1200 Sixth St., LLC v. United States

• Citation: 848 F.Supp.2d 767
• Decision Date: 16 March 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 11–12948.
• Parties: 1200 SIXTH STREET, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, acting by and through the GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)

848 F.Supp.2d 767

1200 SIXTH STREET, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America, acting by and through the GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

Case No. 11–12948.

United States District Court,

E.D. Michigan,

Southern Division.

March 16, 2012.

Carl G. Becker, Becker Law Firm, PLC, Rochester, MI, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Quinn, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

CORRECTED OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

DAVID M. LAWSON, District Judge.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote: “Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143, 41 S.Ct. 55, 65 L.Ed. 188 (1920). Add to that caution the further warning that one chooses to do business with the General Services Administration at its peril, and the lesson of this case emerges. The plaintiff has brought suit to recover the considerable expenses it incurred based on a representation made by a General Services Administration (GSA) employee that the GSA intended to exercise an option to purchase the plaintiff's office building complex. As it turns out, the GSA fumbled the deal when it failed to contractually bind a developer whose participation was integral to the closing. The sale fell through, and the plaintiff—who might have had a remedy against the GSA and its employees had they been private actors—has run into the obstacle of sovereign immunity in its efforts to recover its losses. Although the plaintiff has tried to plead around that doctrine, in the end the plaintiff's theories of liability all are based on the statements by the GSA's employees that the government intend to close the deal, which proved to be a misrepresentation for which the government is immune from liability. The Court, therefore, must grant the government's motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

The facts of the case come from the complaint, which are taken as true because of the procedural posture of the case. The office building complex is located at 1200 Sixth Street on the western edge of Detroit's downtown area. The eponymous plaintiff is a limited liability company whose sole business purpose is to own and operate that land, building, and adjoining parking areas. Its managing partner is Samir A. Danou.

The plaintiff purchased the land from the State of Michigan in 2005 for $6.3 million. The building was vacant at the time; however, the State reserved an easementunder which two entities—the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Michigan State Police (MSP)—could continue to operate tower antenna systems that had been installed on the building, which the plaintiff was obligated to maintain. The easement was to last for five years or until the plaintiff decided to terminate it, whichever occurred first.

In the meantime, in the summer and fall of 2005, Congress authorized the GSA to lease up to 266,200 square feet and 271 parking spaces for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a term of 15 years. The plan was for the GSA to obtain an option on a suitable building, assign the option to a developer who would purchase and refurbish the building, and then the GSA would enter into a long-term lease of the premises for the FBI.

The plaintiff and the GSA negotiated an assignable one-year option on the 1200 Sixth Street land and building effective August 1, 2006. The purchase price was $9 million, and the GSA had the right to extend the option for one thirty-day period. The option agreement required the plaintiff to accomplish a number of tasks at the plaintiff's expense before the real estate transaction could close. Those tasks included delivering a topographical metes and bounds land title survey, delivering a preliminary title commitment for an owner's title insurance policy, funding any unapproved “due care” activities referenced in Michigan's hazardous substances law, Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.20107a, obtaining governmental approvals to vacate Sixth and Abbott Streets, and obtaining any zoning variances. The option obliged the plaintiff to deliver clear title, which apparently included the obligation to eliminate the easement for the communications antennae. Several of the tasks required the parties to the option to spend substantial amounts of money, time, and effort, presumably on the hope that the deal would be finalized. Except for reimbursement of the plaintiff for the cost of a traffic study, the option contained no provision to compensate either party for the expenses of bringing the deal together before the option actually was exercised. To the contrary, the option explicitly stated:

14. Failure to Exercise Option. If Optionee elects not to exercise the rights, option, or fee simple interests granted herein and to complete the purchase within the time and in the manner provided herein, then this Option shall terminate without further action or obligation on the part of either party.

Compl., Ex. D, Option Agreement ¶ 14.

