U.S. v. Ramos

• Decision Date: 21 January 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 92-6849,92-7087,s. 92-6849
• Citation: 12 F.3d 1019
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. William RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Richard RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1019

12 F.3d 1019

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. William RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Richard RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 92-6849, 92-7087.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 21, 1994.

William B. Richbourg, Pensacola, FL, for defendant-appellant.

J.B. Sessions, III, U.S. Atty., George A. Martin, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Mobile, AL, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER ^*, District Judge.

SCHLESINGER, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellants Richard Ramos and William Ramos each pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Appellants' respective sentences included the imposition of a term of imprisonment of 120 months. On appeal each argues that the district court erred by denying two different joint motions to suppress, one involving the search of an Orange Beach, Alabama condominium ("the Alabama search"), the other involving the search of a trailer and hotel room in Austin, Texas ("the Texas search"). Appellant Richard Ramos also argues that the district court erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty.

Without discussion, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress testimony and physical evidence derived from the Texas search. We also conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to allow Richard Ramos to withdraw his guilty plea. However, for the reasons discussed below, we find that the district court incorrectly concluded that William Ramos abandoned his expectation of privacy in the briefcase found during the Alabama search.

II. BACKGROUND

Appellant William Ramos ("William") was the tenant of record for two different condominiums in the Back Bay Resort, located in Orange Beach, Alabama. He lived in these condominiums with his brother Appellant Richard Ramos ("Richard"). On July 28, 1991, William signed a five-month lease for Unit 408, but was transferred to Unit 606 on November 1, 1991, as 408 previously had been rented to someone else beginning November 1. William signed a new agreement for Unit 606 for a two-month period concluding January 1, 1992. Both units were managed by Meyer Realty ("Meyer"), which rented several units at that location on behalf of the individual units' owners. Each of these rental agreements specified on the front page that check-in time was between 2 P.M. and 5 P.M., and that check-out time was 10 A.M. Unit 606 was leased to another party for a period commencing on January 1, 1992.

Meyer had a contract with D.J.'s Cleaning ("D.J's") for the provision of housekeeping and cleaning services during the changeover periods between tenants. Debbie Anding, the owner of D.J.'s, was notified by Meyer on December 31, 1991 that the current tenants of Unit 606 would be leaving the next day. Accordingly, Anding sent two cleaners to Unit 606 on the morning of January 1, 1992. Katie Lester and Jeannie Williams arrived at Unit 606 at approximately 10 A.M., observed that the tenants were not out of the unit, and telephoned Anding with this information. Lester and Williams went to clean another unit, and Anding then met the two at Unit 606 sometime between 11:30 A.M. and 12 P.M.

When Anding arrived the tenants still had not moved out. Accordingly, Meyer instructed the cleaners to pack the personal effects into garbage bags so that the unit could be cleaned before the new tenants arrived. However, as the owner's closet had been opened, the cleaners had some difficulty determining what property belonged to the tenants and what belonged to the owner. The cleaners found two dollar bills, one in the owner's closet and one in the bathroom, each of which, according to Anding, had "white powder substance in it." Anding then found a briefcase on the floor of the master bedroom. Williams, her employee, tried to open the briefcase, but the right side was locked. When Williams peered inside through the unlocked left side she saw pieces of napkins wrapped by rubberbands. However, neither Williams nor Anding could determine what was wrapped inside the napkins, and could not determine whether the briefcase belonged to the owner or renter.

Anding relayed this situation to Kathy Fleming at the Meyer office, and told Fleming that there was "either drugs or money" in the briefcase. Fleming instructed the cleaners to unpack everything, and leave all the unit's items as they had found them. Gail Harris, Meyer's rental manager, notified the state police that her housekeepers had found a briefcase containing "what they thought to be cocaine," and asked them to send a trooper to Unit 606. Early that afternoon, Meyer's maintenance man escorted Trooper Warren Stewart to Unit 606. Stewart located the briefcase, observed some plastic bags while looking through the unlocked left side, and then opened the locked right latch with his pocketknife. Stewart field-tested a powder substance found in one of the bags within the briefcase. The substance tested positive for cocaine. He relocked the suitcase, placed it under the bed and telephoned Agent Michael Kirk from the Drug Enforcement Administration task force in Mobile, Alabama. Later that afternoon they obtained a search warrant from an Alabama state judge for the purpose of expanding the search in Unit 606. The following day Harris received a message at the realty office that William Ramos had called.

Appellants and codefendant Christine Adkins were indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. After pleading not guilty, they filed the two joint motions to suppress. William testified briefly at the suppression hearing, and stated that he was the owner of the briefcase.

At the close of the suppression hearing on the Alabama search, the district court stated that this type of rental was a "very definite limited tenancy," and that when the time expires the owner, or the owner's agent (e.g., Meyer), has a right to enter or send agents or state troopers into the condo "to check on that condo." The court, in denying the motion, concluded that:

And I'm of the opinion that the owner of the briefcase had abandoned his privacy rights in that briefcase because he had not checked out on time, something had to be done with that briefcase, and because it was left partially opened and a cleaning woman saw something in there that was suspicious, and the owner had every right to check to see what that was before they stored that briefcase or moved that briefcase. They did exactly the proper thing. They called the state trooper to come check the contents of that briefcase before they did anything with it.

And I'm of the opinion that there was no privacy right in this briefcase at that time by the owner of that briefcase. So therefore, there could be no invasion of any privacy rights in that briefcase.

Subsequently, the district court entered a summary Order stating that the motion was denied at the hearing. The written Order did not discuss any of the merits of the motion.

By finding that Appellants had abandoned the briefcase, the district court implicitly found that Appellants had no standing to contest the legality of the Alabama search. Thus, the district court never reached any questions concerning the legality of the search itself.

After the court subsequently denied the motion to suppress concerning the Texas search, William and Richard pled guilty to the conspiracy charge. In their respective plea agreements, Appellants expressly reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of the motions to suppress.

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, William and Richard argue in part that the district court erroneously denied their motion to suppress the fruits of the Alabama search. As rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of fact and law, the district court's factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while that court's application of the law is subject to de novo review. United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 401 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 358 (11th Cir.1989). Because the concept of abandonment "involves a factual issue," United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir.1987), a district court's finding of abandonment is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1521-22 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Reed v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 347, 121 L.Ed.2d 262 (1992).

In determining whether there has been abandonment, the " 'critical inquiry is "whether the person prejudiced by the search ... voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search." ' " United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 603 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting McKennon, 814 F.2d at 1546 (citation omitted)). Whether abandonment occurred is a question of intent which may be inferred from acts, words and "other objective facts." United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 871, 103 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed.2d 131 (1982). While Appellants here bear the burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the burden of proving abandonment is on the government. See United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S.Ct. 1277, 79 L.Ed.2d 681 (1984).

An individual can urge suppression of evidence only if his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. United States v....