Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp.

Decision Date31 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-60509,96-60509
Citation119 F.3d 330
Parties79 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1586, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,863, 134 Lab.Cas. P 33,620, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1052, 7 A.D. Cases 138, 24 A.D.D. 196, 10 NDLR P 227 Betty Faye PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARATHON CHEESE CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Jim D. Waide, III, David Anthony Chandler, Waide Law Office, Tupelo, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Duncan A. Lott, Booneville, MS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE *, District Judge.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff-Appellant Betty Price appeals the district court's grant of Defendant-Appellee Marathon Cheese Corporation's motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that

she failed to establish a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act 1 (FMLA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 2 (ADEA), or the Americans with Disabilities Act 3 (ADA). In our de novo review we find that Price failed to adduce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that she was a victim of actionable employment discrimination under any of those Acts. Accordingly, we affirm.

I FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Price was employed by Marathon for twenty-three years. She was fired on November 7, 1994, by Marathon's plant manager, Tim Trace, at the age of forty-nine. Although some of the circumstances surrounding her termination are in dispute, in the end there is insufficient evidence supporting Price's position on disputed points to require jury resolution.

In August 1994, Dr. Dwight Johnson diagnosed Price with carpal tunnel syndrome and prescribed conservative treatment. Price contends that shortly thereafter she told Trace about her condition and that he inquired as to when she planned to have surgery. Trace maintains that he was never specifically informed that she had carpal tunnel syndrome and that he never stated that she would need surgery. In mid-September, Dr. Johnson restricted Price's work to light duty with limited arm movement, not to exceed eight hours per day. Price gave supervisor Carolyn Walker a note from Dr. Johnson relaying this restriction. Marathon accommodated the restricted work recommendation, placing Price on a salvage line that entailed nonrepetitive motion. Price testified that while she worked on the salvage line she was required to perform duties that were never before required of salvage line workers. She stated specifically that she first had to remove mold from the cheese by cutting through its paper wrapping, then had to place the cheese in a barrel, and finally had to remove all of the paper from the barrel. According to Price, the usual method is to remove the paper first and then remove the mold. Marathon countered that she was required to cut through the paper first, as removing the paper initially would have contaminated the entire batch of cheese.

Price requested a transfer to her old job on the two-pound line, but Trace denied this request. Her subsequent request to be placed on the random weight line was also denied.

Price obtained a release to full duties from Dr. Johnson at the end of September. In October, Price requested overtime and worked fifty-two hours in the last week of the month, which was the week before she was fired. She continued to see Dr. Johnson in October. Price claims that the October visits involved her carpal tunnel syndrome and stomach problems associated with her treatment. According to Dr. Johnson's deposition testimony, however, these visits dealt solely with her blood pressure.

On Friday, November 4, Price asked to speak with Walker and Ronnie Johnson, another plant supervisor. According to Marathon's witnesses, Price left work without permission after expressing her unwillingness to train or supervise new employees on the five-pound line, 4 as she was not a supervisor. Rather, she stated that she would not work as a supervisor and that they could get one "back there." Price testified that she became so ill that day that she was unable to perform her duties. She contends that she informed her supervisors that she was too sick to work and was given permission to leave. Marathon's witnesses denied that Price complained of any pain; they testified that when asked whether she sought permission to leave work to see the doctor, she responded that she did not have a doctor's appointment. In fact, she did not see a doctor that day.

On the ensuing Monday, November 7, Price reported for work with a doctor's excuse that she obtained during an office visit that morning. The excuse addressed only that day; however, according to Price, she told Trace that Dr. Johnson could confirm that her condition existed prior to November 4.

Trace fired Price that morning. He testified that he did so because she had left work early without permission on the preceding workday (Friday, November 4), in violation of company policy. Marathon has a posted policy that prohibits an employee from leaving work without first notifying and obtaining permission from a supervisor.

Price testified that she is the only Marathon employee ever fired for leaving work early. Marathon rebutted Price's testimony with evidence that other employees had been discharged for leaving work without authorization.

In support of her age discrimination claim, Price testified that two years prior to her discharge Trace had joked that he wanted to get rid of older workers to bring younger employees into the company. To refute her age discrimination claim, Marathon adduced evidence that when Price was dismissed, the "bulk" of its employees were over forty years old. Additionally, Marathon's evidence shows that in 1992, when Trace became plant manager, he re-hired many former employees who had been laid off, three of whom were at least fifty years old. Marathon also hired younger individuals who were referred by another company.

Price filed suit against Marathon in May 1995. A jury trial was held in July 1996. Marathon moved for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of all of the evidence. The trial court granted this motion, dismissing Price's claims with prejudice. A notice of appeal was timely filed.

II ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's decision to grant judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. 5 Judgment as a matter of law is proper after a party has been fully heard by the jury on a given issue and "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue...." 6 In evaluating such a motion, the court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and leaving credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury. 7

B. APPLICABLE LAW
1. FMLA--Did Price adduce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that she suffered from a serious health condition?

The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to as much as twelve weeks leave from work when he has a serious health condition that makes him unable to perform the essential functions of his position. 8 Such leave may be taken intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule when medically necessary. 9 The FMLA further provides that, upon return from leave, an employee shall be restored to the position of employment he held when the leave commenced or to an equivalent position. 10

The FMLA defines "serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves--(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or

                residential medical care facility;  or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." 11  The interim regulations applicable to this claim clarify what is meant by a serious health condition. 12  A "serious health condition" involves
                

(1) Any period of incapacity or treatment in connection with or consequent to inpatient care ... in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility;

(2) Any period of incapacity requiring absence from work, school, or other regular daily activities, of more than three calendar days, that also involves continuing treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health care provider; or

(3) Continuing treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health care provider for a chronic or long-term health condition that is incurable or so serious that, if not treated, would likely result in a period of incapacity of more than three calendar days;.... 13

"Continuing treatment" means one or more of the following:

(1) The employee or family member in question is treated two or more times for the injury or illness by a health care provider. Normally this would require visits to the health care provider....

(2) The employee or family member is treated for the injury or illness two or more times by a provider of health care services ... under the orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider, or is treated for the injury or illness by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider--for example, a course of medication or therapy--to resolve the health condition.

(3) The employee or family member is under the continuing supervision of, but not necessarily being actively treated by, a health care provider due to a serious long-term or chronic condition or disability which cannot be cured.... 14

A "chronic serious health condition" is one that requires periodic visits for treatment, continues over an extended period of time, and may cause episodic rather than a "continuing" period of incapacity. 15

Price contends that on November 4, 1994, she was...

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