Forsyth v. Doolittle
| Decision Date | 17 January 1887 |
| Citation | 7 S.Ct. 408,30 L.Ed. 586,120 U.S. 73 |
| Parties | FORSYTH, impleaded, etc., v. DOOLITTLE and others |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
J. E. McDonald and John M. Butler, for plaintiff in error.
M. W. Fuller, Jas. R. Doolittle, and Jas. R. Doolittle, Jr., for defendants in error.
This is an action to recover compensation for services rendered by the plaintiffs below to the defendants in effecting a sale of certain lands in Indiana, and in various legal proceedings concerning the title, or claims against them. The declaration alleges a joint contract and liability by the defendants below, Caroline Forsyth and Jacob Forsyth, her husband; but the summons was served on her only. She appeared, and pleaded the general issue. A statute of Illinois provides that sue. A statute of Illinois provides that in actions on contracts, express or implied, against two or more defendants as partners, joint obligors, or payors, proof of their joint liability or partnership shall not be required to entitle the plaintiff to judgment, unless such proof shall be rendered necessary by a plea in abatement, or a plea in bar, denying the partnership or joint liability, verified by affidavit. The joint contract and liability of the defendants, therefore, stood admitted by the pleadings, and this is a sufficient answer to several objections taken to the admissibility of statements and the proof of acts of the defendant, J cob Forsyth. Being jointly liable with Caroline on the contract in suit, his declarations respecting the services rendered under it were as admissible as if made by her.
The services for which compensation is sought were not only those required of attorneys and counselors at law, but were also those of negotiators seeking to accomplish the result desired by consultation with proposed purchasers, and presentation to them of the advantages to be derived from the property, present and prospective. Varied as were the legal services of the plaintiffs, it is plain from the testimony that those rendered by negotiation and consultation, and presentation of the uses to which the property could be applied, were far more effective and important. This fact necessarily had a controlling weight in estimating the value of the services. It is difficult to apply to such services any fixed standar by which they can be measured, and their value determined, as can be done with reference to services purely professional. There is a tact and skill and a happy manner with some persons which render them successful as negotiators, while others of equal learning, attainments, and intellectual ability fail for the want of those qualities. The compensation to be made in such cases is, by the ordinary judgment of business men, measured by the results obtained. It is not limited by the time occupied or the labor bestowed. It is from overlooking the difference in the rule by which compensation is measured in such cases, and that in cases where the services are strictly of a professional nature, that several objections are urged for reversal of the judgment recovered, which, if this difference were regarded, would not be seriously pressed.
The services rendered related to so many different subjects that it would require a long narrative to describe them with much detail. It is sufficient for the consideration of the questions not disposed of by what has already been said to state generally the main facts of the case. Caroline Forsyth, for several years before the employment of the plaintiffs, had been the owner of a tract of land consisting of 8,000 acres in Indiana, about 16 miles from Chicago. Only about 1,000 acres of it were fit for cultivation. The principal value of the tract was owing to its proximity to Chicago, and to the belief that it could be made use of for manufacturing and commercial purposes as a suburb of that city. It yielded no revenue. There were taxes due upon it, and portions of it had been sold for taxes. It was subject to a mortgage for $163,000, executed in 1875, upon a loan of $100,000, which, with the stipulated interest to maturity, amounted to that sum; and a suit had been commenced by its holders in the circuit court of the United States in Indiana for its foreclosure, and the sale of the premises. The defendants were without means to meet...
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Williams v. Illinois
...answers to the questions are entitled to no weight, because based upon false assumptions or statements of facts.” Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 [7 S.Ct. 408, 30 L.Ed. 586] (internal quotation marks omitted). Modern rules of evidence continue to permit experts to express opinions bas......
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Barefoot v. Estelle
...to their professional calling." See also Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 26-27, 21 L.Ed. 73 (1872); Forsythe v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 78, 7 S.Ct. 408, 410-411, 30 L.Ed. 586 (1877); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 568-569, 18 S.Ct. 183, 196-197, 42 L.Ed. 568 Today, in the federal system, ......
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Williams v. Illinois
...answers to the questions are entitled to no weight, because based upon false assumptions or statements of facts." Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 [7 S.Ct. 408, 30 L.Ed. 586] (internal quotation marks omitted). Modern rules of evidence continue to permit experts to express opinions bas......
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Activated Sludge v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago
...of defendant's proof. Such questions are, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the discretion of the court. Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 7 S.Ct. 408, 30 L.Ed. 586. See also generally Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L.Ed. 256; Schmeider v. Barney, 113 U.S. 6......