Gibson v. Shufeldt

• Decision Date: 23 May 1887
• Parties: GIBSON and another v. SHUFELDT and others
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

122 U.S. 27

7 S.Ct. 1066

30 L.Ed. 1083

GIBSON and another v. SHUFELDT and others.

May 23, 1887.

Wm. A. Maury, W. W. Crump, and John A. Coke, in support of motion.

No brief filed in opposition.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented by this motion can hardly be considered an open one. But the subject has been so often misunderstood that the court has thought it convenient to review the former decisions, and the grounds on which they rest. By the act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 3, which differs from earlier laws only in increasing the amount required to give this court appellate jurisdiction from a circuit court of the United States, it is necessary that 'the matter in dispute shall exceed the sum or value of five thousand dollars, exclusive of costs.' 18 St. 316. The sum or value really in dispute between the parties in the case before this court, as shown by the whole record, is the test of its appellate jurisdiction, without regard to the collateral effect of the judgment in another suit between the same or other parties. Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U. S. 578, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484; Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 424; The Jessie Wiliams, Jr., 108 U. S. 305, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 108 U. S. 564, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 875; Opelika v. Daniel, 109 U.S. 108, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 70; Wabash, etc., R. R. v. Knox, 110 U. S. 304, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Bradstreet Co. v. Higgins, 112 U. S. 227, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117; Bruce v. Manchester & K. R. R., 117 U. S. 514, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 849.

The value of property sued for is not always the matter in dispute. In replevin, for instance, if the action is brought as a means of trying the title to property, the value of the property replevied is the matter in dispute; but, if the replevin is of property distrained for rent, the amount for which avowry is made is the real matter in dispute, and the limit of jurisdiction. Peyton v. Robertson, 9 Wheat. 527.

When the object of a suit is to apply property worth more to the payment of a debt for less than the jurisdictional amount, it is the amount of the debt, and not the value of the property, that determines the jurisdiction of this court. This is well illustrated by two cases, in one of which the appeal was taken by the creditor, and in the other by a mortgagee of the property.

In Farmers' Bank of Alexandria v. Hooff, 7 Pet. 168, this court dismissed an appeal from a decree of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, dismissing a bill to have land, worth more than $1,000, sold for the payment of a debt of less than $1,000, which was the limit of jurisdiction, Chief Justice MARSHALL saying: 'The real matter in controversy is the debt claimed in the bill; and, though the title of the lot may be inquired into incidentally, it does not constitute the object of the suit.'

In Ross v. Prentiss, 3 How. 771, land worth more, and mortgaged for more, than $2,000, was about to b sold on execution of a debt for a less sum; and a bill by the mortgagee to stay the sale was dismissed. He appealed to this court, and insisted that its jurisdiction depended on the value of the property and the amount of his interest therein, and and that he might lose the whole benefit of his mortgage by a forced sale on execution. But the appeal was dismissed, Chief Justice TANEY saying: 'The only matter in controversy between the parties is the amount claimed on the execution. The dispute is whether the property in question is liable to be charged with it or not. The jurisdiction does not depend on the amount of any contingent loss or damage which one of the parties may sustain by a decision against him, but upon the amount in dispute between them; and, as that amount is in this case below $2,000, the appeal must be dismissed.'

When a suit is brought by two or more plaintiffs, or against two or more defendants, or to recover or charge property owned or held by different persons, (which more often happens under the flexible and comprehensive forms of proceeding in equity and admiralty than under the stricter rules of the common low,) the question what is the matter in dispute becomes more difficult. Generally speaking, however, it may be said that the joinder in one suit of several plaintiffs or defendants, who might have sued or been sued in separate actions, does not enlarge the appellate jurisdiction; that, when property or money is claimed by several persons suing together, the test is whether they claim it under one common right, the adverse party having no interest in its apportionment or distribution among them, or claim it under separate and distinct rights, each of which is contested by the adverse party; that when two persons are sued, or two parcels of property are sought to be recovered or charged, by one person in one suit, the test is whether the defendants' alleged liability to the plaintiff, or claim to the property, is joint or several; and that, so far as affected by any such joinder, the right of appeal is mutual, because the matter in dispute between the parties is that which is asserted on the one side and denied on the other.

