Joyce v. State, Dept. of Corrections

Decision Date15 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 74176-0.,74176-0.
Citation119 P.3d 825,155 Wn.2d 306
PartiesStephen JOYCE, individually, and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Paula Joyce, and as Guardian for the Estate of Paula Joyce, and as Guardian for the Estates of Marie Therese Joyce, a minor, Thomas Joyce, a minor, Katherine Joyce, a minor, and Joseph Joyce, a minor, Respondents, v. STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; and Vernon Valdez Stewart, a single man, Petitioners.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Michael E. Tardif, Michael Patrick Lynch, Glen Andrew Anderson, Olympia, WA, for Petitioners.

John Robert Connelly, Darrell L. Cochran, Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, et al, Tacoma, WA, for Respondents.

Daniel Brian Heid, Auburn, WA, for Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Municipal Attorneys.

Ronald Lamar Williams, Bertha Baranko Fitzer, Pierce County Pros. Office, Tacoma, WA, for Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

Stewart Andrew Estes, Keating, Bucklin & McCormack, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae Washington Cities Insurance Authority.

Debra Leigh Williams Stephens, Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Spokane, WA, for Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation.

CHAMBERS, J.

¶ 1 Washington State waived sovereign immunity more than 40 years ago. RCW 4.92.090. Implicitly, this waiver functions as a promise that the State and its agents will use reasonable care while performing its duties at the risk of incurring liability. See, e.g., Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash.2d 237, 243, 44 P.3d 845 (2002).

¶ 2 The Washington State Department of Corrections (Department or State) was supervising Vernon Valdez Stewart under two felony convictions, one for assault and the other for possession of stolen property. While on this community supervision Stewart stole a car in Seattle, ran a red light in Tacoma, and collided with a vehicle operated by Paula Joyce, killing her. The Joyce family sued the Department for negligently supervising Stewart. The Department moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to protect Joyce and that it was not the cause of her death. The trial court denied the motion. A jury subsequently found the State's negligence caused Joyce's death and awarded damages to her family.

¶ 3 The State asks us to limit its duty to supervise offenders. In this case, the State asserts its duty is to prevent Stewart from committing assault and possession of stolen property, the crimes that triggered his supervision. But as we have long recognized, once the State has taken charge of an offender, "the State has a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect against reasonably foreseeable dangers posed by the dangerous propensities of parolees." Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 217, 822 P.2d 243 (1992) (emphasis added). The existence of the duty comes from the special relationship between the offender and the State. Cf. Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash.2d 265, 284, 979 P.2d 400 (1999). Once that special relationship is created, the State has a duty of reasonable care and may be liable for lapses of reasonable care when damages result. However, the State also correctly argues that several jury instructions improperly stated its duty. We accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

¶ 4 On September 8, 1995, Stewart pleaded guilty in King County to assaulting his girl friend and threatening her with a gun. Because it was his first adult felony (after many juvenile offenses), Judge Pasette granted Stewart a first offender waiver and 24 months of community supervision. Stewart was also required to complete 72 hours of community service, have no contact with his former girl friend for five years, not purchase or possess deadly weapons, complete domestic violence counseling, make financial payments, and obey all laws.

¶ 5 The Department assigned Catherine Lo to supervise and monitor Stewart. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, such offenders are monitored by community corrections officers, who are authorized to report violations of the conditions of release to the sentencing judge, if they deem it appropriate to do so. RCW 9.94A.631. The judge is authorized to fashion an appropriate response. RCW 9.94A.634(1). For example, the judge is explicitly authorized to modify the sentencing conditions by requiring education, counseling, inpatient treatment, curfew, daily reporting, home detention, jail, and other appropriate responses when an offender is noncompliant. RCW 9.94A.634(3) (formerly RCW 9.94A.200 (2001)). Under the SRA, the community corrections officer is the eyes and ears of the sentencing judge.

¶ 6 Joyce presented considerable evidence that the State knew of Stewart's dangerous propensities. The King County presentence report detailed Stewart's abusive relationship with his girl friend. Foretelling things to come, Stewart's criminal history included two juvenile convictions for driving without a valid license, and convictions for third degree possession of stolen property and obstruction of a public servant.