The plaintiff's transactional attorney was Neil Silver. The GSA's contact person in charge of the project was Julie Hoffman. On February 16, 2007, Hoffman sent a letter to the Michigan State Housing Development Authority and Silver in which she stated, in part: “This Project will be built. There is no speculation. In short, this Project will be a tremendous success story demonstrating what can be accomplished when private parties and federal, state, and local government partner to revitalize our older urban areas.” Compl., Ex. L, Feb. 16, 2007 correspondence at 2. On May 10, 2007, Hoffman e-mailed Silver and asked him to “proceed with contacting the State regarding the 90–day notice for removal of the antennaes [sic].” Compl., Ex. J, Tower Removal Notice. The plaintiff complied; it cost the plaintiff $114,000 to vacate the easement and remove the tower. The plaintiff also incurred legal fees in preparing for the closing on the property.

Higgins Development Partners, Inc. (Higgins) was the developer that initially won the bid for the FBI project in late 2006. According to Silver, Forrest Hudson of the GSA stated that the bid specifications required the successful bidder to accept the option to purchase and close the transaction as soon as the plaintiff removed all the contingencies. Silver says that he repeatedly requested and received assurances from Hudson and Latrice Lacey, GSA's contract procurement officer, that Higgins was “locked in” to the deal. The plan, apparently, was to assign the option to Higgins and have Higgins complete the purchase according to the terms of the option. However, during 2007, Higgins attempted to restructure the agreement, and the plaintiff inquired of the GSA how Higgins could do that.

In June 2007, Silver began asking for copies of Higgins's written acceptance of the assignment and its execution of the option agreement. In response, Hoffman and Robinson told Silver for the first time that Higgins had not been contractually bound to the deal due to an “oversight” by the GSA. They assured Silver that the deal would close even if another developer had to be found. Higgins ultimately walked away from the project. GSA issued a second set of bid solicitations, but no satisfactory bidder responded.

On July 21, 2010, plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to the GSA demanding reimbursement for its expenditures of approximately $4.3 million. The plaintiff summarized the basis for its claims as follows:

[T]he so called ‘Real Estate Option Agreement’ between the GSA and 1200 Sixth Street LLC ... was represented by yourself to my client and Mr. Silver as a mere formality necessitated because the Government was involved and that, in fact, the transaction was an assured purchase whereby the Government would absolutely secure the purchase of the property. These representations were made by you at the insistence of Mr. Danou due to Mr. Danou's stated financial concerns as to why would he spend hundreds of thousands of dollars meeting ‘pre-conditions' to closing if the Government could merely walk away at any time it chose. According to Mr. Danou and Mr. Silver such statements were made on a minimum of 4 or 5 occasions and in all instances you assured them that there was nothing to be concerned over as the option is merely the format of the way the Government acquires property but that notwithstanding the format if my client performed all of the preconditions at its expense the sale would consummate.

Compl., Ex. M, July 21, 2010 Letter to GSA. The plaintiff described its theories of recovery thus:

Without providing an extended dissertation of the law relative to all the conduct above described, my client claims that because of the special trust relationship created by you and the GSA that various causes of action exist including but not limited to innocent, negligent, silent and active misrepresentation, detrimental reliance, promissory estoppel and of course, breach of contract.

Ibid.

The GSA acknowledged receipt of the plaintiff's claims on March 22, 2011 but rejected all of them, except for $13,814.98 for the traffic study. Despite the government's willingness to reimburse the plaintiff for the cost of the traffic study, it has not done so yet.

The plaintiff filed the present action alleging promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance (Count 1), quasi contract (Count 2), negligent misrepresentation for future facts and negligent directives (Count 3), declaratory and injunctive relief (Count 4), and attorney's fees under the EAJA (Count 5). Count 4 alleges a class claim for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the disputes clause in the option agreement that refers to the Contract Disputes Act. The option stated that the parties agreed that disputes would be resolvedunder that Act, which by its own terms does not apply to procurement contracts involving real estate. See41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)(1) (formerly codified as 41 U.S.C. § 602). The complaint alleges that...