Brooks v. State of Missouri

• Citation: 8 S.Ct. 443,31 L.Ed. 454,124 U.S. 394
• Parties: BROOKS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 1
• Decision Date: 23 January 1888
• Court: United States Supreme Court

124 U.S. 394

8 S.Ct. 443

31 L.Ed. 454

BROOKS v. STATE OF MISSOURI.¹

January 23, 1888.

P. W. Fauntleroy and John Y. Martin, for plaintiff in error.

B. G. Boone, for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 181, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22, it was said that 'to give us jurisdiction under section 709, Rev. St., be- cause of a denial by a state court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the constitution or any treaty or statute of the United States, it must appear on the record that such title, right, privilege, or immunity was 'specially set up or claimed' at the proper time in the proper way. To be reviewable here, the decision must be against the right so set up or claimed. As the supreme court of the state was reviewing the decision of the trial court, it must appear that the claim was made in that court, because the supreme court was only authorized to review the judgment for errors committed there, and we can do no more.' Applying that rule to this case, we find that at the trial no title, right, privilege, or immunity was specially set up or claimed under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Thus, when the testimony of McCulloch was offered, the admission of which is now assigned for error, the objection made was not that its admission would be a violation of any provision of the constitution or laws of the United States, but because it was 'incompetent and irrelevant,' coming, as it did, from a man who, by his conduct in procuring the statements from the defendant as to which it was proposed he should testify, had shown himself to be 'unworthy of belief in a court of justice,' and because 'the witness has shown that he held out an inducement—a promise—to the defendant for his statement, which renders it incompetent.' And so, in respect to the ruling on the motion to quash the indictment, and to discharge the defendant from arrest, the only objection was 'that said indictment, proceedings, imprisonment, and restraint are illegal and unlawful, and in violation of the constitution and laws of the state of Missouri, and without any due process of law or lawful authority whatsoever.' The particular provisions of the constitution of the state now relied on in support of this assignment of error are section 11 of the bill of rights, to the effect that 'no warrant to * * * seize any person * * * shall issue without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing;' and section 12, 'that no person shall for a felony be proceeded against criminally, otherwise than by indictment.'

Another of the assignments of error is that the court instructed the jury that they might find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, if they were satisfied from the evidence that he did kill and murder the person named in the indictment 'in the manner and form charged in either of the counts,' when one of the counts was bad. As presented to the trial court at the time, the question involved in this part of the charge was one of general law only, and not in any manner dependent upon the constitution or laws of the United States. The same is true of the instruction that the jury were to be governed by the law as given them in charge by the court, and of the refusal to allow counsel to read in his argument parts of the opinion of the supreme court of the state in a case decided by that court, which, as was claimed, stated correctly the legal principles bearing upon a part of the defense. No reference was made to any provision of the constitution or laws of the United States which gave to the defendant any rights in this behalf.

In the progress of the trial, counsel for the defendant addressed the court as follows: 'If the court please, we learn that there are two men stationed at the door who refuse to admit any one who is not a juror or witness or officer or some one having business in the court-room. We object to that. We claim this is a public court-room, and the trial should be public, and the public ought to be admitted. We understand that they are there by order of the court.' Upon this statement, permission was asked 'to introduce proof to show that, during the whole day of yesterday, and so far to-day, up to this time to-day, that a deputy-sheriff and a police officer have been stationed at the door of the court-room, who refuse—who have refused—to admit any one to the court-room unless they were jurors or witnesses or have some business with the court.' The court refused this permission, but did direct 'that all persons be admitted to the court-room until it is filled,—all the seats are filled; reserving the right to the attorneys for the state and the defendant to bring within the bar such persons as the court may permit, giving preference to jurors who have been summoned here to be seated in the front seats outside of the bar.' To this ruling exception was taken, and it is assigned here as one of the errors on which our jurisdiction may rest. No reliance seems to have been placed in the trial court upon any federal law; and here, section 22 of the bill of rights of the Missouri constitution is alone cited as supporting the objection which was made. That section provides that 'in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county.'

Others of the exceptions taken at the trial relate to rulings by means of which, it is claimed, the defendant was deprived of an impartial jury; but it does not appear to have been claimed that any provision of the constitution of the United States guarantied to him such a jury. That the sixth article of the amendments contains no such guaranty as to trials in the state courts has always been held. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 166, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22, and the cases there cited.

These are all the assignments of error which relate to the rulings in the progress of the trial, and they fail entirely to present any questions of federal law for our consideration. So far as appears the trial court, in its decisions, was governed exclusively by the constitution and laws of the state; and the supreme court in its opinion on this part...