¶ 7 Lo first met Stewart on October 17, 1995. Together they reviewed Stewart's reporting requirements and conditions of release. Lo kept a chronological log of all her contacts with Stewart. The Court of Appeals' published opinion surveyed the Department's chronological report in detail and it will not be repeated here. Joyce v. Dep't of Corr., 116 Wash.App. 569, 575-85, 75 P.3d 548 (2003). It is sufficient to say that from the beginning, Stewart seldom reported as required, did not perform community service, did not receive any domestic violence counseling, and with few exceptions failed to make his $5 monthly financial obligation payments. On February 25, 1996, Lo issued a notice of violation of Stewart's community service conditions. The notice specifically documented Stewart's failure to enter domestic violence counseling, failure to perform community service, and failure to make the $5 monthly restitution payments. Despite this documented noncompliance, Lo did not take any of the steps authorized by statute to call Stewart's noncompliance to the court's attention.

¶ 8 On March 6, 1996, Stewart was arrested in Kittitas County driving 86 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone. The car was stolen and the ignition had been popped out of the steering column. Stewart was charged with first degree possession of stolen property, third degree driving with a suspended license, and failure to sign a notice of infraction.

¶ 9 On April 16, 1996, Lo was informed by Stewart's mother that he had been in the Providence Hospital psychiatric ward since the previous week. Lo confirmed with the hospital that Stewart had been admitted, but the hospital refused to provide Lo details concerning Stewart's condition without a release. Lo took no action to obtain more information.

¶ 10 Stewart continued to not report regularly. He repeatedly failed to appear for court hearings in the King County assault case. He was finally arrested on a bench warrant on October 2, 1996, well after Lo's February 25, 1996, notice of violation. Judge Pasette imposed a total of 39 days jail time and ordered Stewart to sign a release of his medical records so Lo could review Stewart's psychiatric history. It appears Lo never actually obtained this release. Lo also did not advise Judge Pasette of the Kittitas County violations, even though she had learned of them in April 1996.

¶ 11 Stewart was released from the King County jail on October 8, 1996, but because he failed to appear at a hearing in Kittitas County, another bench warrant was issued and he was again arrested six days later. On December 5, 1996, in Kittitas County, Stewart was found guilty of possession of stolen property and was sentenced by Judge Cooper to 75 days in jail, 12 months community supervision, and ordered to pay restitution. As conditions of community supervision Stewart was required to maintain law-abiding behavior, not to associate with other offenders, not to move without first obtaining permission from his community corrections officer, and to maintain or actively seek full time employment. Lo was Stewart's community corrections officer for the Kittitas County community service.

¶ 12 Stewart continued to go in and out of Providence Hospital and Harborview Medical Center psychiatric departments complaining of paranoia and visual and auditory hallucinations. Had Lo required Stewart to sign the medical release as ordered by Judge Pasette and had she obtained Stewart's medical records, she and Judge Pasette would have learned of his psychiatric condition and may have been able to craft appropriate modifications to his conditions of release. Lo and the judge also would have learned that Stewart had been using marijuana, that he had stolen another vehicle from a relative by popping the ignition, and that he had pleaded guilty to driving without a license.

¶ 13 By March of 1997, Stewart's psychiatric condition had worsened. He had a diagnosis of acute affective psychosis. He also had still not completed any community service or domestic violence counseling as required by Judge Pasette. Neither had he found (nor was he seeking) full time employment as required by Judge Cooper. He had not provided Lo with the ordered medical release or an address where he was living. He had failed to make the financial payments required by both courts. Lo notified neither Judge Pasette nor Judge Cooper of these events.

¶ 14 On May 9, 1997, Lo left her position and was replaced by Odel Mosteller. Mosteller determined that Stewart had moved and the State did not have an address for him. In the meantime, Stewart's mental health had continued to significantly deteriorate.

¶ 15 On July 22, 1997, mental health officials responded to Stewart's mother's home. Stewart had been smashing doors, cutting holes in walls with a knife, and setting...

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