the Busing Clause") and two Colorado statutory provisions. See Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 22-36-101(3), 22-30.5-104(3). Those issues, however, are not justiciable. As a consequence, there is no case or controversy as required by Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
This case originated in June of 1969, when children in the Denver public schools challenged the School District's deliberate policy of racial segregation. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F.Supp. 279 (D.Colo.1969). Since that challenge, this case has evolved through several stages of litigation during which this and other courts have rendered numerous opinions. 2 A brief summary of the history of the case provides necessary context.
From 1960 through 1969, the School District established and maintained de jure segregation in the Denver public schools. Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F.Supp. 1274, 1276 (D.Colo.1995). In 1969 and 1970, the district court found that the School District had engaged in seven specific de jure segregative acts by attempting to maintain predominantly white schools in the Park Hill neighborhood. See Keyes, 902 F.Supp. 1274, 1278 (D.Colo.1995) (citing Keyes I, 303 F.Supp. 279, 282-85 (D.Colo.1969); Keyes II, 303 F.Supp. 289, 295 (D.Colo.1969); Keyes IV, 313 F.Supp. 61 (D.Colo.1970)). As a consequence, it ordered a desegregation plan for the Park Hill area schools in 1970. Keyes V, 313 F.Supp. 90, 96-99 (10th Cir.1970).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court broadened the scope of the district court's jurisdiction. Instead of limiting the desegregation plan to the Park Hill area, the Supreme Court determined that the entire Denver school system was a dual system 3 requiring desegregation. Keyes VII, 413 U.S. 189, 201-02, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2694-95, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). Thus, in 1974, the district court ordered a city-wide desegregation plan. See Keyes XIX, 902 F.Supp. at 1279. This court, however, found that plan inadequate. Keyes X, 521 F.2d 465, 475-79 (10th Cir.1975). Finally in 1976, the parties agreed to a remedial plan which was approved and implemented. See Keyes XIX, 902 F.Supp. at 1279. The remedial plan required, among other things, pairing elementary schools, changing attendance zones, establishing percentage ratios of Anglo to minority students, and transporting students by bus to implement the plan. Id.
Following the implementation of the remedial plan, the School District passed Resolution 2233 to direct continued desegregation efforts. In 1984, the School District moved to terminate the court's jurisdiction. Keyes XIV, 609 F.Supp. 1491, 1518-20 (D.Colo.1985). The district court denied the motion, finding the School District had not yet achieved unitary status and that Resolution 2233 was too vague. Id.
In an effort to remedy the vagueness of Resolution 2233, the School District passed Resolution 2314 in 1987. Resolution 2314 called for continuing teacher assignment and student transfer policies that enhanced integration and required annual reports of progress toward achieving a unitary school district. The School District again sought to terminate jurisdiction and the court again refused. Instead, the court authorized existing plans to remedy the vestiges of past discrimination and ordered a meeting with counsel to issue a permanent injunction against the School District. Keyes XVI, 653 F.Supp. 1536, 1539-40, 1542 (D.Colo.1987). Still later that same year, the court entered an Interim Decree, superseding all prior remedial actions. Keyes XVII, 670 F.Supp. at 1516-17. That decree diminished the court's jurisdiction by freeing the School District to make changes in its existing plans to accommodate new situations. Id.
On appeal, this court affirmed the denials of the motions to terminate jurisdiction, but invalidated some portions of the Interim Decree which merely required the School District to obey the law. See Keyes XIX, 902 F.Supp. at 1281; Keyes XVIII, 895 F.2d 659, 666-69 (10th Cir.1990). The School District thus remained under the district court's jurisdiction to remedy past discrimination, but could develop its own plans to do so. See Keyes XIX, 902 F.Supp. at 1281.
In 1992 the School District moved again to terminate the district court's jurisdiction. See id. at 1275. This time Appellants requested the court to rule on the constitutionality of Colorado's Busing Clause before it decided whether to terminate jurisdiction. 4 The Busing Clause, Article IX, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution, provides in pertinent part that no school pupil shall "be assigned or transported to any public educational institution for the purpose of achieving racial balance." Appellants asserted that after termination of the court's jurisdiction, the Busing Clause would impede...
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