O'Guin v. Bingham County

• Decision Date: 03 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 30344.,30344.
• Citation: 142 Idaho 49,122 P.3d 308
• Parties: Frank and Leslie O'GUIN, husband and wife, individually, and in their capacity as parents and legal guardians of Frank O'Guin, Jr., a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BINGHAM COUNTY; Bingham County Commissioners; and Bingham County Public Works, a political subdivision, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

122 P.3d 308

142 Idaho 49

Frank and Leslie O'GUIN, husband and wife, individually, and in their capacity as parents and legal guardians of Frank O'Guin, Jr., a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BINGHAM COUNTY; Bingham County Commissioners; and Bingham County Public Works, a political subdivision, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 30344.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 2005 Term.

October 3, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Comstock & Bush, Boise, for appellants. John A. Bush argued.

Anderson, Nelson, Hall & Smith, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Blake G. Hall argued.

TROUT, Justice.

Frank and Leslie O'Guin, acting as individuals and as legal guardians of Frank O'Guin Jr. (the O'Guins), appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Bingham County, Bingham County Commissioners and Bingham County Public Works, (collectively the County). Because the district court erred in its determinations regarding the negligence per se claim, we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 1999, Shaun and Alex O'Guin were killed while playing at the Bingham County landfill. Apparently, a section of the pit wall collapsed and crushed the children. Their older brother, Frank Jr., initially discovered their bodies at the bottom of the pit. Earlier that day, the children had been eating lunch at Ridgecrest Elementary School as part of a summer lunch program. As they started walking home, the children went through an unlocked gate at the back of the schoolyard and through a privately owned empty field. The empty field is situated between the landfill and the schoolyard. The border between the empty field and the landfill was unobstructed. At the time of the children's death, the landfill was open to the public one day a week. It was closed on the day the children were killed and no landfill employees were present on the site.

The O'Guins filed an action alleging the landfill was an attractive nuisance and that the County breached certain legal duties to control access to the landfill. The County filed a motion for summary judgment. In ruling on the motion, the district court dismissed the attractive nuisance claim for failure to assert facts that prove an essential element of the claim but denied the motion as to the common law negligence claim and the negligence per se claim. The County requested permission to appeal and in response to the County's request, the district court sua sponte reconsidered its original decision on the motion for summary judgment and issued a substitute decision. In its substitute decision, the district court granted summary judgment to the County on all claims. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed summary judgment on the attractive nuisance and common law negligence claims. Because the district court's substitute decision did not address the negligence per se claim, we remanded the case to the district court for further consideration. See O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 72 P.3d 849 (2003). Upon remand, the County renewed its motion for summary judgment on the negligence per se claim and the district court granted the motion. The O'Guins again appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Generally, the question of whether a duty exists is a question of law, over which we exercise free review." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001). Negligence per se, which results from the violation of a specific requirement of law or ordinance, is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Negligence Per Se Claim

The dispute in this case focuses on the duty or standard of care the County owed to the O'Guin children. The parties disagree on how the common law duty of a landowner to a trespasser affects the statutory duty of a landfill owner. The O'Guins argue that once the district court determined the regulations established a duty and the County had breached that duty, there was no need to apply the common law willful or wanton standard. The County argues that because the O'Guin children were trespassers, even if the requirements of negligence per se are met, the O'Guins must still prove that the County's conduct was willful or wanton, and the O'Guins have failed to allege that in their complaint. The County also argues that negligence per se does not apply here.

"The elements of a common law negligence action are (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991). The distinction between trespassers, licensees and invitees is the controlling test in determining the scope and extent of the duty of care owed by landowners to entrants. See Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980). "A landowner's duty to a trespasser is to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injury." Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (citing Huyck, 101 Idaho at 301, 612 P.2d at 144). In the first appeal in this case, this Court held "the facts before the district court support the court's conclusion that the boys were trespassing at the time of the accident." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 13, 72 P.3d 849, 853 (2003). This Court also affirmed the summary judgment entered against the O'Guins on the common law negligence claim because the complaint "[did] not allege any willful or wanton conduct by the County [nor a] breach of the duty owed to a trespasser." Id. at 15, 72 P.3d at 855.

Negligence Per se

"[I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986). "A court may adopt `as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation....'" Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irr. District, 97 Idaho 580, 586, 548 P.2d 80, 86 (1976) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965)). "The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence...." Slade v. Smith's Management Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 (1991). "Negligence per se lessens the plaintiff's burden only on the issue of the `actor's departure from the standard of conduct required of a reasonable man.'" Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B cmt. B (1965)). "Thus, the elements of duty and breach are `taken away from the jury.'" Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts 230 (5th ed.1984)).

In order to replace a common law duty of care with a duty of care from a statute or regulation, the following elements must be met: (1) the statute or regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of the injury. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078 (citing Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986)).

As to the first element, the district court found, and we agree, that the statute and regulations in this case clearly define the County's standard of conduct. Idaho Code Title 39, Chapters 1 and 74 grant authority to the Board of Environmental Quality to adopt solid waste management rules and standards. Those rules require municipal solid waste landfill units to block access by unauthorized persons. The rule in effect at the time of the boys' deaths provided in pertinent part:

Solid waste management sites shall comply with the following ...

e. Access to the site shall be limited to those times when an attendant is on duty.

i. Hours of operation and other limitations shall be prominently displayed at the entrance.

ii. The site shall be fenced or otherwise blocked to access when an attendant is not on duty.

iii. Unauthorized vehicles and persons shall be prohibited access to the site.

IDAPA 58.01.06.005.02. In addition, Idaho Code § 39-7412(6) states that owners or operators of all municipal solid waste landfill units shall "[p]rovide and control access as provided in 40 CFR 258.25." That section of the Code of Federal Regulations states:

Owners or operators of all municipal solid waste landfill units must control public access and prevent unauthorized vehicular traffic and illegal dumping of wastes by using artificial barriers, natural barriers, or both, as appropriate to protect human health and the environment.

40 C.F.R. § 258.25. These regulations require the County to fence or otherwise block access to the landfill when an attendant is not on duty. The Legislature has specifically declared it to be "unlawful" to fail to comply with the landfill rules. I.C. § 39-7402(1). In this case, the record reveals that on July 7, 1999, some of the landfill boundaries were not fenced or blocked. There is also evidence that the landfill was closed and no attendant was on duty on July 7, 1999. Therefore, the district court was correct that the regulations clearly define the County's required standard of conduct, and the County failed to meet that standard.

The second element asks whether the death of the O'Guin children is the type of harm the statute and regulations were intended to prevent. Idaho Code...