Allred v. American President Lines

Decision Date29 September 1953
Citation119 F. Supp. 55
PartiesALLRED et al. v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Jacob Rassner, New York City, for libelants.

J. Edw. Lumbard, U. S. Atty., New York City, for respondent.

NOONAN, District Judge.

The respondent's exception to the amended libel in this suit was heard and partially determined in open court. At that time, the first alleged cause of action was dismissed and the second alleged cause of action was dismissed as to the administratrix of the estate of the deceased seaman. This leaves exceptions to the second alleged cause of action remaining to be considered at this time with respect to all the libelants except the aforesaid administratrix.

This is an action in admiralty for unseaworthiness predicated upon the General Maritime Law. The respondent excepts to the amended libel on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and on the further ground of lack of jurisdiction over the respondent by virtue of the failure of the libelants to institute suit within three years after their repatriation and return to the United States.

Libelants' reply to the exceptive allegations asserts that there can be no statute of limitations applied to an admiralty proceeding such as this, but rather that the doctrine of laches applies.

In an order dismissing the original libel, Judge McGohey specifically granted leave to the libelants to file an amended libel so that they might show what facts, if any, they are relying on to prove that the statute of limitations would be tolled as to them. The paragraph of the amended libel numbered "Twentieth" obviously is their attempt to set out such facts.

Other changes in the amended libel consist generally of a switch from reliance on the Jones Act to reliance on the General Maritime Law. Thus the matter of laches is clearly in issue. The three year New York State personal injury statute referred to is not applicable as such, but may properly be applied by analogy as a yardstick to determine whether the suit was brought within a reasonable time. The libelants have asserted several reasons for extending the time which must be considered in determining whether the action was timely brought or inexcusably delayed.

Detriment to the adverse party is presumed from delay for the statutory period unless the contrary is shown; it is incumbent on the libelant to show facts negating laches or tolling the statute. Redman v. U. S.,...

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2 cases
  • Murphy v. International Freighting Corporation, Civ. A. No. 57-533-F.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • April 4, 1960
    ...72 S.Ct. 12, 96 L.Ed. 31; Loverich v. Warner Co., 3 Cir., 118 F.2d 690; Hughes v. Roosevelt, 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 901; Allred v. American President Lines, D.C., 119 F.Supp. 55. Yet there is no evidence that plaintiff did anything to assert his claim until sometime in May 1957 when he first cons......
  • Beychok v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
    • February 17, 1954

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