State v. Reynolds

Citation125 A. 636,101 Conn. 224
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date28 July 1924
PartiesSTATE v. REYNOLDS.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; John R. Booth, Judge.

Patrick W. Reynolds was convicted of owning and keeping whisky with intent to sell, and he appeals. No error.

Information charging the accused with owning and keeping, with intent to sell, in count 1, whisky, and in count 2, alcohol and water containing more than one-half of one per cent. of alcohol by volume, and fit for beverage purposes. Verdict and judgment of guilty on first count and appeal by the accused. No error.

Samuel E. Hoyt, of New Haven, for appellant.

Edwin S. Pickett, Pros. Atty., of New Haven, for the State.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and BEACH, CURTIS, KEELER, and KELLOGG JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove: That on September 17 1923, the accused conducted a saloon in New Haven, and at about 9:30 p. m. of this day two police officers of New Haven saw the accused inside the saloon and behind the bar. Shortly thereafter the officers entered the saloon through two swinging doors, being the front door and unlocked, and found therein a bar, a back bar, a bench, chairs, tables, and various bar glasses. When the officers entered the accused was not in the saloon, but another man stood at one end of the bar with his feet upon the rail, drinking beer from a glass. In the rear of the saloon was a doorway leading to a stairway which in turn led to the living apartment on the second floor, in which the accused and his family lived. The officers waited a few moments in the saloon near the rear door when the accused came down the stairway and entered the saloon by the rear door, he not having on hat or coat. One of the officers went up to him, felt of the pockets in his clothing, and in the rear pocket of his trousers found a bottle and took it from his pocket and placed him under arrest. The contents of the bottle were later analyzed and found to be whisky and to contain 30 61/100 per cent. alcohol by volume. The accused at this time made no statement concerning the bottle of liquor but trembled and turned pale. The officers had no search warrant directing them to search the premises or the apartments upstairs or the person of the accused. The liquor taken was in fact owned and kept by the accused, and so kept and owned by him with intent to sell the same at the time the officer took it.

The accused offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that he had not for a long time conducted a saloon but a restaurant on the first floor of this building; that on this day he obtained the bottle of whisky from his wife who had procured it for the purpose of presenting it to her brother, who was ill in a hospital; that he did not purchase it, nor intend to sell it, but intended to take it to the hospital for his brother-in-law; that Carter, the man found by the officers in the saloon, was not drinking alcoholic drink, and intended to accompany the accused to the hospital and that he had lived in the home of the accused for 14 months; that the accused himself had entered the barroom for the purpose of getting his coat and hat; and that the officer took the bottle of whisky from his pocket without his consent.

Errors which we shall consider concern certain rulings on the admission of evidence and requests to charge. Upon the trial the state offered, and the court admitted, evidence tending to prove that the officer felt in the pocket of the accused and took from it a bottle which on analysis was found to contain whisky. To the admission of all of this evidence the accused duly objected and excepted.

The accused requested the court to charge:

" (4) I further charge you that, if you find that any of the evidence presented in this case was obtained from the accused in violation of his rights to be secure in his person and effects from search without a legal search warrant properly authorized, then in that event such evidence if presented before you in compelling the accused to furnish evidence against himself in this criminal case under the meaning of the Constitution of this state, and such evidence should be by you disregarded and given no value whatsoever in arriving at your verdict."
" (6) I therefore charge you that the admitted facts in this case as to how the police officer obtained the possession of the liquor involved in the case was an unreasonable seizure from the person of the defendant, and unlawfully violated the defendant's rights in his person and in his possession, and that this conduct on the part of the police officer deprived the defendant of the protection of his constitutional guaranty; and therefore the evidence should be disregarded, and the accused acquitted in this case."

The record does not state the ground of the objection to this evidence, but we think it fair to assume that the ground was the same as that contained in these requests. It is obvious that, if the evidence was properly admitted, the requests to charge should have been refused. Evidence properly admitted cannot be legally disregarded by the jury. The question which is involved in the rulings on evidence is whether the evidence was inadmissible because the search of the accused's person and the seizure of the bottle of whisky were unreasonable and in violation of section 8, art. 1, of the state Constitution, and compelled the accused to give evidence against himself in violation of section 9, art. 1, of the state Constitution. The search of the person of the accused was unreasonable if unlawful, and it was unlawful unless the accused was taken or apprehended in the act of violating the law, or on the speedy information of others. Under such conditions he could have been placed under arrest under section 223 of the General Statutes, without warrant. A crime was about to be committed in the presence of the officer, if the circumstances then observed by him, taken in connection with those before observed by him, when weighed in the light of common knowledge gave him probable reason or ground to believe that such a crime was being, or was about to be, committed. Ex parte Morrill (C. C.) 35 F. 261, 267; Agnelle v. United States (C. C. A.) 290 F. 671, 679; State v. Campbell, 182 N.C. 911, 915, 110 S.E. 86; State v. Simmons, 183 N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591.

