Fuller v. Berger
Decision Date | 05 February 1903 |
Docket Number | 847. |
Parties | FULLER v. BERGER et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Douglas Dyrenforth and John H. Lee, for appellant.
James H. Pierce, for appellees.
Before JENKINS, GROSSCUP, and BAKER, Circuit Judges.
Appellant complainant below, unsuccessfully sought to enjoin appellees from infringing letters patent, No. 613,844, on a bogus-coin detector for coin-operated vending machines. The letters were granted November 8, 1898, to the Mills Novelty Company assignee of the inventor. While that company was the owner the only practical use to which the detectors were put was to guard gambling machines, made and controlled by the company, from being operated by means of bogus coins. On December 8, 1899, the company assigned the patent to appellant, and, as a part of the same transaction, took from him a license to make and use the device. No one else used it by authority. Appellees, without license, applied it to gambling machines of their make. This suit was begun about a month after the assignment. The circumstances surrounding the assignment and attending the conduct of this litigation warranted the trial court in finding that the equities of the case should be determined as if the Mills Novelty Company had been complainant.
The defenses are two: That the patent is void for want of utility; and that, even if it is found not to be void, complainant has no standing because he comes into court with unclean hands, in this, that his suit is brought to enable the Mills Novelty Company to prevent another gambler from interfering with its illegal enterprises.
In support of this first contention, appellees cite Device Co. v. Lloyd (C.C.) 40 F. 89, 5 L.R.A. 784; Novelty Co. v. Dworzek (C.C.) 80 F. 902; Schultze v. Holtz (C.C.) 82 F. 448; Rickard v. Du Bon, 43 C.C.A. 360, 103 F. 868; and Mahler v. Animarium Co., 49 C.C.A. 431, 111 F. 530. In the Rickard Case, involving a process for spotting tobacco leaves, and in the Mahler Case, concerning a cure-all device, the clear purpose and the sole use of the respective inventions were found to be to deceive and defraud the public. In the Schultze Case, the fact that the invention had been used solely for gambling and could not be put to any other use was held to avoid the patent. In the two other cases, applications for injunctions were denied on showings that the devices had been used only for gambling purposes. But the court, in each case, went further and held the device to be wanting in utility, saying: 'The patent has been very recently issued, and it is possible that a useful application may yet be found for it; but, as the case now stands, the only use to which the invention has been put being for gambling purposes, I must hold that it is not a useful device within the meaning of the patent law. ' It may be doubted whether, in the latter holding, useableness (utility) and use (application) were not confounded; but, at all events, the courts in those cases came to the same end as the others in deciding that the respective patents were not for useful devices within the meaning of the patent law.
With regard to the defense of no utility (available equally at law and in equity), we hold that the true inquiry is, Was the government improvident in making the grant? Does the opposing evidence, the grant itself being prima facie proof of utility, go to the extent of establishing not merely that the device has been used for pernicious purposes, but that it is incapable of serving any beneficial end? As the just criterion, we approve and adopt Mr.Walker's conclusion (section 82 (3d Ed.)), with the additions to his text which we note by parentheses:
We deem the additions to the second hypothesis necessary to a complete statement of the acceptable test, for, to continue with Colt's revolver as an example, if at the time of a suit for infringement the defendant should prove that the only uses to which 'that instrument of death' had been put were vicious, the patent should not be held void for want of utility, if the court for itself should see, or be convinced by experts, that the instrument was susceptible of good uses, though in fact never put to such before the suit was begun. And, if utility is found, the cases seem to be uniform that courts will not set up a measure of utility which must be filled.
If the device here in question should be found insusceptible of other use than to guard gambling machines from being operated by means of bogus coins, we would be led to an outlook from which two interesting queries appear in view: (1) The statutes of Illinois, it is said, prohibit the use of coin-operated gambling machines, but not the manufacture or sale thereof. We are referred to statutes of other states, which, it is claimed, legitimate the use of such machines. Should a circuit court of the United States, sitting in Illinois, hold invalid a patent on such a machine and thereby destroy the monopoly of its manufacture and sale, because its use is forbidden in Illinois, though its manufacture and sale in Illinois and its use in certain other states are lawful? And (2) if the federal courts may properly hold patents on gambling machines void for lack of utility, because immoral, though countenanced by the legislation of particular states, is a device attached to such a machine likewise inimical to good morals, which prevents a gambler from being also a cheat?
But returning to the main road, we have no difficulty, under the principles hereinabove asserted, in finding some degree of utility in this invention. In the specifications and claims the device is called a bogus-coin detector for coin-operated vending machines. The inventor's attention to the need of such a mechanism was not directed by the Mills Novelty Company or other maker of chance machines. A manufacturer of coin-operated banjo-playing instruments expressed a want for a bogus-coin detector. The invention in suit resulted. The parties failed to come to terms, not because the detector would not supply the need for which it was designed, but because the inventor asked more than the banjo manufacturer was willing to pay. Afterwards the application was assigned to the Mills Novelty Company, and by it the device was applied to gambling machines. There is no element of chance, however, in the operations of the detector. Its mechanism has no connection with that of the machine to which it is attached. The outlets of its coin chutes are placed in registration with the inlets of the chutes of the coin-operated machine. 'The object of the invention,' says the specification, The testimony of experts was not needed to show that the detector would perform its functions without regard to the character of the machine below its outlet. ' It is doubtless true that the detector would be more efficacious if an attendant were...
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