Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 96-11247
| Decision Date | 14 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-11247,96-11247 |
| Citation | 120 F.3d 513 |
| Parties | , 7 A.D. Cases 1031, 23 A.D.D. 668, 10 NDLR P 253 Carolyn C. CLEVELAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; General Information Services, a Division of Policy Management Systems Corporation; Cybertek Corporation, Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John Edward Wall, Jr., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David Norman Kitner, Kimberly Summer Moore, Strasburger & Price, Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, * District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Carolyn C. Cleveland appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Policy Management Systems Corporation (PMSC), on her claim of wrongful termination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 1 We affirm, concluding that Cleveland has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact which, if proved, would rebut the presumption that her sworn declarations of disability submitted to the Social Security Administration (SSA) judicially estop her from asserting that under the ADA she is a "qualified individual with a disability."
PMSC hired Cleveland in August 1993. The following January, Cleveland suffered a stroke while on the job and took a leave of absence. She was unable to return to work immediately, however, as the stroke caused aphasia, a condition that affects concentration, memory, and language functions such as speaking, reading, and spelling.
With her daughter's assistance, Cleveland filed an application for social security disability benefits. In support of her sworn application, Cleveland certified that she had become "unable to work because of [her] disabling condition on January 7, 1994" and that she was "still disabled." She acknowledged also that it is a crime to make a false statement in an application for social security disability benefits.
In April 1994, Cleveland's doctor released her to return to work and anticipated an eventual recovery for her of nearly 100%. Cleveland alleges that when she returned to work at PMSC she contacted the SSA and informed them that she had returned and that she no longer needed disability benefits.
PMSC concedes that she informed the SSA of her return but denies that she ever withdrew her application for disability benefits or otherwise indicated that she was anything other than totally disabled.
Following her return, Cleveland did not perform well at PMSC. She requested several accommodations, including computer training, permission to take work home in the evenings, a transfer of position, and permission for the Texas Rehabilitation Commission to provide a counselor--free of charge--to assist her. PMSC denied each of her requests. In July 1994, PMSC terminated Cleveland for poor job performance.
Cleveland claims that as a consequence of her firing she became depressed and that her aphasia worsened. In September 1994, she renewed her application for social security disability benefits by filing a "Request for Reconsideration" in which she stated, "I continue to be disabled," and a "Work Activity Report" in which she stated that she was terminated "because I could no longer do the job because of my condition." In January 1995, Cleveland filed another "Request for Reconsideration" and that May requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in both instances representing that she was "unable to work due to my disability."
In September 1995, the ALJ concluded that Cleveland had become disabled on January 7, 1994 and was disabled continuously through the date of the ALJ's decision. Consequently, the ALJ granted her social security disability benefits, effective retroactively to January 7, 1994.
One week before the ALJ's decision, Cleveland had filed suit against PMSC for wrongful termination in violation of the ADA and the Texas Labor Code. PMSC moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that Cleveland could not establish a prima facie case under the ADA, as her representations in her application for, and her receipt of, social security disability benefits estopped her from claiming that she is a "qualified individual with a disability." The district court granted PMSC's motion on the ADA claim and dismissed the state law claim without prejudice.
Cleveland timely appealed, insisting that she is not estopped from establishing as a matter of law that she is a "qualified individual with a disability." Specifically, she maintains that her position in pursuit of social security disability benefits and her instant position under the ADA are not inconsistent, as (1) she was disabled for purposes of social security disability benefits when she filed the initial application; (2) when she returned to work, she notified the SSA and withdrew her claim for benefits; and (3) she became disabled again for purposes of social security disability benefits only after and as a result of her termination. Cleveland contends that, from the time she returned to work until she was terminated, she could have performed the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation, i.e., during that period she was a "qualified individual with a disability."
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. 2 Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability." 4 To assert an ADA violation successfully, in The Social Security Act prescribes an individual's eligibility for social security disability benefits. An individual is entitled to receive such benefits if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment" 8 and only if that impairment is of such severity that he is unable to do his previous work and cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 9
the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that, inter alia, he is a "qualified individual with a disability." 5 A "disability" is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of the individual. 6 A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions" of his job. 7
When the two statutes are read in pari materia, it seems logically inconsistent, at first blush, for an individual to claim that he qualifies for social security disability benefits while simultaneously maintaining that he can perform the essential functions of his position for purposes of asserting an ADA claim. Herein lies the dilemma.
Several of our fellow circuits have held that a plaintiff who represents that he is totally disabled for purposes of recovering social security disability benefits cannot then assert that he is a "qualified individual with a disability" for purposes of bringing an ADA claim. Those circuits have barred the subsequent ADA claim under various theories of preclusion, including the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel. 10
Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding. 11 The doctrine serves a clear purpose: to protect the integrity of the judicial process. 12
We decline, however, to adopt a per se rule that automatically estops an applicant for or recipient of social security disability benefits from asserting a claim of discrimination under the ADA. 13 It is at least theoretically conceivable that under some limited and highly unusual set of circumstances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually exclusive, as the SSA's determination of an applicant's entitlement to social security disability benefits would not be synonymous with a determination that a plaintiff is or is not a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. 14
First, while the ADA requires an individualized inquiry into the ability of a particular person to meet the requirements of a particular position, the SSA permits general presumptions about an individual's ability to work. The SSA considers some conditions to be presumptively disabling. If a claimant has an impairment that is medically equivalent to a listed impairment, the SSA presumes that the disorder is so severe as to prevent the claimant from doing any substantial gainful activity, without considering his age, education or past work experience. 15 Thus, an individual can have a "disability" under the SSA definition and still be able to work.
Second, the SSA does not consider whether the individual can work with reasonable accommodation. An SSA interpretative guidance addressing the SSA's disability determination process states,
The fact that an individual may be able to return to a past relevant job, provided that the employer makes accommodations, is not relevant to the issues to be resolved.... [H]ypothetical inquiries about Thus, a person may be unable to do any work which exists in the national economy even though he can work with a reasonable accommodation. In those instances, the person is both a person with a "disability" under the SSA and a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. Accordingly, a person claiming to be disabled...
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...benefits was estopped from asserting that he or she is a “qualified individual with a disability.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. , 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court overruled the rebuttable presumption rule in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, ......
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Summary Judgment Practice
...benefits was estopped from asserting that he or she is a “qualified individual with a disability.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. , 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court overruled the rebuttable presumption rule in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, ......
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Summary judgment practice
...benefits was estopped from asserting that he or she is a “qualified individual with a disability.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. , 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court overruled the rebuttable presumption rule in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, ......