U.S. v. Black
| Decision Date | 03 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-3890,97-1144,s. 96-3890 |
| Citation | 125 F.3d 454 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerald BLACK, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stephen R. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Andrew B. Baker, Jr. (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Dyer, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 96-3890.
Clark W. Holesinger, Portage, IN, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 96-3890.
Judith A. Stewart, Mark D. Stuaan (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee in No. 97-1144.
Steven J. Riggs, Indiana Federal Community Defenders, Inc. Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant in No. 97-1144.
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, BAUER, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Gerald Black and Stephen R. Davis were each convicted of one count of willfully failing to pay a past due support obligation, in violation of the Child Support Recovery Act ("the CSRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 228. Their appeals were consolidated. On appeal, Black contends that the CSRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and an unconstitutional intervention into matters reserved for the States under the Tenth Amendment. Black also argues that a state-court arrearage order determining past due child support is required for a finding of guilt under the CSRA. Davis offers the same arguments. In addition, along with a host of other contentions, Davis contends that the CSRA is unconstitutional as applied to him in particular. We hold that the CSRA is constitutional, and we affirm as to all other issues raised on appeal.
Gerald Black ("Black") and Elaine Black were divorced in 1985 in Lake County Indiana Circuit Court. Black was originally given custody of the couple's three children, Ernest, Eric, and Elizabeth. However, in 1986, the custody decree was modified, wherein Elaine Black was given custody and Black was ordered to pay seventy-five dollars per week in child support. Black kept the family home in Hammond, Indiana. Elaine Black moved to Illinois, where she received welfare in 1986 and 1987. She assigned her support rights to the State of Illinois. Elaine Black then moved back to Indiana in 1988.
On August 27, 1990, the Lake County Circuit Court ordered Black to pay $150 per week in child support. On August 27, 1991, the court entered an order showing that Black was $5,787.50 in arrears in his child support payments. Black made no payments towards that arrearage. He also never sought a modification of the court's earlier support order. On January 10, 1992, Black sold his Hammond home for $58,000. He quit his job of twenty-three years on May 9, 1992. He stopped making child support payments altogether in June 1992.
In February 1993, Black moved back to his hometown in Michigan and bought a farm. Some time later he married Pamela Black. Ernest Black moved out of Elaine Black's home in August 1993. Eric Black joined the Air Force in January 1995 and moved out in August of that same year.
On December 21, 1994, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Indiana filed an information charging that Black, residing in a state different from his children, willfully and unlawfully failed to pay a due support obligation; that Black failed to pay this obligation for over one year; and that Black's obligation exceeded $5,000, all in violation of the Child Support Recovery Act, 28 U.S.C. § 228. On November 22, 1995, the U.S. Attorney's Office filed a superseding indictment, indicating that the amount Black owed was at least $17,274. On November 27, 1995, Black filed a motion to dismiss the information, contending that the CSRA exceeded Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and was a violation of the Tenth Amendment. That motion was denied.
On March 5, 1996, after a bench trial before a magistrate judge, Black was found guilty and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. The court suspended the sentence and put Black on probation for eighteen months. Black was ordered to pay the U.S. Attorney's Office $16,565 in restitution by September 5, 1996, and $500 per month thereafter until the total amount he owed was fully satisfied. Black appealed and the district court affirmed. Black now appeals the district court's judgment.
Stephen R. Davis ("Davis") and Barbara L. Davis divorced in May 1985 in Indianapolis, Indiana. As part of the divorce decree, the couple entered into a written agreement, which, among other things, detailed Davis' duty to make child support payments. Under the agreement, Davis was required to pay $300 per week in child support ($150 for each of their children, James and John). When the oldest child reached the age of twenty-one, Davis' obligation would be reduced to $150 per week for the younger son. In 1985 and 1986, contempt proceedings were brought against Davis in Marion County, Indiana. On September 18, 1987, Davis and Barbara Davis signed an "Agreed Entry," indicating that Davis was in arrears in his child support payments.
In the meantime, Davis moved to Texas in late 1985 or early 1986. He apparently told Barbara Davis that he moved to Texas because he believed that his Indiana support obligation would not be enforced there. Barbara Davis asked Marion County court officials to pursue Davis in Texas. Barbara's case was filed on July 16, 1992, in Family District Court, Dallas County, Texas, but was dismissed for want of prosecution on October 5, 1993. Davis made periodic payments which ended in August 1992. As of October 1995, Davis was approximately $111,800 in arrears in child support payments.
On December 22, 1995, Davis was charged by information in Indiana District Court with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 228. On September 25, 1996, after a bench trial, Davis was found guilty and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, to be followed by a one-year term of supervised release. He was ordered to make restitution in the amount of $111,800. He now appeals that judgment.
On appeal, Black claims that the CSRA is unconstitutional because: it is not within Congress' power to regulate commerce because the Act contains no substantial interstate link; being a criminal statute, it has no substantial relation to interstate commerce; it intervenes into family law matters reserved for the States and therefore violates the principles of federalism and comity; and it violates the Tenth Amendment. Davis, too, claims that the CSRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power, both on its face and as applied to him. Davis also claims that the CSRA, as applied to him, is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and that the district court committed constitutional error in refusing to hear his theory of defense. Davis argues that the information filed against him should have been dismissed because it failed to state an offense cognizable under the CSRA. Davis also believes that the district court should have abstained from asserting and exercising federal jurisdiction. Finally, he claims that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he willfully failed to pay child support. In addition, both men believe that a state court arrearage order is required before a finding of guilt under the CSRA. None of the grounds asserted by Black or Davis affords them relief.
We review the district court's determination as to the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir.1995). Black and Davis raise a number of constitutional concerns, first and foremost, that Congress has overstepped its Commerce Clause power in enacting the CSRA, which punishes the "willful[ ] fail[ure] to pay a past due child support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State." 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). "Past due child support" refers to "any amount--(A) determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living; and (B) that has remained unpaid for a period of one year, or is greater than $5,000...." 18 U.S.C. § 228(d)(1).
Congress has expressly recognized that collecting past due child support obligations from out-of-state deadbeat parents has outgrown state enforcement mechanisms. In a report to accompany H.R. 1241 (), the House of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary noted that in 1989, $16.3 billion in child support payments were due, but only $11.2 billion were made. H.R.REP. No. 102-771, at 7 (1992). The Committee expressed concern that this deficit continues to average $5 billion annually. Id. It also found that statistics suggest that delinquent parents' chances for successfully avoiding support payments increase markedly when they cross state lines. Id.
At least forty-two states have made willful failure to pay child support a crime, punishable in some states by imprisonment for up to ten years, but the Committee noted that the ability of those states to enforce such laws outside their own boundaries is severely frustrated. Although most states have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), which includes provisions that provide for the extradition of interstate child support defendants and the processing of requests for enforcement of support orders, the Committee concluded that "interstate extradition and enforcement in fact remains a tedious, cumbersome and slow method of collection." Id. at 7-8. On the day of the CSRA's passage in the House of Representatives, Congressman Charles Schumer stated:
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