Sawyer v. White

• Decision Date: 13 April 1903
• Docket Number: 1,817.,1,816
• Citation: 122 F. 223
• Parties: SAWYER v. WHITE (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

122 F. 223

SAWYER v. WHITE (two cases).

Nos. 1,816, 1,817.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 13, 1903

Syllabus by the Court.

In determining the competency of a grantor to execute a deed the question is not whether or not his mental powers were impaired, or whether or not he had ordinary capacity to do business when he executed it, but whether or not he had any-- the smallest-- capacity to understand what he was doing, and to decide intelligently whether or not he desired to do it.

The existence of a fiduciary relation between a parent and his child is not necessarily fatal to a deed or gift from the former to the latter, because such a deed or gift is natural and reasonable, and is sustained by the presumption that it was inspired by parental affection and devotion. This presumption overcomes the ordinary presumption that an unnatural or unreasonable gift procured through a fiduciary relation is voidable.

The undue influence which will avoid a deed is an unlawful or fraudulent influence which controls the will of the grantor. The affection, confidence, and gratitude of a parent to a child, which inspires a deed or gift, is a natural and lawful influence, and will not render it voidable, unless this influence has been so used as to confuse the judgment and control the will of the donor.

A father 88 years of age, who had been a paralytic for 15 years, and so feeble that he had required constant attendance and assistance, had intrusted his business to his son, who had managed it for him and had supplied his wants with rare assiduity and kindness. The father had perfect confidence in this son, and was grateful to him for his kindness. For many years he had intended to give his property to him at his decease. His mind was impaired, his powers of speech and locomotion were very limited, but he knew what he was doing and he intentionally conveyed land worth $20,000 to this son without any actual consideration, so that the son of a deceased daughter received no part of it.

Held the deed was not void on account of lack of mental capacity the fiduciary relation, or undue influence.

In a proceeding in a federal court to contest the validity of a probated will under Rev.St.Mo. 1899, Secs. 4622, 4623, the burden of proof is upon those who claim under the will to the same extent as if no action allowing the will had ever been taken by the probate court.

When the controversy over the validity of a will arises between two citizens of different states, a federal court has jurisdiction of a proceeding to contest it which the statutes of a state authorize to be instituted in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.

Lucian E. Carter, for appellant and plaintiff in error.

O. J. Chapman, Crosby Johnson & Son, for appellee and defendant in error.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Robert Sawyer, brought an action against the defendant, William M. White, to avoid a deed of certain lands in the state of Missouri, of the value of $20,000, made by Robert White, the grandfather of the plaintiff, to William M. White, his son, on May 9, 1896, and to set aside the will of Robert White, deceased, and the probate thereof, on the ground that the defendant, William M. White, had procured the execution of this will by undue influence. The court below dismissed both causes of action, and the plaintiff presents the decree and judgment for review by appeal and by writ of error.

The grounds upon which the plaintiff bases his attack upon the deed are that the grantor had not sufficient mental capacity to execute it, that the grantee was the confidential adviser and the manager of the property of the grantor, and that he procured the execution of the deed by undue influence. Robert White was 88 years of age in May, 1896, when he made this deed to his son. He had been partially paralyzed, so that he talked and walked with difficulty, for at least 15 years. At times during this period he was practically helpless, and required constant assistance and attendance to enable him to arise from his bed and to procure and take his necessary food and drink, while at other times he was able to walk a block or two with the aid of a cane. He was a feeble old man, and his mind was undoubtedly much less active and powerful than when he was young and vigorous. But the question of his mental capacity is not whether or not the powers of his mind were impaired, or whether or not he had ordinary capacity to do business, but whether or not he had any-- the smallest--capacity to understand what he was doing, and to determine intelligently whether or not he would do it. Mann v. Keene Guaranty Sav. Bank, 29 C.C.A. 547, 548, 86 F. 51, 52; Rugan v. Sabin, 3 C.C.A. 578, 584, 53 F. 415, 421; Stewart's Ex'r v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 303; Ex parte Barnsley, 3 Atk. 168; Hill v. Nash, 41 Me. 586, 66 Am.Dec. 266; Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. 216, 15 Am.Dec. 354; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N.Y. 531, 84 Am.Dec. 97. Any other test would wrest from the feeble and the aged that power over their earnings and savings which is their best safeguard against misfortune, and would produce endless uncertainty, difficulty, and litigation. Careful and repeated perusals of all the evidence in this case have convinced us that Robert White was competent, when tried by this test, to execute the deed which the complaint attacks. He understood perfectly what he was doing when he made it, and he was able to decide and did decide intelligently whether he would or would not execute the conveyance. The evidence is undisputed that he had intended for at least 10 years that his son should succeed to his property when he should die, that he made this deed to accomplish this settled purpose, and that his mind was sufficiently clear for him to understand his act and its effect when he performed it. The deed cannot be avoided for lack of mental capacity in the grantor to make it.

May it be set aside because the grantee occupied a fiduciary relation to his father, and induced him to execute it by undue influence? Robert White and his son, William, had lived for many years in the same town, and at times in the same house. Each was a shrewd and successful business man, possessed of considerable property. For 15 years the father had been a paralytic, and his son had been kind, attentive, and watchful of his interests, his welfare, and his comfort. For this kindness and attention the father was grateful to the son. He had implicit confidence in his ability, his integrity, and his judgment. He had intrusted his business and his property to his care for many years, and for at least 10 years he had intended to give him his property when he should pass away. He made the deed here in question to effectuate this intention. There is no doubt that he was influence to do so by his affection for and confidence in his son, and by his gratitude to him for his years of devotion and service. But hatred or indifference is not indispensable to the validity of a gift, nor is gratitude or affection for the grantee fatal to it. The undue influence which will avoid a deed or will is an unlawful or fraudulent influence which controls the will of the grantor or testator. The natural influence of the affection of a parent for a child is neither fraudulent nor illegal, and courts will not set aside a deed or a will because it was induced by such an influence unless it appears that this influence was exercised to confuse the judgment and to overcome the free will of the grantor or testator.

Nor is the fact that the grantee or devisee occupies a fiduciary relation to his grantor or testator necessarily fatal to the gift. It is the use of that relation to secure a deed or devise against the free will or desire of the grantor or donor, and not the mere existence of the relation, that vitiates a grant. It is true that when an unnatural or unreasonable gift or devise is made-- such as one by a ward to his guardian, or by a helpless invalid to his nurse, or by a client to his trusted attorney-- the presumption at once arises that the fiduciary relation was used to overcome the will of the grantor, and that the deed or devise is voidable. But when the natural gift of a parent to a loved and...