Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 31 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | P,AMAYA-RUI,No. 96-99011,96-99011 |
| Citation | 121 F.3d 486 |
| Parties | 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6042, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9948 Jose Jacoboetitioner-Appellant, v. Terry STEWART, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Edward H. Laber and Jose H. Robles, Tucson, AZ, for Appellant.
Paul J. McMurdie and Diane M. Ramsey, Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; William D. Browning, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-91-00606.
Before KOZINSKI, THOMPSON and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
In 1985, a jury convicted Jose Jacobo Amaya-Ruiz of first degree murder, manslaughter, theft, and first degree burglary. The state trial court sentenced Amaya-Ruiz to death.
Amaya-Ruiz appeals the district court's denial of his first federal habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. 1
Amaya-Ruiz, an illegal alien from El Salvador, worked for Kimberly Lopez (Kimberly) and her husband, Mark Lopez, on their ranch in Tucson, Arizona. On March 28, 1985, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Kimberly was speaking to her sister on the telephone. Through the telephone, her sister heard a knock at Kimberly's door, heard Kimberly open the door, and heard Kimberly say, The sister hung up and phoned the police.
The police immediately went to the Lopez's ranch. When they arrived, Kimberly was dead. She had been stabbed over twenty times and shot once, near her ear. The gunshot wound, however, was not fatal. Kimberly, who was approximately four months pregnant, bled to death over a period of ten to fifteen minutes.
While driving to the scene, a police officer reported seeing a "Mexican-looking male in a baseball cap" walking away from a truck which had run off the road. Two knives belonging to the Lopez's household were found in the truck. One knife had blood on it and was believed to be the murder weapon. Officers searched the area but did not find Amaya-Ruiz. They issued a bulletin to law enforcement officers to detain him if he was apprehended.
Later that evening, on March 29th, at approximately 12:15 a.m., railroad security officers apprehended Amaya-Ruiz while he was trespassing and attempting to board a train in Yuma, Arizona. Amaya-Ruiz was turned over to the United States Border Patrol. At the Border Patrol station, Amaya-Ruiz surrendered a loaded revolver he was carrying. The revolver matched a gun missing from the Lopez's ranch.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., a police detective questioned Amaya-Ruiz and Amaya-Ruiz eventually confessed to the murder. Officers also later determined that a bloody shoe print found near Kimberly's body at the murder scene matched Amaya-Ruiz's shoe.
Prior to trial, the state trial court ordered two competency evaluations of Amaya-Ruiz, held a competency hearing, and determined that he was competent to stand trial. A jury convicted him of first degree murder, manslaughter (for the death of the unborn child), theft, and first degree burglary. The state trial court sentenced him to death.
After an evidentiary hearing on Amaya-Ruiz's ineffective assistance claim, the state trial court denied his first state post-conviction petition. The Arizona Supreme Court consolidated his direct appeal and his appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the manslaughter conviction but affirmed the convictions for the remaining offenses and the death sentence. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260 (1990). The United States Supreme Court denied Amaya-Ruiz's petition for certiorari. 500 U.S. 929, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991).
In September 1992, Amaya-Ruiz filed his first federal habeas petition with the district court. In this petition, he raised twenty-seven claims. The district court determined Amaya-Ruiz had procedurally defaulted several claims and determined the remaining claims were meritless. Amaya-Ruiz now appeals from the district court's denial of his first habeas petition.
Amaya-Ruiz raises four issues on appeal. He argues his federal constitutional rights were violated because (1) the state trial court failed to order an additional competency evaluation during the pretrial, trial, or sentencing proceedings, (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, (3) his confession was involuntary and he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights, and (4) he did not waive his right to be present during his mitigation/aggravation hearing.
Prior to trial, the state trial court ordered two competency evaluations, held a competency hearing, and found Amaya-Ruiz to be competent. Amaya-Ruiz argues the state trial court should have ordered an additional competency evaluation of him during the pretrial, trial, or sentencing proceedings. According to Amaya-Ruiz, the state trial court's failure to order such an additional evaluation violated his federal constitutional right to due process.
The due process clause requires a state trial court to sua sponte inquire into a defendant's competency if "a reasonable judge would be expected to have a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence." Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.1993). A bona fide doubt exists if there is "substantial evidence of incompetence." Lewis, 991 F.2d at 527; see also Moran, 57 F.3d at 695. "Although no particular facts signal incompetence, suggestive evidence includes a defendant's demeanor before the trial court, previous irrational behavior, and available medical evaluations." Moran, 57 F.3d at 695.
The issue presented by this appeal is not whether Amaya-Ruiz was in fact incompetent. See Lewis, 991 F.2d at 527. Instead, we must respond to the issue Amaya-Ruiz presents: whether his due process rights were violated because the state trial court had information before it which should have caused the court to have a bona fide doubt as to Amaya-Ruiz's competency and, thus, to order an additional competency evaluation. See id. In resolving this issue, we examine only the information that was before the state trial court at the time of the pretrial, trial, and sentencing proceedings. Id.
Prior to trial, Amaya-Ruiz's counsel, Susan Kettlewell, moved the state trial court for a competency determination. The state trial court granted the motion and appointed Doctor Overbeck, suggested by Amaya-Ruiz, and Doctor LaWall, suggested by the prosecution, to evaluate Amaya-Ruiz.
In his report, Doctor Overbeck opined:
Amaya-Ruiz persisted in stating that he did not intend to answer the questions posed because he was not sure of what was happening. Repeated efforts were made, unsuccessfully, to explain events and secure his cooperation. It was this examiner's strong impression that Mr. Amaya-Ruiz had voluntarily decided to refuse to answer the questions in his own best interests--probably as a result of advice from other incarcerated prisoners.
When asked, the court interpreter described Mr. Amaya-Ruiz's behavior at the prior rule 11 interview as much more vocal, cooperative and expressive, reinforcing this examiner's belief that Mr. Amaya-Ruiz was not ignorant of the need to employ self-protecting strategies in his legal defense.... [H]is behavior suggested that he was well aware of the proceedings against him and intended to exercise due caution accordingly.
This examiner cannot unequivocally identify Mr. Amaya-Ruiz as either competent or not competent to stand trial. However, reasonable confidence is present that Mr. Amaya-Ruiz is probably capable of developing competence, assuming (a) the opportunity for brief tutoring in the terminology and process of the legal proceedings and, most importantly, (b) Mr. Amaya-Ruiz is willing to actively involve himself in the process.
Doctor LaWall opined in his report that:
[Amaya-Ruiz] had difficulty grappling with the concept of a jury but understood in general the judicial process in criminal cases, that is [to] say he seemed to understand the state would attempt to prove him guilty of the charges against him....
He relates in a pleasant and cooperative manner
....
It's my opinion that this man understands the nature of the proceedings against him and is able to assist in his defense....
After receiving these reports, the state trial court held a competency hearing. During the hearing, Doctor LaWall answered affirmatively the State's question whether he believed Amaya-Ruiz was competent to stand trial and also testified: "In my opinion, he had adequate understanding, or at least the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and assist his attorney." He further testified:
I couldn't separate how much was truly bewilderment to him and how much [was] him taking a stance of just not responding to anything.
...
I suspect that someone has advised him not to say anything to anybody, probably other inmates.
When asked whether he believed an additional examination of Amaya-Ruiz would be beneficial, Doctor LaWall responded:
Well, it is potentially a benefit, but I see a big problem in his assessment being the possibility of malingering, of faking ignorance, if you will, and I don't know how much of that was going on at the time I saw him versus genuine lack of understanding.
I have a suspicion that I might find the same thing again and it might be on the basis of malingering.
In response to the following questions, Doctor Overbeck testified:
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