State v. Moore

• Citation: 121 N.W. 1052,143 Iowa 240
• Parties: STATE v. MOORE ET AL.
• Decision Date: 01 July 1909
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

143 Iowa 240

121 N.W. 1052

STATE

v.MOORE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 1, 1909.

Appeal from District Court, Grundy County; Charles E. Ransier, Judge.

The defendants were indicted for burglary. From a judgment of conviction, they have appealed. Affirmed.Tom. H. Milner and Charles T. Rogers, for appellants.

H. W. Byers, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Lyon, for the State.

EVANS, C. J.

The indictment charged the defendants under section 4791 of the Code with the crime of breaking and entering in the nighttime a building belonging to Charles J. Adams, with intent to commit larceny. The defendants entered a plea of not guilty and a plea of former conviction for the same offense. The trial court determined as a matter of law that the plea of former conviction as made presented no defense. On the issue of “not guilty,” the verdict of the jury was adverse to the defendants.

The facts, briefly stated, are that one Adams was postmaster at Reinbeck, Iowa, and was owner of the building in which the post office was located. The post office proper was contained in the front room of such building. In the rear of the post office was another room occupied by Adams principally as a private office. In the rear of this office was another room in which was contained his printing establishment. Between the post office and the private office was a partition, and a door therein furnished the means of passing from one office to the other. In the private office Adams had his safe, wherein he kept his post office funds. The office was used more or less also by the rural mail carriers. On the night of December 12, 1904, the defendants are alleged to have broken and entered this private office and rifled the safe therein of its contents, consisting principally of currency, a part of which belonged to the government, and a part of which belonged to Adams. The defendants were first apprehended and taken into custody by the federal officers. They were prosecuted and convicted in the federal court under section 5478, Rev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3696). After serving the term of imprisonment imposed by the federal court, they were put upon trial under the indictment in the present case. The fact that they were formerly convicted in the federal court furnishes the basis of their plea of former conviction in this case.

The only question submitted for our consideration is whether as a matter of law such plea should be sustained. It is urged in argument that the offense for which they were convicted in the federal court is the same offense as is charged against them in the present case. The contention cannot be sustained. It is true that the same act on their part is involved in both prosecutions. But the criminal offense is quite distinct in a legal sense. The current of legal authority is quite uniform on this question. The reasons for the distinction are well set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588. We quote as follows from the opinion of Chief Justice Waite in that case: “The people of the United States resident within any state are subject to two governments, one state and the other national; but there need be no...