Moore v. Francis

Decision Date15 April 1890
Citation121 N.Y. 199,23 N.E. 1127
PartiesMOORE v. FRANCIS et al.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, general term, third department.

Action by Amasa R. Moore against John M. Francis and others for libel. Verdict for defendants, and from a judgment of the general term affirming the judgment on the verdict, and an order denying a motion to set aside the same, and for a new trial, plaintiff now appeals.

Matthew Hale, for appellant.

R. A. Parmenter, for respondents.

ANDREWS, J.

The alleged libelous publication which is the subject of this action was contained in the Troy Times of September 15, 1882, in a article written on the occasion of rumors of trouble in the financial condition of the Manufacturers' National Bank of Troy, of which the plaintiff was at the time of the publication, and for 18 years prior thereto had been, teller. The rumors referred to had caused a ‘run’ upon the bank; and it is claimed by the defendants, and it is the fair conclusion from the evidence, that the primarymotive of the article was to allay public excitement on the subject. That part of the publication charged to be libelous is as follows: ‘Several weeks ago, it was rumored that Amasa Moore, the teller of the bank, had tendered his resignation. Rumors at once began to circulate. A reporter inquired of Cashier Wellington if it was true that the teller had resigned, and received in reply the answer that Mr. Moore was on his vacation. More than this the cashier would not say. A rumor was circulated that Mr. Moore was suffering from overwork, and that his mental condition was not entirely good. Next came reports that Cashier Wellington was financially involved, and that the bank was in trouble. A Times reporter at once sought an interview with President Weed of the bank, and found him and Directors Morrison, Cowee, Bardwell, and others in consultation. They said that the bank was entirely sound, with a clear surplus of $100,000; that there had been a little trouble in its affairs, occasioned by the mental derangement of Teller Moore, and that the latter's statements, when he was probably not responsible for what he said, had caused some bad rumors.’ The complaint is in the usual form, and charges that the publication was false and malicious, made with intent to injure the plaintiff in his good name and credit in his occupation as bank teller, and to cause it to be believed that, by reason of mental derangement, he had, become incompetent to discharge his duties, and had caused injury to the bank, etc. The court on the trial was requested by the plaintiff's counsel to rule, as a question of law, that the publication was libelous. The court refused, but submitted the question to the jury. The jury found a verdict for the defendants; and, as the verdict may have proceeded upon the finding that the article was not libelous, the question is presented whether it was per se libelous. If it was, the court erred in leaving the question to the jury.

It is the settled law of this state that, in a civil action for libel, where the publication is admitted, and the words are unambiguous and admit of but one sense, the question of libel or no libel is one of law, which the court must decide. Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43; Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173;Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369;Kingsbury v. Bradstreet, 116 N. Y. 211, 22 N. E. Rep. 365. Of course, an error in submitting the question to the jury would be harmless if their finding that the publication was not libelous was in accordance with its legal character. The import of the article, so far as it bears upon the plaintiff, is plain and unequivocal. The words amount to a distinct affirmation- First, that the plaintiff was teller of the bank; second, that while acting in this capacity he became mentally deranged; third, that the derangement was caused by overwork; fourth, that while teller, and suffering from this mental alienation, he made injurious statements in respect to the bank's affairs which occasioned it trouble. The cases of actionable slander were defined by Chief Justice DE GREY in the leading case of Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. 177; and the classification made in that case has been generally followed in England and this country. According to this classification, slanderous words are those which (1) import a charge of some punishable crime; or (2) impute some offensive disease which would tend to deprive a person of society; or (3) which tend to injure a party in his trade, occupation, or business; or (4) which have produced some special damage. Defamatory words, in common parlance, are such as impute some moral delinquency or some disreputable conduct to the person of whom they are spoken. Actions of slander, for the most part, are founded upon such imputations. But the action lies in some cases where the words impute no criminal offense; where no attack is made upon the moral character, nor any charge of personal dishonor. The first and larger class of actions are those brought for the vindication of reputation, in its strict sense, against damaging and caluminous aspersions. The other class fall, for the most part at least, within the third specification in the opinion of Chief Justice DE GREY, of words which tend to injure one in his trade or occupation. The case of words affecting the credit of a trader, such as imputing bankruptcy or insolvency, is an illustration. The action is maintainable in such a case, although no fraud or dishonesty is charged, and although the words were spoken without actual malice. The law allows this form of action not only to protect a man's character as such, but to protect him in his occupation, also, against injurious imputations. It recognizes the right of a man to live, and the necessity of labor, and will not permit one to assail by words the pecuniary credit of another, except at the peril, in case they are untrue, of answering in damages. The principle is clearly stated by BAYLEY, J., in whittaker v. Bradley, 7 Dowl. & R. 649: ‘Whatever words have a tendency to hurt, or are calculated to prejudice, a man who seeks his livelihood by any trade or business are actionable.’ Where proved to have been spoken in relation thereto, the action is supported; and unless the defendant shows a lawful excuse the plaintiff is entitled to recover without allegation or proof of special damage, because both the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
99 cases
  • In re Houbigant, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 17 Octubre 1995
    ...57, 61 (2d Cir.1993); See Privitera v. Town of Phelps, 79 A.D.2d 1, 3, 435 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (4th Dept.1981) (citing Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 203, 23 N.E. 1127 (1890); 2 N.Y. PJI 45-47 (Supp.); 34 N.Y.Jur., Libel & Slander, ? 14 et seq.; Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), ? 112, pp. 754-760; ......
  • Regan v. Sullivan
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 25 Mayo 1977
    ...one is a criminal or has committed or been arrested for the commission of a crime is libelous per se in New York. Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 203, 23 N.E. 1127 (1890); 34 N.Y.Jur., Libel & Slander §§ 8-13 (1964). Moreover, it is clear that publication of a photograph can constitute libe......
  • Cain v. Esthetique
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 20 Abril 2016
    ...permanency of its impact, more readily held to be defamatory per se than are oral utterances of similar import."); Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 204, 23 N.E. 1127 (1890) ("The authorities tend to support the proposition that spoken words imputing insanity are actionable, per se, when spok......
  • Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc.
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • 11 Julio 1956
    ...unnecessary by requiring a submission of all publications to juries to determine all issues. We declared in Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 202-203, 23 N.E. 1127, 1128, 8 L.R.A. 214: 'It is the settled law of this state that, in a civil action for libel, where the publication is admitted an......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Restraining false light: constitutional and common law limits on a "troublesome tort".
    • United States
    • Federal Communications Law Journal Vol. 61 No. 3, June 2009
    • 1 Junio 2009
    ...that one is defamatory, the court must declare them actionable in themselves and limit the issue to that of damages."); Moore v. Francis, 23 N.E. 1127, 1128-29 (N.Y. 1890) (citing "settled law" that "where the publication is admitted, and the words are unambiguous and admit of but one sense......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT