Peck v. Peck

• Decision Date: 23 January 1880
• Citation: 12 R.I. 485
• Parties: STEPHEN P. PECK, Administrator, v. EMELINE PECK.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

12 R.I. 485

STEPHEN P. PECK, Administrator, v. EMELINE PECK.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 23, 1880

Betrothal followed by copulation does not make the common law marriage, " per verba de futuro cum copula ," when the parties looked forward to a formal ceremony and did not agree to become husband and wife without it.

Cohabitation following a marriage promise is primâ facie evidence, but not conclusive, of consent between the parties to become husband and wife de praesenti .

Query, whether there being no prohibitory language in the statute, a so-called common law marriage is valid in Rhode Island.

By an antenuptial agreement, each of the parties released all claim arising from the marriage to the property of the other. The intended husband had considerable personality, but little realty; the intended wife had little personality, but expected to inherit some realty.

Held, that as the marriage would give to the wife no interest in the husband's personality of which he could not deprive her, and might give to him a curtesy in her realty, the agreement was not without consideration, nor was it grossly inequitable.

BILL IN EQUITY praying for an injunction.

The bill was filed by Stephen P. Peck, administrator of Asahel Peck, formerly of Providence, against Emeline Peck, widow of Asahel. It sets forth an antenuptial agreement under seal, executed March 25, 1869, between Asahel and Emeline, then Emeline Hendrick, by which each of the parties relinquished all claim arising from the marriage to the property of the other; and charges that after the agreement the parties intermarried, and that Asahel Peck died March 2, 1878. At the time of the agreement and marriage both parties were of mature age, and both had living issue by former marriages. The bill also charges that after the death of Asahel, Emeline asked the Probate Court of Providence to make her an allowance from his estate; that she demands her distributive share from her husband's estate, and threatens to object to the allowance of the administrator's accounts unless her claims are complied with.

The bill prays that the respondent may be enjoined from making any claim on the estate of the deceased, and from embarrassing the complainant, as administrator, by submitting to the Probate Court any demand against the estate of her husband for allowance, distributive share, or payment of any claim arising from the coverture.

The answer admits the execution of the agreement, but denies its validity because it was executed under the following circumstances:

In 1867, the respondent, then a widow, and Asahel Peck, betrothed themselves by mutual promises, and subsequently cohabited. She became pregnant in 1868, and suffered a miscarriage, the result of an operation, which was proposed by Asahel and consented to by herself. The cohabitation continued, and she repeatedly solicited Asahel to have a marriage ceremony performed. They were married March 25, 1869, just after the execution of the antenuptial agreement, she stating that Asahel made the execution of the agreement a condition of their marriage. The answer is under oath and in the nature of a cross-bill. It prays that the agreement may be declared void, that the respondent may be declared entitled to dower and to her widow's share of the personality, and may be allowed a suitable provision from her husband's estate as provided by statute.

The reasons urged for the invalidity of the agreement and the evidence adduced, so far as it bears on the questions at issue, are given in the opinion of the court.

Oscar Lapham & Charles H. Page, for complainant.

James Tillinghast, for respondent.

DURFEE C. J.

The defence to this suit is that the antenuptial contract set forth in the bill as the ground of relief is void.

1. Because it was obtained by duress.

2. Because it was without any adequate consideration and was grossly inequitable.

3. Because the parties to it had before its execution become husband and wife by a common law marriage.

We do not think the defence is made out on either of these grounds.

1. It is true the defendant executed the contract under a kind of pressure, but it was a pressure of the circumstances in which she found herself rather than any duress exerted by the other party. This is apparent from the fact, proved by several uncontradicted witnesses, that immediately after the contract was executed, and her marriage with the other party solemnized, she stated the terms of the contract, and referred to it as proof that she had married for love and not money, claiming credit for her disinterestedness, and also from the fact that she afterwards repeatedly referred to it in the same manner, and never until some time after the death of her husband set up the claim that the contract was invalid.

2. When the contract was executed, the defendant had a...