The jury might have found: Before the officers entered the saloon they saw within the surroundings and indicia of a saloon where alcoholic beverages were dispensed. The unlocked door was an invitation to enter; within they found the proprietor, the accused, had left the saloon by its rear door. One of the officers stepped to the rear door and waited the return of the proprietor. In a moment he came down the rear stairs leading from his apartment and entered. At once the officer felt his pockets from the outside, and then took from his rear trousers pocket a bottle of whisky. It is apparent, if this was the conduct of the officer that he had diagnosed the situation correctly. Did he, before he put his hand in the accused's pocket, have reasonable ground to believe that the accused had gone to his apartment for liquor which he proposed selling? If the facts were as claimed by the state, we think he did, and that he was justified in securing the bottle of whisky before he placed the accused under arrest. In reality both acts were practically simultaneous, and if the general rule had required the arrest before the search we should think it far too technical an application of the rule to hold that this search was unlawful because it preceded the arrest by an appreciable moment of time. We reached a like conclusion in Ely v. Bugbee, 90 Conn. 584, 590, 98 A. 121, L.R.A. 1916F, 910, where property was seized without warrant for a violation of the fish laws on the day following the commission of the offense, and at or about the same time that the plaintiff was arrested for this offense upon a warrant issued according to law. We held in that case:

" It must be conceded that property may lawfully be seized without warrant if taken by the officer at the very time when it is being used in violation of the fish and game laws, or upon the speedy information of others; and without attempting any general definition of the powers of fish and game wardens under other statutes, we think that a seizure without warrant of this property on the day after its use, in connection with the arrest of the owner for the commission of the offense of using it in violation of the fish laws, is not an unreasonable seizure when the fact is admitted that the property was so used."

Cases in which the officers were justified in entertaining a reasonable belief that the accused was committing or about to commit a crime under the Volstead Act (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1923, § 10138 1/4 et seq.) and searching without warrant are Herine v. U.S. (C. C. A.) 276 F. 806; Vachine v. U.S. (C. C.) 283 F. 35; Kathriner v. U.S. (C. C. A.) 276 F. 808; U.S. v. Hilsinger (D. C.) 284 F. 585.

The many cases of violations of the National Prohibition Act and of state statutes in its aid disclose the length to which these violators go in this traffic. Every form of ingenuity of which the mind is capable seems to have been used. Peace officers charged with the enforcement of these acts are familiar with these devices and recognize them as by instinct, as this officer may have the purpose of this proprietor. Unless the facts show clearly that the officer has made an unreasonable search, the courts ought not to so hold; the officer's conduct should be judged in the light of the circumstances, with a due appreciation of the character of the traffic he is seeking to prevent, of the exceeding difficulty of his task, of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
50 cases
  • Moore v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 6 Abril 1925
    ...205 P. 435. 5. COLORADO. (1922). Sullivitch v. People, 206 P. 789; (1922) Pasch v. People, 209 P. 640. 6. CONNECTICUT. (1924). State v. Reynolds, 125 A. 636. DELAWARE. (1922). State v. Chuchola, 120 A. 212. 8. GEORGIA. (1923). Johnson v. State, 118 S.E. 702. 9. IDAHO. (1918). State v. Ander......
  • State v. Waller
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 4 Agosto 1992
    ...547 A.2d 10 (1988), this court recognized the exclusionary rule and expressly overruled a prior Connecticut case; State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 237, 125 A. 636 (1924); that held to the contrary. In Dukes, we concluded that "the exclusionary rule is now widely recognized as an effective ......
  • Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 27 Junio 1949
    ...ALA. Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A.L.R. 1359. ARK. Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633, 233 S.W. 758. CONN. State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 A. 636. GA. Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 647, 119 S.E. KANS. State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 58, 226 P. 245. ME. State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10,......
  • Elkins v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 27 Junio 1960
    ...(admissible). CONNECTICUT Pre-Weeks: State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 A. 1046, 33 L.R.A. 227 (admissible). Pre-Wolf: State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 A. 636 (admissible). Post-Wolf: no holding. DELAWARE Pre-Weeks: no holding. Pre-Wolf: State v. Chuchola, 32 Del. 133, 120 A. 212 (adm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT