Stansfield v. Minute Maid Co.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:14cv290–MW/CAS. |
| Parties | Andrew E. STANSFIELD and Michael Stephen Mathews, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The MINUTE MAID COMPANY, a division of the Coca–Cola company, and the Coca–Cola Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Aashish Yadvendra Desai, Desai Law Firm PC, Costa Mesa, CA, Louis Martin Bograd, Washington, DC, Phillip Timothy Howard, Howard & Associates PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiffs.
David Stephen Johnson, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Tampa, FL, Steven A. Zalesin, Patterson Belknap Webb Etc LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
In this proposed class action, Plaintiffs Andrew E. Stansfield and Michael Stephen Matthews assert that the label of a juice drink produced by Minute Maid Company and the Coca–Cola Company ("Defendants") is misleading. Defendants moved to dismiss the first amended complaint. This Court considered the matter without hearing. This order grants the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint because these state-law claims are preempted by federal law.
The standards for considering a motion to dismiss are well-established. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 12(b)(6) calls for a dismissal of a complaint if it fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must "accept[ ] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir.2004). To survive dismissal, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). It must also contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim is facially plausible when the court can draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Defendants produce a beverage which is labeled as a pomegranate and blueberry flavored blend of five juices. The five-juice blend is 99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice, 0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice.
The front of the bottle has a "principal display panel." See 21 C.F.R. § 101.1. The back has an "information panel." See id. § 101.2. Plaintiffs do not assert that anything on the information panel is untrue. But Plaintiffs say that the principal display panel is misleading-that it suggests that the product is predominantly pomegranate and blueberry juice. This is the product and its principal display panel:
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Within the four years preceding the filing of this action (which was on June 13, 2014), Plaintiffs each bought more than $25.00 worth of this product. They point to various health benefits associated with pomegranate and blueberry juice. They say they had cheaper juice options available and paid more for Defendants' five-juice blend because they did not know it was almost entirely apple and grape juice.
Plaintiffs seek recovery on the theory that the primary display panel is misleading. They assert claims under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (§§ 501.201 –501.213, Florida Statutes ), the Florida false advertising statute (§ 817.44, Florida Statutes ), and breach of express and implied warranties, negligence,1 and unjust enrichment. ECF No. 22.
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that all the claims are preempted by federal law and are otherwise deficient.
The amended complaint alleges that this juice label implies that the product is predominantly pomegranate and blueberry juice when it is not. Plaintiffs say this violates state laws that mirror federal laws and seek to recover damages. Defendants argue that those claims are preempted by federal law.
The existence of an affirmative defense such as preemption will not usually support a motion to dismiss. See Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd, 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc). But there is an exception allowing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the affirmative defense "clearly appears on the face of the complaint." Id. at 1069. If the "complaint itself demonstrates" that the claims are preempted, then dismissal is proper. Id.
Under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to," federal law "must yield." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Congress has the authority to expressly preempt state law by statute. E.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). When there is an express preemption clause, a court must consider "the substance and scope of Congress' displacement of state law." See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008). The effect of a presumption against preemption is "to support, where plausible, a narrow interpretation of an express pre-emption provision." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2189, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On these alleged facts, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims are expressly preempted by federal statute.
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 –399f, prohibits "misbranded" food in interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 331.2 There are many ways in which a product might be misbranded. Three are relevant here.
A food is misbranded if its label does not bear "the common or usual name of the food, if any there be," id. § 343(i), or if information required to appear on its label "is not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness (as compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use." Id. § 343(f). A third provision is something of a catch-all, deeming a product misbranded if its labeling is "false or misleading in any particular." Id. § 343(a)(1). The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") is authorized to promulgate regulations to enforce the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a).3
In a recent case, POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca–Cola Co. ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014), the Supreme Court considered this very product in a different context. POM sued Coca–Cola under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which allows one competitor to hold another liable for unfair competition arising from false or misleading product descriptions. Id. at 2233. The suit alleged that Coca–Cola's juice blend misled consumers and that the ensuing confusion caused POM to lose sales. Id. In part, Coca–Cola argued that the product complied with regulations implementing the FDCA and that compliance precluded a Lanham Act claim.
The Supreme Court held that the FDCA did not preclude a Lanham Act claim challenging food and beverage labels that are regulated by the FDCA. Id. The Court did not decide whether the product's label complied with regulations implementing the FDCA. The Court said the FDA could not, through those regulations, displace statutory rights under the Lanham Act. POM Wonderful thus addressed the horizontal relationship between complementary federal laws.
This case concerns the vertical relationship between federal requirements and state laws.4 In the FDCA's preemption provision, Congress has established "[n]ational uniform nutrition labeling." See 21 U.S.C. § 343–1. The Nutrition Labeling & Education Act of 1990 ("NLEA"), Pub.L. 101–535, 104 Stat. 2353 (Nov. 8, 1990), amended the FDCA to expressly preempt state requirements within certain categories that are not identical to federal requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 343–1. A state may not "directly or indirectly establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce ... any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by" § 343(i) or (f)"that is not identical to the requirements of such section." Id. § 343–1(a)(2) & (3).5 According to the FDA, "Not identical to" means the requirements "concerning the ... labeling of food ... ‘(i) Are not imposed by or contained in the applicable provision [or regulation]; or (ii) Differ from those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable provision [or regulation].’ " 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(c)(4).
By its plain terms the NLEA does not preempt state requirements that are identical to federal requirements in the applicable sections of the FDCA and its implementing regulations. See, e.g., Koenig v. Boulder Brands, Inc., 995 F.Supp.2d 274, 283 (S.D.N.Y.2014). "The state thus can impose the identical requirement or requirements, and by doing so be enabled, because of the narrow scope of the preemption provision in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, to enforce a violation of the Act as a violation of state law." Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir.2011) (Posner, J.). A private plaintiff may bring a state-law claim that parallels federal requirements. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315, 330, 128 S.Ct. 999, 169 L.Ed.2d 892 (2008) ; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) ; Wolicki–Gables v. Arrow Int'l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir.2011). This means that if the product violates an implementing regulation, and so is misbranded under § 343, Plaintiffs may bring a parallel claim under state law to impose an...
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...the "complaint itself demonstrates" that the claims are preempted, then dismissal is proper. Id.; see also Stansfield v. Minute Maid Co., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1230 (N.D. Fla. 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-14114 (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015). The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provide......