In the leading case of Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, upon a libel in admiralty against the owners of a vessel to recover seamen's wages, and an attachment of the proceeds of the vessel in the hands of assignees, the libelants obtained a decree for the payment out of those proceeds to them respectively of sums less than $1,000, but amounting in all to more than $2,000, and the assignees appealed. This court, at January term, 1832, in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice STORY, dismissed the appeal, for the reasons that the shipping articles constituted a several contract with each seaman to all intents and purposes; that, although the libel was in form joint, the contract with each libelant, as well as the decree in his favor, was in truth several, and none of the others had any interest in that contract, or could be aggrieved by that decree; that the matter in dispute between each seaman and the owners, or other respondents, was the sum or value of his own demand, without any reference to the demands of others; that it was very clear, therefore, that no seaman could appeal from the circuit court to this court, unless his claim exceeded $2,000; 'and the same rule applies to the owners or other respondents, who are not at liberty to consolidate the distinct demands of each seaman into an aggregate, thus making the claims of the whole the matter in dispute; but they can appeal only in regard to the demand of a seaman which exceeds the sum required by law for that purpose as a distinct matter in dispute.'

Upon like reasons, in Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347, where a libel by several owners of cargo against the ship to recover damages by improper stowage had been consolidated by order of the court with similar libels by other owners of cargo, and a decree entered awarding to the libelans respectively various sums, some more and some less than $2,000, but amounting in all to more than $10,000, and appeal by the owner of the ship was dismissed as to all the libelants who had recovered less than $2,000 each. Similar decisions were made at October term, 1882, in two cases of libels to recover damages to ship and cargo by collision, in one of which theappeal was taken by the libelants, and in the other by the owner of the vessel against which the suit was brought. Ex parte baltimore & O. R. R., 106 U. S. 5, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35; The Nevada, 106 U. S. 154, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234. See also, Clifton v. Sheldon, 23 How. 481. In the intermediate case of The Rio Grande, 19 Wall. 178, in which material-men joining in a libel in rem had severally recovered in the circuit court various sums, a motion by them to dismiss the appeal of the owners of the vessel was not sustained, because the motion was 'to dismiss the appeal' generally, and not as to those only who had recovered sums insufficient to give this court jurisdiction.

The decisions in cases of salvage illustrate the application of the rule to different states of facts. From a decree on a libel for salvage of a ship and cargo, or of several parcels of goods, belonging to different owners, when the salvage demanded against the whole exceeds the jurisdictional limit, but the amount chargeable on the property of each owner is within it, no appeal lies, either by the salvors or by the owners. Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Pet. 4; Spear v. Place, 11 How. 522. The reasons for this were summed up by Chief Justice TANEY as follows: 'The salvage service is entire; but the goods of each owner are liable only for the salvage with which they are charged, and have no common liability for the amounts due from the ship or other portions of the cargo. It is a separate and distinct controversy between himself and the salvors, and not a common and undivided one, for which the property is jointly liable.' Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 3, 6. Because the salvage service is entire, and is the common service of all the salvors acting together, and the salvage awarded is for that service, and the matter in dispute is the amount due the salvors collectively, and it is of no consequence to the owner of the property saved how the money recovered is apportioned among those who have earned it, this court has since decided that the owner of a ship may appeal from a decree against the ship for salvage which exceeds the sum of $5,000, although the amount awarded to each salvor is less than that sum. The Connemara, 103 U. S. 754.

Upon like grounds, it was held in the case of The Mamie, 105 U. S. 773, that, from a decree dismissing a petition to obtain the benefit of the act of congress limiting the liability of ship-owners, the owner of the vessel might appeal, even if the value of the thing surrendered was less than $5,000, when the claims against it were for much more than twice that sum in the...