Town of Enfield v. Jordan

Decision Date10 January 1887
Citation30 L.Ed. 523,119 U.S. 680,7 S.Ct. 358
PartiesTOWN OF ENFIELD v. JORDAN
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

C. H. Patton, for plaintiff in error.

T. C. Mather, for defendant in error.

BRADLEY, J.

This is a suit brought by C. N. Jordan against the town of Enfield to recover the amount of 22 interest coupons, for $50 each, made by the town on the first of January, 1871, and payable in January and July, 1881, 1882, and 1883. The defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and on the trial a jury was waived, and the cause was tried by the court, consisting of the circuit and district judges. A finding of the facts was made, and, the judges being divided in opinion as to certain questions of law arising thereon, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in accordance with the opinion of the presiding judge. The principal question of law was whether an 'incorporated town,' as Enfield was, had power to make a donation of its bonds to the railroad company. Questions of estoppel were also raised, as hereafter noticed.

The facts found by the court, in accordance with an agreed statement presented by the parties, are substantially as follows:

(1) That the town of Enfield was incorporated under an act of the general assembly of the state of Illinois, approved March 15, 1869. This act is set out in full, and is entitled 'An act to extend the corporate powers of the town of Enfield.' It is an ordinary town charter, making the town a corporation by the name and style of 'The Town of Enfield.' Its territorial limits were then prescribed, being one mile square, and the usual corporate powers were conferred. A town council, consisting of five trustees, together with a police magistrate, a treasurer, and a town constable, were directed to be elected annually on the first Monday of May. The powers given to the town council were similar to those usually conferred upon municipal bodies,—as the power to levy and callect taxes; to appoint a clerk, supervisor of streets, and other officers; to appropriate moneys to pay the debts and expenses of the town; to make regulations for securing the general health; to provide a supply of water; to make sidewalks, and to open, grade, pave, and repair streets; to establish markets; to regulate the public grounds; to organize a fire department; to regulate the police, etc.

The findings next set forth at large an act of assembly of Illinois incorporating the Illinois Southeastern Rail way Company, approved February 25, 1867. This act authorized the company to construct a railroad from a point on the Illinois Central Railroad, by way of Fairfield, in Wayne county, to the Ohio river. The route designated would naturally pass in the neighborhood of Enfield, and the railroad, when built, did pass through the town. The seventh section authorized counties through which the road might pass to donate to the company any sum not exceeding $100,000, and to give its bonds therefor. The ninth sec ion authorized any town in any county under township organization to donate not to exceed $30,000; but such donation was payable only by taxation, no authority being given to issue bonds. This section related not to incorporated towns, but to townships forming the territorial subdivisions of counties. The eleventh section authorized 'any incorporated city or town' through or by which the railroad might run to make donations not exceeding $10,000, on the same terms, propositions, conditions, and under the same restrictions, as provided for townships.

The findings next set forth an amendment to the railroad charter, approved February 24, 1869, by the tenth section of which authority was given to 'any village, city, county, or township organized under the township organization law, or any other law of the state, along or near the route of the railway * * * or anywise interested therein,' to subscribe to the stock of the railroad company, or make donations to it to aid in the construction and equipment of its road, provided such subscription or donation was sanctioned by an election of the people. This section gave power to issue bonds for such subscriptions or donations; but towns are not included therein by name.

The court further found that on the first of January, 1871, the town of Enfield issued and delivered to the officers of the Springfield & Illinois Southeastern Railway Company, a company formed by consolidation with the Illinois Southeastern Railway Company, the bonds and coupons now in controversy, copies of which are attached; that said bonds and coupons were issued by said town by virtue of the power (if any) contained in the acts aforesaid, approved February 25, 1867, and February 24, 1869; and that afterwards said bonds and coupons came to the plaintiff through mesne transfers from said Springfield & Illinois Railway Company, and that the bonds were registered in the state auditor's office.

The findings further set forth copies of the order of the town council of Enfield, made June 10, 1870, appointing judges of election to be held in the town on the eleventh of the same month, and a copy of the returns of the vote at said election, for the purpose of determining whether the town would donate the sum of $7,000 to the Springfield & Illinois Southeastern Railway Company, the result of which was: for donation, 64 votes; against it, 1 vote; and that this was the only election held in relation to said donation.

The court further found that at the June term, 1880, of that court, judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant was rendered upon coupons then due, detached from the same bonds from which the coupons now sued on were taken. It was also admitted by the plaintiff that the Enfield town bond represented by Post in the case of Welch v. Post, 99 Ill. 471, was one of the series of seven bonds in controversy in this suit; but as to which bond it was the plaintiff disclaimed any knowledge.

Upon these facts the judges who tried the cause have certified a difference of opinion upon the following questions, to-wit: (1) Whether the incorporated town of Enfield had power to vote and issue the bonds and coupons in controversy under any of the provisions of the acts above specified. (2) More particularly, whether said town had said power under the tenth section of the amendment of the railway company's charter, approved February 24, 1869. (3) Whether said town was not estopped from further defense by the litigation theretofore had between it and plaintiff. (4) In case there was power in the town, under said laws, to vote and issue said bonds and coupons, whether one of said bonds, and the coupons thereto belonging, were void in the hands of plaintiff in this suit by reason of one Post having litigated it in the state courts of Illinois.

1. As to the first question, it is clear that the town derived no authority to issue the bonds from anything contained in its own charter. But, by the eleventh section of the act incorporati g the railway company, power is given to any incorporated city or town through or by which the railroad might run, to make donations to the company, and to pay the same by taxes assessed by the county clerk at the request of the company. No authority, however, was given to issue bonds in payment of such donations. The tenth section of the amending act, approved February 24, 1869, contains the only authority which can be invoked for that purpose. But that section does not mention towns by name. It declares 'that any village, city, county, or township * * * along or near the route of said railway or its branches, or that are in anywise interested therein, may in their corporate capacity subscribe to the stock of said company, or make donations to said company, to aid in constructing and equipping said railway,' with a proviso for holding an election on the subject, and authorizing the issue of bonds in payment; 'said bonds to be signed, in case of a village, by the chairman of the board of trustees thereof; in case of a city, by the mayor thereof,' etc. The town of Enfield is not a township nor a county nor a city. If it is within the purview of the act, it must be because it is a village. The question, then, arises, is the incorporated town of Enfield a village within the meaning of the act?

This question depends upon the use of the words 'town' and 'village' in the laws of Illinois. The general and popular distinction between them in English speech will not carry us far towards a solution. The dictionaries tell us that the word 'town' signifies any walled collection of houses. (Johnson.) But that is its antique meaning. By modern use, it is said to be applied to an undefined collected of houses or habitations; also to the inhabitants; emphatically to the metropolis. (Richardson.) Again, a town is any collection of houses larger than a village; or any number of houses to which be- longs a regular market, and which is not a city. (Johnson, Webster, Ogilvie.) The same authorities define a village as a small collection of houses in the country, less than a town. According to this distinction, the law, in giving power to 'any village, city, county, or township' to make donations and issue bonds to the railroad company, confers the power upon bodies of higher and lower degrees of municipal organization than towns, and leaves them out. This is an incongruity which we can hardly suppose was intended. The supreme court of Illinois, in a recent decision against the power, to which we shall presently refer, is obliged to say, 'Why incorporated towns were omitted in that act cannot now be known.'

In seeking aid from collateral sources, we shall probably derive more light from the political use of the terms 'town' and 'village' in this country, than from general lexicography. In New England and New York, towns are the political units of territory into which the county is subdivided, and answer, politically, to parishes and hundreds in England, but are vested with greater powers of local government. In Delaware the...

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