Wheeler v. Com.

• Decision Date: 21 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-SC-0444-MR.,2001-SC-0444-MR.
• Citation: 121 S.W.3d 173
• Parties: Roger Lamont WHEELER, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

121 S.W.3d 173

Roger Lamont WHEELER, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

No. 2001-SC-0444-MR.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

August 21, 2003.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing December 18, 2003.

Daniel T. Goyette, Frank Wm. Heft, Jr., Office of the Jefferson District, Public Defender, Louisville, Counsel for Appellant.

A.B. Chandler III, Attorney General of Kentucky, Louis F. Mathias, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth A. Heilman, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee.

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.

Roger Lamont Wheeler was convicted by a jury of the intentional murders of Nigel Malone and Nairobi Warfield. The aggravating circumstance is that Wheeler's acts of killing were intentional and resulted in multiple deaths as described by KRS 532.025(2)(a)(6). Wheeler was sentenced to death on each conviction.

Wheeler raises 28 issues which we will discuss in the order in which they were presented in his original brief.

On October 2, 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of the victims in the apartment the victims shared. The male victim was found in a hallway near the bathroom. He had suffered nine stab wounds. Two stab wounds to the chest were considered the fatal wounds by the medical examiner. She described the crime scene as having blood spatters on the floor, walls, furniture and appliances. The medical examiner believed that the main struggle occurred in the kitchen and progressed to the hallway where the body of the male victim was found.

The female victim died as a result of manual strangulation. The medical examiner testified that she believed the struggle between the female and her assailant occurred in the bedroom where she was found. The female victim had multiple abrasions on the left side of her neck and lacerations with a bruise on her mouth and several bruises on her lips. Her body was found in a seated position, leaning against a bedroom wall. She was covered with a blanket or quilt and a scissors was protruding from her neck. The medical testimony determined that she had been stabbed with the scissors after she was already dead. During the autopsy, the medical examiner discovered that the female victim was pregnant.

There was blood on the floors and walls in nearly every room in the apartment. Numerous blood samples were also collected at the scene and were subject to laboratory testing. No fingerprints were found on the scissors.

Wheeler denied killing the two victims but he changed his story on several occasions. Originally, he denied ever being inside of the apartment on the night the murders occurred but then later admitted being in the apartment on that night. He claimed that Nigel Malone was already stabbed, but that he did not see Nairobi Warfield. He also asserts that the assailant was already inside the apartment and he and that person fought which was why he was wounded.

During the trial that began in February 2001, the trial judge instructed on one aggravating circumstance, intentional killings that resulted in multiple deaths. The trial judge also instructed on mitigating circumstances that Wheeler was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance; that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of intoxication and any other circumstances that the jury could consider as mitigating. We will now begin to consider the various arguments presented in the sequence provided by the brief of Wheeler.

I. Jury Challenges

Wheeler first argues that erroneous rulings on challenges for cause denied him the full use of his peremptory challenges. He exercised all nine of the allotted peremptory strikes.

The question of whether a juror should be excused for cause is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871 (1993); Alexander v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 856 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 883 (1997). Kentucky law requires that a jury must be fair and impartial and that the probability of bias or prejudice is a determinative factor in ruling on a challenge for cause. Thompson, supra; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 221 (1958).

Mabe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884 S.W.2d 668 (1994), determined that a "per se disqualification" is not required simply because a juror does not immediately understand and embrace every legal concept presented during the general voir dire examination. The true test is whether, "after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict." Mabe, supra.

In this case, the trial judge allowed counsel for both parties great latitude in questioning the persons summoned for jury duty. The question of whether the potential jurors had any preconceived opinions that would interfere with their impartiality was carefully explored. The trial judge properly refused to strike for cause jurors who could consider the minimum penalty of twenty years. She appropriately struck for cause those jurors that could not impose the death penalty. She also correctly excused one juror who demonstrated a financial hardship. The voir dire process was entirely proper and thoroughly examined the question of whether any prospective jurors were predisposed. There was no error and the rights of the defendant to a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury, due process and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under both the federal and state constitutions were not violated.

II. Religious Beliefs of Prospective Jurors

Wheeler argues that it was prejudicial error to inquire into the religious beliefs of prospective jurors during individual voir dire and to excuse them from service or allow peremptory challenges to be used against them because of their religious beliefs. This issue is not properly preserved for appellate review and is raised as plain error as provided by RCr 10.26 and KRS 532.075(2). During the individual voir dire, the trial judge asked each juror several questions related to his or her religious beliefs. Not only did counsel for Wheeler not object to the line of questioning used by the trial judge of prospective jurors, but defense counsel participated in the development of the questions themselves. Decisions made during voir dire are generally regarded as trial strategy. Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 837 (2000).

Pursuant to RCr 9.36(1), a prospective juror shall be excused as not qualified if there is reasonable ground to believe that the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence. There was no error in the inquiry of the trial judge of prospective jurors if they held any moral, religious or spiritual beliefs that would interfere with their service on the jury. There is no violation of any provision of either the federal or state constitutions.

III. Juror Excused During Trial

At the beginning of the third day of trial, Juror 537 informed the trial judge that her husband was approached that morning by a coworker, the defendant's wife, who engaged him in a conversation about the trial. The husband of the juror told her that he remembered Wheeler very well and that Wheeler had to be fired because he "stayed high on the job all the time." The juror also told the trial judge that family members of the victim kept staring at her when she would leave the courtroom. The trial judge struck the juror for cause because she had extrajudicial knowledge that the defendant was fired because he stayed high all the time. The question of whether a juror should be excused for cause is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Thompson; Alexander, supra. The right to an unbiased decision by an impartial jury in a criminal trial is a basic principle of due process. Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 338 (2001). There was no abuse of discretion.

IV. Batson Question

Wheeler contends that the exercise of peremptory challenges against African-American jurors violated the standards provided in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Wheeler asserts that the reasons offered by the prosecution for exercising a peremptory strike against Juror 536 does not withstand the close scrutiny of the Batson test. We disagree.

In exercising a peremptory challenge on Juror 536, the Commonwealth noted that she refused to state her opinion as to the death penalty, stating that she felt that her opinion was irrelevant. The Commonwealth further noted that the juror stated that she believed in redemption and salvation as opposed to fixing a punishment. A careful examination of the record indicates that the Commonwealth gave sufficient race-neutral explanations for the exercise of a peremptory challenge against African-American Juror 536. See Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104 (2001). We find no error.

V. Death Penalty Qualification

At trial, defense counsel filed a motion to preclude the removal of jurors who were not death qualified, or in the alternative, the defense requested that separate juries be selected for the guilt and penalty phases of the trial and that only the sentencing jury be death qualified. The trial judge overruled the motion after a hearing. This Court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected the argument that death qualification of a jury violates the constitutional rights of the defendant. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 890 S.W.2d 286 (1994). There was no error.

VI. Commonwealth Opening Statement

Wheeler claims that the use of the words "slaughterhouse" and "gutted like a pig" by the prosecutor in the opening statement warranted a mistrial because they were inflammatory and calculated to unduly...