Knight v. Paxton

• Decision Date: 06 February 1888
• Citation: 31 L.Ed. 518,124 U.S. 552,8 S.Ct. 592
• Parties: KNIGHT v. PAXTON. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

124 U.S. 552

8 S.Ct. 592

31 L.Ed. 518

KNIGHT v. PAXTON.¹

February 6, 1888.

Geo. L. Paddock, for appellant.

L. H. Boutell, for appellee.

FIELD, J.

This suit was brought by James W. Paxton, the complainant below, in the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois, to obtain a decree that so much of certain described real property, situated in Chicago, as was of the value of $1,000, be set off to the defendants for their homestead, and that the possession of the residue be delivered to him; or, if the premises could not be divided, that the possession of the whole be delivered to him on his paying into court, for the use of the defendants, the sum of $1,000. The facts, as set forth in the bill, are in substance as follows: On the thirteenth of February, 1872, James M. Marshall, of Chicago, being indebted to the complainant in the sum of $10,000, executed and delivered to one Francis Bradley his bond of that date, in the penal sum of $20,000, conditioned to pay the amount of that indebtedness on the thirteenth of February, 1877, with semi-annual interest; and also 10 coupon notes, each for $450, payable to the order of the said Francis Bradley. The bond and coupon notes were on the same day assigned to the complainant, and Marshall and his wife at once executed a deed of the real property mentioned to one Lyman Baird, in trust for the security of the principal and interest of the bond and the coupon notes, and subject to a condition of defeasance on their payment according to their terms, and the performance of the covenants mentioned therein. This deed purported to be acknowledged by Marshall and his wife, and was, on the following day, recorded i the recorder's office of the county. Default having been made in the payment of the principal sum, the trustee, Baird, at the request of the complainant, and by virtue of the power contained in the trust deed, on the eighth of March, 1879, sold the premises, and the title and equity of redemption of the grantors therein, for the sum of $10,000, to the complainant, he being the highest bidder therefor. A deed thereof was executed to him by the trustee. Immediately afterwards he demanded possession of the premises from Marshall and his wife, who were, when the trust deed was executed, in the occupation of the premises as a residence. But they refused to surrender them, and about a year afterwards set up that Susan Marshall, the wife, had never acknowledged the deed of trust, and by reason of this fact her homestead right in the premises had never been released. The bill alleged that this was the first knowledge the complainant ever had of any such claim, and that he always believed the trust deed was properly acknowledged by both Marshall and his wife, and that thereby they had released all their right in the premises under the homestead laws of Illinois.

The bill also alleged that the value of the premises was greatly in excess of the value of the homestead rights therein, and that the complainant was entitled to the possession of so much thereof as might not be set off to the defendants for a homestead, or, in case the premises were incapable of division, he was entitled to the whole of them on payment into court of the sum of $1,000 for the use of the defendants, which payment he offered to make. The bill concluded with a prayer for a decree in accordance with these averments, as stated above, and for such other and further relief as the nature of the case might require.

Soon after the bill was filed, James M. Marshall died, and his widow filed a separate answer, setting up four defenses: First, that the premises in question were conveyed on the twenty-first of November, 1860, by James M. Marshall, prior to her marriage with him, and in consideration thereof, to his brother, Thomas E. Marshall, in trust, as an antenuptial settlement, and therefore she was incapable of executing the trust deed of February 13, 1872; second, that at the time this latter deed was signed she was confined to her bed by sickness, and by reason thereof, and the effect of narcotics prescribed by her physician to relieve her pain, she had not sufficient mental capacity to read and understand it; third, that when she signed it her husband falsely stated to her that it related to other property, which was situated in a different part of the city of Chicago; and, fourth, that after the bond secured by that deed became due, the time for payment was extended by the complainant in consideration of a rate of interest greater than that originally stipulated.

Of these objections, the first is the only one which requires consideration by this court. The other three are not sustained by the evidence in the case. That which bears upon them is vague and conflicting, seldom engendering a doubt, and never producing conviction. The deed of trust constituting the antenuptial settlement was executed by James M. Marshall to his brother, Thomas E. Marshall, in trust for the appellant, Susan C. Larmon, whom he was...