Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church

Decision Date07 May 1963
Docket NumberNo. 50902,50902
Citation255 Iowa 120,121 N.W.2d 639
PartiesElsle LATTNER, Appellee, v. IMMACULATE CONCEPTION CHURCH, a Corporation, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Lynch, Dallas, Smith & Harman, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Wm. W. Crissman, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff Elsie Lattner, an elderly widow, brought this law action against defendant Immaculate Conception Church to recover for serious personal injuries sustained in a fall at the bottom of stairs leading to a basement room in the church in Cedar Rapids. Defendant has appealed from judgment on jury verdict for plaintiff.

Defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict for it on the grounds it was not negligent in any of the respects submitted to the jury and plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Error is also assigned in submitting to the jury each of plaintiff's four specifications of negligence against defendant.

In considering the claim defendant was entitled to a directed verdict we give plaintiff's evidence the most favorable construction it will reasonably bear. Rule 344(f) 2, Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 I.C.A. Generally questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury; it is only in exceptional cases they may be decided as matters of law. Rule 344(f) 10, R.C.P.

Defendant's church building is a large one. The church had a membership in excess of 4000 at the time plaintiff was injured November 11, 1960. The basement room at the entrance to which plaintiff fell was formerly used as a chapel with altar and pews. In 1954 it was remodeled for use of the ladies' circles of the church. The combined circles were known as the Sanctuary Society. The remodeled room was called the Immaculata room. It was used largely for social purposes of the ladies' circles, one of which was St. Elizabeth's Circle. The ladies of this circle ordinarily gathered in the Immaculata room every two weeks, usually to play bridge.

On the day plaintiff fell her sister-in-law, Mrs. Joe Lattner, was hostess for the bridge party of St. Elizabeth's Circle and asked plaintiff to help her out by filling in for an absent member. Plaintiff accepted the invitation and was directed to go to the Immaculata room at 12:30. She was not a member of the circle nor of the Catholic faith. She had filled in at two earlier bridge parties of this same circle at the same place in the preceding July and August. On one of these occasions the same sister-in-law was hostess and on the other it was plaintiff's sister.

Entrance to the Immaculata room was down a flight of 12 stairs leading from an outside door at about sidewalk level near the rear of the building. Just inside this door was a landing from which a left turn was made to descend the stairs. Each step was 45 inches wide, with 7-inch riser and 12-inch tread, except the bottom step was about 10 inches wider at one end and had a tread of 13 1/2 inches rather than 12.

At the top of the bottom step a solid wood door opened into the Immaculata room. As plaintiff descended the stairs the door was closed. The bottom step was thus not visible to her until she opened the door. She testifies that when she opened the door to go into the room she thought the door swung even with the floor. The two previous times she had gone to this room were in real warm weather, the wood door was standing open against one wall of the room and she did not notice it was there.

The light in the stairway as plaintiff descended it was rather dim but she had no trouble seeing her way down the steps. As plaintiff opened the door the light inside the room was very bright. Plaintiff wore trifocal glasses. The ladies of the circle were seated. Plaintiff looked at them, hesitated a moment on the bottom step waiting to greet them and to be greeted, took a step forward, fell and sustained serious permanent injuries.

In February, 1955, when the stairs and door into the Immaculata room--except for a sign over the door to which we will later refer--were in substantially the same condition, a member of St. Elizabeth's Circle fell and turned her ankle as she opened the door. Like plaintiff she thought she would be on the floor of the room as she opened the door. She reported the incident to the pastor of the church and told him she thought the condition was dangerous. He said, 'Yes, it would be corrected.'

It was not unusual for the hostess to invite nonmembers of St. Elizabeth's Circle to fill in for absent members at bridge parties where multiples of four usually play. Sometimes these 'subs' were nonmembers of the church or even of the faith. The pastor of the church at the time plaintiff fell testifies as her witness that if her sister-in-law had asked his permission to invite plaintiff to fill in at bridge on November 11 he certainly would have given it. Apparently it was not then customary for the hostess to ask the pastor's permission before extending such an invitation. The pastor would occasionally drop in at circle meetings to greet the ladies.

The foregoing is a sufficient reference to the evidence for the present. Some other facts will be mentioned later.

I. Much of defendant's argument deals with plaintiff's status at the time she was injured. In our view this is not a vital question upon this appeal and does not call for extended discussion.

We have frequently recognized four classes of persons who are injured on property of another: trespasser, bare (or mere) licensee, licensee by express or implied invitation, and invitee. Reasoner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 251 Iowa 506, 510, 101 N.W.2d 739, 741, and citations. See also article 9 Drake Law Review 119. Defendant does not contend plaintiff was a trespasser and she does not claim she was an invitee. So we are not concerned with whether plaintiff was a trespasser or an invitee. Defendant argues plaintiff was a bare licensee while she claims she was a licensee by express or implied invitation.

The trial court left to the jury the question whether plaintiff was a bare licensee or a licensee by express or implied invitation. The jury was instructed that if plaintiff was a bare licensee defendant owed her no duty to make its property safe or keep it in any particular condition, but if she was a licensee by express or implied invitation it was defendant's duty to use ordinary care not to unreasonably or unnecessarily expose her to danger or to adequately warn her of dangers not obvious or reasonably apparent and those that are hidden or concealed. However, if any such danger is obvious, reasonably apparent or in the exercise of reasonable care should be discovered by such person there is no duty to give any warning.

The instruction seems to be taken largely from language in Mann v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 232 Iowa 1049, 1062-1064, 7 N.W.2d 45, 53, for which many precedents are cited. Reasoner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., supra, repeats the language at pages 510-511 of 251 Iowa, pages 741-742 of 101 N.W.2d.

We think it was proper to submit to the jury the question whether plaintiff was a bare licensee or a licensee by invitation. We are not persuaded plaintiff was a bare licensee as a matter of law. The Reasoner opinion, supra, observes: 'The difference between a trespasser and a bare licensee is slight. Under certain conditions the obligation of a property owner as to a bare licensee is slightly more than that to a trespasser.'

Further, as the appeal is presented, defendant would not be entitled to a directed verdict if plaintiff were a bare licensee. Defendant's argument admits that while it is the rule an owner or occupier of premises has no duty to keep them in reasonably safe condition for a bare licensee, there is an exception to this rule in the case of defects which amount to a trap or pitfall. Mann v. Des Moines Ry. Co., supra, cites several earlier decisions for the proposition an owner or occupier might be liable for injury to a bare licensee if he 'knowingly permitted him to enter premises where there were traps or pitfalls or other hidden dangers * * *.' (page 1063 of 232 Iowa, page 53 of 7 N.W.2d).

It will be noticed the court's instruction here, above referred to, was more favorable to defendant, as to its liability toward plaintiff if she was a bare licensee, than its admission in argument and the language just quoted indicate it was entitled to.

It is our conclusion the jury could find the entrance to the Immaculata room amounted to a trap or pitfall. As previously stated, the closed solid wood door opened into the room. The bottom step was not visible to plaintiff until she opened the door. She believed the bottom of the door was even with the floor of the room inside, rather than with the top of the bottom step. We cannot say a reasonably prudent person had no right to such belief. On plaintiff's two earlier visits to this room the door was standing open against the wall and she had no occasion to notice it. It is unusual for a door to open into such a room at the level of the step rather than the floor. There is evidence the pastor of the church who was in charge of the building was fully aware of the dangerous condition.

We think Warner v. Hansen, 251 Iowa 685, 102 N.W.2d 140, supports the conclusion just expressed. There plaintiff fell from a landing a step above a basement floor. She mistook the landing for the floor. Handrails ended above the landing rather than, as she supposed, near the bottom of the stairs. Plaintiff could not see the step-off of seven to eight inches until she reached the landing. Merchandise was displayed on the landing which also led plaintiff to think she had reached the floor. We held a jury question was created as to whether maintaining this change in floor level, under the circumstances, amounted to a pitfall. See also Holmes v. Gross, 250 Iowa 238, 93 N.W.2d 714, and Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co., 235 Minn. 20, 49 N.W.2d 1, which the Warner...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Keasling v. Thompson, 56364
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 24 April 1974
    ...to recover for his host's active negligence. This includes a host who is a possessor of land. See Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church, 255 Iowa 120, 121 N.W.2d 639 (1963); Mann v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 232 Iowa 1049, 7 N.W.2d 45 (1942); cf. Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (......
  • Lewis v. State
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 29 June 1977
    ...After quoting from Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 1011-1012, 208 N.W. 277, 279, 45 A.L.R. 498; Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church, 255 Iowa 120, 129, 121 N.W.2d 639, 645; Peters v. Lyons, 168 N.W.2d 759, 766 (Iowa 1969); and authorities from other jurisdictions, we held violation by......
  • Wilson v. Nepstad
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 25 July 1979
    ...Railway, 160 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Iowa 1968), Aff'd, 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church, 255 Iowa 120, 129, 121 N.W.2d 639, 645 (1963); W. Prosser, Supra, at 192-95. The city does not disavow its duties under the statutes and ordinances b......
  • Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 21 July 1982
    ...for breach of duty created by ordinance requiring landlord to install handrail on stairway); Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church, 255 Iowa 120, 128-30, 121 N.W.2d 639, 644-45 (1963) (statutory fire-safety provision requiring exit door to open outward provided duty giving rise to neglige......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT