State v Daniel

Citation12 S.W.3d 420
Decision Date31 January 2000
Docket Number97-00142
PartiesSTATE OF TENNESSEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN DANIEL, Defendant-AppellantIN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Filed:
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

Knox Criminal

Hon. Richard Baumgartner, Judge

For Plaintiff-Appellee:

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter

Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General

Todd R. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee

Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney General, Sixth Judicial District

Scott Green, Assistant District Attorney General, Knoxville, Tennessee

For Defendant-Appellant:

Mark E. Stephens,District Public Defender

Paula R. Voss, Assistant Public Defender

Jamie Niland, Assistant Public Defender

(Trial Only)

FOR PUBLICATION

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AND COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS REVERSED; CONVICTION VACATED; CHARGE DISMISSED.

DROWOTA, J.

OPINION

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution occurred when a police officer approached the defendant, Brian Daniel, in the parking lot of a convenience store, asked Daniel to produce some identification, and retained Daniel's identification to run a computer check for outstanding warrants.

The trial court found that no seizure took place prior to the time the officer placed Daniel under arrest on an outstanding warrant which was revealed by the computer check of Daniel's identification. Accordingly, the trial court denied Daniel's motion to suppress the marijuana which was discovered while the officer was searching Daniel's person incident to the arrest. Thereafter, Daniel pled guilty to possession of marijuana, but reserved the right to seek appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i).1 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the defendant was seized when the police officer retained his identification to run a computer check for outstanding warrants. Because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the seizure,2 the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is reversed; the defendant's conviction is vacated, and the charge is dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Deputy Jim Wright of the Knox County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Wright stated that while on patrol at approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 16, 1995, he observed an automobile parked in an unlighted area beside Bengie's Market in Knox County. Four men were standing around the outside of the vehicle. The sun was setting and it was "dusky dark" outside.

Deputy Wright drove up to the men in his patrol car "to see what the individuals were doing" because he thought it was peculiar for four young men to be standing around an automobile in the dark. Deputy Wright asked the men what was going on and requested that they provide some identification. The men complied. Deputy Wright examined the identification and retained the identification to run a computer check for outstanding warrants. While waiting for the computer check, two of the young men asked for and received permission from Deputy Wright to go inside the market to use the restroom and buy a soft drink.

After the computer check revealed an outstanding warrant for Daniel's arrest, Deputy Wright handcuffed Daniel and placed him under arrest. Before conducting a search of Daniel incident to the arrest, Deputy Wright asked if Daniel had anything sharp in his pockets. Daniel replied that he had a bag of marijuana in his pocket.

Daniel was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, and he moved to suppress the marijuana. In support of his motion, Daniel argued that the evidence had been discovered as a result of an unlawful seizure and was thereby tainted. Daniel asserted that the initial police questioning constituted an illegal seizure because he was not violating any law when the officer initiated the questioning, and the officer had no reasonable suspicion to believe that he had violated the law or was about to violate the law.

The trial court denied Daniel's motion, finding that no seizure took place. Daniel pled guilty to the charged offense,3 but was permitted, with the consent of the District Attorney General, to preserve the suppression issue as a certified question of law for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Thereafter, this Court granted Daniel's application for permission to appeal. For the reasons that follow, the judgments of the lower courts are reversed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard by which an appellate court reviews a trial court's findings of fact on suppression issues is as follows:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evidence supports the trial court's findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other words, a trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of the law to the facts found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997); Beare v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993). In this case, the trial court heard the testimony of only one witness. The facts are not disputed. As a result, the trial court's conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case. Therefore, in determining whether the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, we apply de novo review. Id.; see also State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 303 (Drowota, J. , dissenting).

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment4 to the United States Constitution provides that the people shall "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." Similarly, Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee guarantees "that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." However, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, section 7 limit all contact between police and citizens. Instead these constitutional provisions are designed "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of individuals." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S. Ct.3074, 3081, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976)); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629; State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) ("[A]rticle I, section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment."). Thus, these constitutional protections are implicated only when a police officer's interaction with a citizen impermissibly intrudes upon the privacy or personal security of the citizen. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure, 9.3 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999) (hereafter LaFave __ at __.)

In construing the demands of the Fourth Amendment, courts have recognized three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (1) a full scale arrest which must be supported by probable cause, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct.2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); (2) a brief investigatory detention which must be supported by reasonable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 S. Ct.1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); and (3) brief police-citizen encounters which require no objective justification, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991). See, e.g., Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300; United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the three types of police-citizen interactions). While arrests and investigatory detentions implicate varying degrees of constitutional protection, "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct.1868, at 1879 n.16; Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300; State v. Moore, 776 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tenn. 1989).5

Indeed, courts have repeatedly held that even when police have no basis for suspecting that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime, the officer may approach an individual in a public place and ask questions without implicating constitutional protections. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct.2386; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct.1319, 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300; State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993); Moore, 776 S.W.2d at 938; State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 685 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The rule has been further explained as follows:

law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in...

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