Ange v. State
| Decision Date | 30 September 1929 |
| Parties | ANGE v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Dixie County; Hal W. Adams, Judge.
Charlie H. Ange was convicted under a charge of defamation of character, and he brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Syllabus by the Court
Defamatory language must be proved substantially as alleged in indictment, and allegation of publication to one is not supported by proof of publication to another (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7193). Defamatory language must be proved substantially as alleged in indictment for defamation of character under Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7193, and allegation of publication of defamatory statement to one person is not supported by proof of publication to another.
Statement in county office pertinent to charge which defendant was preferring, and concerning which judge issued warrant, held privileged and inadmissible in prosecution for defamation (Comp. Gen. Laws, 1927, § 7193). Defamatory statement made by defendant while in county judge's office seeking to have warrant issued against prosecutrix, where pertinent to charge which defendant was preferring and to which he made affidavit to county judge who issued warrant, was privileged communication and inadmissible to sustain charge of defamation of character, in prosecution under Comp. Gen Laws 1927, § 7193.
Defamatory words used by parties, counsel, or witnesses in due course of judicial procedure, where relevant and pertinent, are privileged (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7193). Defamatory words when used by parties, counsel, or witnesses in due course of judicial procedure, and when relevant to matter in hand and pertinent to subject of inquiry, are privileged, and cannot be made basis of prosecution for libel or defamation of character, under Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7193, no matter how false or malicious such statements may be.
Statements made in judicial proceedings before competent court or magistrate are privileged, and privilege extends to judge parties, counsel, and witnesses. Privilege applicable to defamatory statements made in course of judicial proceedings includes all proceedings before competent court or magistrate which are to result in determination or action by court or officer, and extends to protection of judge, parties counsel, and witnesses, and arises immediately upon the doing of any act required or permitted by law in due course of judicial proceedings, or as necessary and preliminary thereto.
Defamatory words in due course of judicial procedure, where not pertinent, are only conditionally privileged. Defamatory words published in due course of judicial procedure, not pertinent or relevant to subject of inquiry, are only conditionally or qualifiedly privileged, but do not necessarily become actionable unless malicious.
Exemption from prosecution for defamation for relevant statements made in course of judicial proceedings does not necessarily prevent person unjustifiably prosecuted from redress (Comp Gen. Laws 1927, § 7193). That one uttering defamatory words relevant to matter at issue in course of judicial proceedings is exempt from prosecution for defamation under Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 7193, does not deprive person unjustifiably prosecuted of other means of redress as by action for malicious prosecution.
W. P. Chavous, of Cross City, and O. O. Edwards, of Mayo, for plaintiff in error.
Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the state.
Plaintiff in error was indicted for defamation of character under section 7193, Comp. Gen. Laws. The indictment charged that the defamatory statement was made in the presence and hearing of William M. Mills. There was a variance between the pleading and the proof. The testimony of Mills, who was a sheriff of the county, failed to show that all of the defamatory statement, as set out in the indictment, was made while he was present. It appears...
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Fridovich v. Fridovich
...any act required or permitted by law in the due course of the judicial proceedings or as necessarily preliminary thereto. 98 Fla. 538, 540-41, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929) (emphasis The same rule is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 587 (1977): A party to a private litigation or......
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Chames v. Demayo
...attorney prior to the institution of criminal charges are presumptively qualifiedly privileged. We therefore recede from Ange [v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 123 So. 916 (1929)] and Robertson [v. Industrial Insurance Co., 75 So.2d 198 (Fla.1954) ] to the extent they are inconsistent with our ruling......
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Kelly v. PALMER, REIFLER, & ASSOCIATES, PA
...by law in the due course of the judicial proceeding or as necessarily preliminary thereto. Id. at 1326 (quoting Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 541, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla.1929)) (emphasis in original). The court found "many examples of publications which are necessarily preliminary to a judicia......
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Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One, 96-2389-CIV-T-24 (E).
...to the subject of inquiry, are privileged and cannot be made the basis of a proceeding for libel or defamation." Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929), quoted in Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So.2d 1323, 1325-26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). It is crucial, however, that the state......