State v. Harris

• Citation: 265 Minn. 260,121 N.W.2d 327
• Decision Date: 19 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 38375,38375
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Paul V. HARRIS, Relator.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 327

121 N.W.2d 327

265 Minn. 260

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Paul V. HARRIS, Relator.

No. 38375.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 19, 1963.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The terms 'probable cause' and 'reasonable cause' are synonymous. Probable cause exists where there is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty. Reasonable cause is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.

2. There is no formula or standard by which to judge the reasonableness of all searches and seizures. Each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.

3. An automobile is constitutionally protected against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, due to its mobility the rules governing its search are necessarily relaxed.

4. Not every arrest of a motorist for a traffic violation justifies a search of his automobile. There must be facts and circumstances observed by the officers to cause them in good faith to believe that the defendant may be about to commit a crime, that he is dangerous, or that he is awaiting an opportunity to escape.

5. For the purpose of preserving peace and to prevent crime, a peace officer may make reasonable inquiry of persons coming under his observation or brought to his knowledge under circumstances which reasonably suggest that a crime has been or is about to be committed.

6. Where police officers noticed an automobile, late at night, parked at an odd angle on or near a driveway upon which a boat and trailer were parked, and the occupant of the automobile offered an improbable excuse for being in the area, the officers were justified in stopping, interrogating, and apprehending the occupant, and in searching his automobile.

7. An arrest is perfected when officers interrupt and restrict a suspect's liberty of movement.

8. Failure to object to a search is evidence of consent. Where defendant did not deny that he gave his consent, and did not claim duress or coercion, the burden of proving lack of consent was his since the officers are presumed to have acted properly.

9. The existence of probable cause is a judicial question.

John S. Connolly, Andrew B. Kjos, St. Paul, for relator.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sol. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Allan R. Markert, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

NELSON, Justice.

The facts involved in this case are practically undisputed. At 12:45 a.m. on August 2, 1960, defendant was sitting in his parked automobile on Benjamin Street Northeast, just off 45th Street, in Columbia Heights. At the same time Officers Melvin Land and John Marchiniak of the Columbia Heights Police Department were patrolling the area in an unmarked vehicle. As the officers turned onto Benjamin Street from 45th Street, they noticed that defendant's automobile was parked at an odd angle with the rear pointing into a driveway where a trailer holding a boat was parked. As they approached defendant's automobile, they noticed that he was looking backward toward the home near which the trailer was parked. They immediately investigated, ordered defendant to step out of his car, and asked him what he was doing. He stated that he had become lost while going to meet a friend at a nearby grocery; that he had become confused by all the detours in the area and 'was just sitting there trying to think it over.' Noticing a black bag in the back seat of defendant's automobile, Officer Land asked defendant to show it to him, and defendant opened it. Defendant stated that there was 'just a bunch of old clothes' in the bag. In it the officers found a .22-caliber revolver, a T-shirt, and three red bandanas. Defendant was then handcuffed and placed in the officers' car, and the search was continued. It revealed a .380-caliber automatic pistol under the front seat; some bank books, later found to belong to a robbery victim; an extra 1960 license plate; and a key to a room in a Minneapolis hotel.

Thereafter, an information was filed, charging defendant with the commission of robbery in the first degree on one Edward A. Sloane on April 16, 1960. Sloane at that time had been confronted by two men wearing bandanas over their faces and carrying guns, who forced their way into his St. Paul apartment and compelled him to open a safe, from which they obtained $7,200 in cash, $1,400 in traveler's checks, and jewelry which had belonged to Sloane's wife. The men also took the purse of a friend visiting Sloane. The purse contained the bank books and the hotel-room key found in the defendant's car.

Defendant was tried, found guilty as charged in the information, and sentenced to a mandatory term in the State Prison. On this appeal from the judgment of conviction, defendant seeks reversal on the following grounds: (1) That no probable cause existed either for the search of his automobile or for his arrest; (2) that the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933, rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 871, 82 S.Ct. 23, 7 L.Ed.2d 72, applies retroactively and prohibited admission of evidence obtained from the search of defendant's automobile ¹; and (3) that his counsel's failure to move to suppress the evidence prior to his trial does not affect the application of the Mapp rule.

The state contends that the acts of the arresting officers in searching defendant's automobile did not violate a right of privacy because there existed at the time reasonable grounds for arrest, search, and seizure. The state also contends that no timely application was made to suppress and return the evidence thus gained by the state and, unless such application is made at the earliest possible moment, a claim of illegal search or seizure is waived. The state further contends that the Mapp decision has no application to the facts of this case since the arrest was based upon probable cause and therefore the search and seizure were justified.

1--2. Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by U.S.Const. Amend. IV, which provides:

'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against Unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' (Italics supplied.)

Minn.Const. art. 1, § 10, contains practically identical language.

The statutory authority of a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant is found in Minn.St. 629.34, which provides in part:

'A peace officer may, without warrant, arrest a person:

'(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence;

'(2) When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence;

'(3) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.'

The constitutional mandate requiring 'probable cause' and the statutory standard of 'reasonable cause' are synonymous. Probable cause for an arrest has been defined to be 'a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty.' Garske v. United States (8 Cir.) 1 F.2d 620, 623. Reasonable cause has been defined to be 'such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.' People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412, 2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 17, 348 P.2d 577, 580. There is no formula by which to judge the reasonableness of a given case and each must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S.Ct. 153, 158, 75 L.Ed. 374, 382. This was emphasized in Jackson v. United States, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 260, 262, 302 F.2d 194, 196, as follows:

'We have indicated on many occasions that there are few absolutes in the area of the law dealing with what constitutes probable cause for arrest. We have also emphasized from time to time that probable cause is not to be evaluated from a remote vantage point of a library, but rather from the viewpoint of a prudent and cautious police officer on the scene at the time of arrest. The question to be answered is whether such an officer in the particular circumstances, conditioned by his observations and information, and guided by the whole of his police experience, reasonably could have believed that a crime had been committed by the person to be arrested. See Bell v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 254 F.2d 82, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 885, 79 S.Ct. 126, 3 L.Ed.2d 113 (1958).' (Italics supplied.)

To require a high degree of technical competency on the part of the average police officer, i.e., that expected of the prosecutor, would be an unfair and unreasonable standard. The degree which we think correct is well stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890, where the court held:

'These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical...