121 F.3d 642 (11th Cir. 1997), 96-6593, Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

Docket Nº:96-6593.
Citation:121 F.3d 642
Party Name:Gheila ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., a corporation, and Trivis Wood, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
Case Date:September 10, 1997
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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121 F.3d 642 (11th Cir. 1997)

Gheila ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,


TYSON FOODS, INC., a corporation, and Trivis Wood,

individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-6593.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

September 10, 1997

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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Larry R. Mann, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paul A. Gilker, Michael R. Jones, Gilker & Jones, Mountainburg, AR, Jack W. Torbert, Torbert & Torbert, Gadsden, AL, Billy J. McPherson, Oneonta, AL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HOWARD [*], Senior District Judge.

HOWARD, Senior District Judge:

Gheila Allen appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Tyson Foods, Inc., the dismissal with prejudice of all federal claims, and the dismissal without prejudice of the supplemental state law claims. Because we find that genuine issues of material fact exist in this action, we reverse the district court and remand this action for further proceedings.


Tyson is a national food processing company with a poultry processing plant located in Blountsville, Alabama. Tyson has a policy against sexual harassment. Plaintiff began working at the Blountsville plant in 1989. In March of 1994, she was transferred to production and began working in the rehang department where defendant Wood was a supervisor. Supervisors are the lowest ranked managerial employees at Tyson. Plaintiff offered evidence that, while working under Wood, Wood wrote her sexually explicit notes, solicited sexual favors from plaintiff, and improperly touched plaintiff on one occasion. Evidence was also offered that Wood had sent similar notes with graphic sexual references to other employees of Tyson and that he often told sexually explicit jokes to employees at the plant. Plaintiff also offered evidence that other employees at the plant

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were aware of Wood's alleged harassment of plaintiff. The record also contains evidence that other employees at the plant, including other supervisors, were aware that Woods had harassed other female employees.

Plaintiff produced evidence indicating that the Blountsville plant was engulfed by an atmosphere of improper sexuality. There was evidence showing that employees, including supervisors, engaged in sexual intercourse at the plant, that sexually graphic jokes were often told throughout the plant, that vulgar and sexually demeaning language was engaged in, that employees groped one another's breasts and genitalia, that employees exhibited their genitalia and buttocks, and that employees used various chicken parts to mimic sexual organs and activities. The evidence suggested that such activities were widely known throughout the plant.

At first, plaintiff allegedly believed that Wood was joking with her when he wrote her notes and did nothing to stop the harassment. With the fourth note, however, plaintiff contends that she asked Wood to stop giving her the harassing correspondence. After receiving a fifth sexually explicit note, plaintiff gave Wood a letter threatening legal action if he continued the harassment. Plaintiff had never complained to anyone at Tyson about her alleged harassment before this time. Wood returned the letter to plaintiff and reported plaintiff's complaint to his superintendent. Tyson management then initiated an investigation into the matter. Plaintiff contends that she was intimidated and harassed by Wood and other Tyson employees during the investigation. The company could not verify plaintiff's complaint and so no action was ultimately taken against Wood. At her request, however, Allen was transferred to another department. Plaintiff alleged that she was continually exposed to Wood after her transfer and that Wood continued to intimidate her. Consequently, Allen quit going to work and was terminated for her absence.


After her termination, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a notice of right to sue. Plaintiff then timely filed suit against the defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Plaintiff's complaint brought claims for legal and equitable relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, the tort of outrage, invasion of privacy, negligent hiring and supervision and constructive discharge. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to bring state claims for assault and battery and sexual harassment. The defendants separately filed motions for summary judgment to which the plaintiff filed an opposition. In her opposition to the motions, plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her claims under the equal protection clause against both defendants and withdrew her Title VII claim against Wood.

On April 23, 1996, the district court granted defendant Tyson's motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice the federal claims against Tyson. The supplemental state law claims against both defendants were dismissed without prejudice. In his memorandum opinion, the district court found that plaintiff's Title VII claim against Tyson bordered on the frivolous. The court focused on the fact that plaintiff had failed to complain to Tyson personnel of the alleged harassment. The court opined that the emphasis under Title VII should be on the curtailment of sexual harassment rather than on delay, damages and attorney fees and that the employer must be given the opportunity to cure the harassment before a lawsuit can be filed. Also, the court failed to find that there were no genuine issues of material fact.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the district court's dismissal of the action which was denied by the district court. In its opinion on the motion, the district court again failed to find that there was an absence of genuine issues of material fact in the action and explained that it did not reach the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the plaintiff was the victim of hostile environment, sexual harassment. While not approving of the alleged conduct at issue, the court took the position that employees could not

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merely "lie in wait to file lawsuits," but, instead, had to cooperate in the implementation of the employer's sexual harassment policy. Plaintiff subsequently filed her notice of appeal of the district court's decisions.



This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards used by the district court. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir.1997). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the...

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