Ritter v. State

Decision Date23 June 1887
Docket Number13,787
PartiesRitter v. The State
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

From the Elkhart Circuit Court.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

H. C Dodge, for appellant.

L. T Michener, Attorney General, F. D. Merritt, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. H. Gillett, for the State.

OPINION

Howk J.

The indictment in this case charged that appellant, Ritter, "on the 23d day of September, 1886, at the county of Elkhart and State of Indiana, was then and there an employee of one John McCarter; that said Daniel Ritter, as such employee, then and there had the control and possession of divers moneys, bills, notes, United States treasury notes, and national bank notes, current money of the United States, amounting in all to the sum of $ 315, of the property of the said John McCarter, to the possession of which the said John McCarter was then and there entitled; a more particular and accurate description of said moneys, bills, notes, United States treasury notes and national bank notes, is to this grand jury unknown and can not be given for the reason that they are in the possession of some person or persons to this grand jury unknown; that said Daniel Ritter did then and there, and while in the employment of said John McCarter, unlawfully, purposely, knowingly, fraudulently and feloniously purloin, secrete, embezzle and appropriate to his own use all of said moneys, bills, notes, United States treasury notes and national bank notes, then and there in the possession of said Daniel Ritter as aforesaid, without then and there having the consent of said John McCarter so to do."

Appellant's motion to quash the foregoing count of the indictment herein was overruled by the court, and this ruling is the first error, of which complaint is here made by his learned counsel. It is manifest that, in and by this first count of the indictment, the State intended to charge appellant with the commission of the public offence, which is defined and its punishment prescribed in section 1944, R. S. 1881. In that section it is provided as follows: "Every officer, agent, attorney, clerk, servant, or employee of any person or persons, corporation or association, who, having access to, control, or possession of any money, article, or thing of value, to the possession of which his or her employer or employers is or are entitled, shall, while in such employment, take, purloin, secrete, or in any way whatever appropriate to his or her own use, or to the use of others, * * * any money, coin, bills, notes, credits, choses in action, or other property or article of value, belonging to or deposited with, or held by such person or persons, or corporation or association, in whose employment said officer, agent, attorney, clerk, servant, or employee may be, shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the State prison," etc.

It is claimed on behalf of appellant, that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash the first count of the indictment, because it charges that appellant was "an employee of one John McCarter," and does not state the facts which would enable the court to ascertain and determine whether or not he was such "employee" within the meaning of that word as used in the statute. In discussing this objection to the indictment, appellant's counsel says: "In criminal pleading it is necessary to specify facts from which the conclusion flows that one is an employee; it will not do to state the conclusion. It was necessary for the pleader to state, in the indictment, the capacity in which appellant was engaged; and it would be for the court to state, as matter of law, on motion to quash, whether or not under the averments of the indictment a public offence had been committed. The ultimate fact to be found, to constitute guilt, was the fact whether appellant was an employee, or not an employee. It will not do to charge, in the indictment, the ultimate fact."

We do not think this objection to the indictment is well taken or can be sustained. The word "employee," although of French derivation, was long since transplanted and adopted as an English or, at...

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