Pearcy v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1887
• Citation: 12 N.E. 98,111 Ind. 59
• Parties: Pearcy v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

111 Ind. 59

12 N.E. 98

Pearcy

v.Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 18, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Jasper county.E. P. Hammond and W. F. McNeil, for appellant. W. S. Hartman and W. H. Hamelle, for appellee.

Elliott, C. J.

The appellant's complaint is based on a policy of insurance issued by the appellee on the life of John Pearcy, the husband of the appellant. The appellant asks a new trial for the reason, among others, that Ezra Bowman, one of the members of the jury, was incompetent, and because he was guilty of misconduct. In the affidavits filed by the appellant it is stated that each of the jurors was asked “whether he, or any of his family, held any life insurance policy issued by the defendant,” and that each of the jurors answered that neither he, nor any of his family, held a policy. The affidavits filed by the appellee state that the question asked each of the jurors was, “Do any of you hold a policy of life insurance issued by the defendant, the Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company?” and that the jurors were not asked, “Do you, or any member of your family, hold such a policy?” It was further shown that Ezra Bowman had taken out a policy on his life for the benefit of his wife, that the policy was in force at the time of the trial, and that the fact that such a policy was issued was unknown to the plaintiff and her attorneys until after the trial. In the affidavit filed by Bowman, he states that the question asked was, “Do you hold a policy of life insurance issued by the Michigan Mutual Insurance Company?” but he does not deny that he had taken out a policy for the benefit of his wife. He and the other jurors swear that, in rendering their verdict, they were influenced solely by the law and the evidence.

It is of high importance to a litigant that the triers of his cause should be impartial and disinterested men, and the law makes careful provision for securing him this right. In speaking of this right, the court of appeals of New York said: “The object of the law is to procure impartial, unbiased persons as jurors. They must be omni exceptione majores. They must have no interest in the subject-matter of the litigation.” Diveny v. City of Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506. The supreme court of Nebraska declared a like doctrine in Ensign v. Harney, 15 Neb. 330, 48 Amer. Rep. 344, 18 N. W. Rep. 73, where it was said: “Unless fair-minded, unbiased jurors can be selected, a trial becomes a mere farce, dependent, not upon the merits of the case, but upon extraneous circumstances, such as the bias, prejudice, or interest of the jury. To determine the competency of a juror, an oath is administered to him, and he is required to answer all questions touching his qualifications as a juror, not generally, but in that particular case. Great latitude is allowed in such examinations, and, if it appears probable that the juror is not indifferent between the parties, he is excluded.” Other courts have asserted a similar doctrine. Thus in Bradbury v. Cony, 62 Me. 223, the court said: “In the trial of causes, the appearance of evil should be as much avoided as evil itself. It is important that jurymen should be devoid of prejudice. It is hardly less so that they should be free from the suspicion of prejudice.” So in Melson v. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682, 36 Amer. Rep. 128, it was said: “A big part of the battle is the selection of the jury, and an impartial jury is the corner-stone of the fairness of trial by jury.” The principle is so plain and just that it needs little more than a bare statement, and we refrain from further reference to authorities, although they are very abundant.

The examination of a juror on his voir dire has a twofold purpose, namely, to ascertain whether a cause for challenge exists, and to ascertain whether it is wise and expedient to exercise the right of peremptory challenge given to parties by the law. It is often important that a party should know the relation of a person called as a juror to his adversary, in order that he may interpose a challenge for cause, or exercise his peremptory right to challenge. It is the duty of a juror to make full and truthful answers to such questions as are asked him, neither falsely stating any fact, nor concealing any material matter, since full knowledge of all material and relevant matters is essential to the fair and just exercise of the right to challenge either peremptorily or for cause. A juror who falsely misrepresents his interest or situation, or conceals a material fact relevant to the controversy, is guilty of misconduct, and such misconduct is prejudicial to the party, for it impairs his right to challenge. In this instance the appellant had a right to a full and...