Leather Manufacturers Nat Bank v. Cooper

Citation30 L.Ed. 816,7 S.Ct. 777,120 U.S. 778
PartiesLEATHER MANUFACTURERS' NAT. BANK v. COOPER, Jr. 1
Decision Date21 March 1887
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Chas. M. Da Costa and N. B. Sanborn, for plaintiff in error.

John M. Bowers, for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

This is a writ of error brought under section 5 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, (18 St. 470,) for the review of an order of the circuit court remanding a suit which had been removed from the supreme court of the county and state of New York. The suit was begun June 1, 1886, by William B. Cooper, Jr., a citizen of New York, against the Leather Manufacturers' National Bank, to recover a balance of account due from the bank to the firm of Ashburner & Co., which had been assigned to him. The bank was originally organized under the national banking act, c. 106, (13 St. 99,) on the twenty-seventh of May, 1865, and its corporate existence was extended May 27, 1885, under the act of July 12, 1882, c. 290, (22 St. 162.) Its place of business is in the city of New York, in the state of New York. Section 4 of the act of July 12, 1882, is as follows:

'Sec. 4. That any association so extending the period of its succession shall continue to enjoy all the rights and privileges and immunities granted, and shall continue to be subject to all the duties, liabilities, and restrictions imposed by the Revised Statutes of the United States, and other acts having reference to national banking associations, and it shall continue to be in all respects the identical association it was before the extension of its period of succession: provided, however, that the jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association established under any law providing for national banking associations, except suits between them and the United States, or its officers and agents, shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States which do or might do banking business where such national banking associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun; and all laws and parts of laws of the United States inconsistent with this proviso be, and the same are hereby, repealed.'

On the twenty-third of September, 1886, the bank presented its petition to the state court for the removal of the suit to the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New York, under the act of March 3, 1875, on the ground of its being a national bank, and consequently the suit was one arising under the laws of the United States. The cause was duly entered in the circuit court October 4, 1886, and on the ninth of the same month Cooper moved that it be remanded. This motion was granted October 22d, because section 4 of the act of July 12, 1882, had taken away from national banks the right of removing suits under the act of 1875, on the ground of their being federal corporations. To reverse that order this writ of error was brought.

The act of 1882 repeals in express terms 'all laws and parts of laws of the United States' inconsistent with its provisions, and enacts that jurisdiction for suits thereafter brought by or against national banks, with few exceptions, 'shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States' doing business where the national bank 'may be doing business when such suits may be begun.' This was evidently intended to put national banks on the same footing as the banks of the state where they were located for all the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The first national banking act, that of February 25, 1863, c. 58, (12 St. 681,) provided, in section 59, that suits by and against banks organized thereunder might be brought in any 'circuit, district, or territorial court of the United...

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81 cases
  • Financial Software System v. First Union Nat. Bank
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 23 de novembro de 1999
    ...banks arose under federal law, thus providing automatic federal question jurisdiction. See Leather Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780, 7 S.Ct. 777, 30 L.Ed. 816 (1887). In 1882, however, the jurisdictional provision was amended in substance, as Provided, however, That the......
  • Burns v. American National Bank and Trust Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 20 de abril de 1973
    ...of Congress, gave it no greater right to remove a case than if it had been organized under a state law. Leather Manufacturers\' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 7 S.Ct. 777, 30 L.Ed. 816." Id. at 111, 35 S.Ct. at 839. At first glance Herrman, Buford, and Cooper do seem to stand for the proposi......
  • Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 1 de novembro de 2004
    ..."were placed in the same category with banks not organized under the laws of the United States"); Leather Mfr.'s Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780, 7 S.Ct. 777, 30 L.Ed. 816 (1887) (describing the purpose of the 1882 Act as "to put national banks on the same footing as the banks of th......
  • Travers v. Paton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 25 de novembro de 1966
    ...regarding tortious invasions of privacy does not mean that such a case arises under federal law. Cf. Leathers Mfr's Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 781, 7 S.Ct. 777, 30 L.Ed. 816 (1887). The facts of this case have no connection with any federal rights, those secured by the Constitution and l......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Arbitral Autonomy
    • United States
    • Louisiana Law Review No. 74-1, October 2013
    • 1 de outubro de 2013
    ...where they were located for all the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.” Leather Mfrs’ Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887). 134. Currently, arbitration does not fully function under the parity principle. For example, the arbitrator might not be able to......

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