125 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 96-3140, United States v. Plunkett
|Citation:||125 F.3d 873|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Hugh O. PLUNKETT, a/k/a Dennis Ivan Hunter, Appellant.|
|Case Date:||October 03, 1997|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|
Argued Sept. 9, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 96cr00207-01).
[326 U.S.App.D.C. 347] Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.
Carmen R. Kelley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and Nancy Page, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the briefs.
Before: SILBERMAN, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.
The Sentencing Guideline commonly known as the "safety valve" limits the applicability of statutory minimum sentences in certain cases. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. A defendant who qualifies for the safety valve also receives a two-level reduction in offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4). To qualify, a defendant must overcome five hurdles, one of which is that the defendant must not have "possess[ed] a firearm ... in connection with the offense." Id. § 5C1.2(2). Application Note 3 to the safety valve defines the word "offense" to mean "the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct." Id. application note 3. Appellant Hugh O. Plunkett appeals his conviction on the principal ground that the district court erred as a matter of law in using this broad definition of "offense" to deny him the two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4). We affirm.
Following his indictment on six narcotics- and weapons-related counts, Plunkett pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack, a form of cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the terms of the plea agreement, his plea related only to the drugs found on his person when he was arrested, and not to more than 500 grams of crack and a firearm found the next day in his apartment. For sentencing purposes, however, Plunkett acknowledged as part of his plea agreement his responsibility for the additional crack and the firearm.
The district court sentenced Plunkett to 189 months imprisonment. Starting from a base offense level of 36, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2), the court imposed a two-level increase for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), resulting in an offense level of 35. The court found that Plunkett could not qualify for the safety valve because, under Application Note 3, his firearm possession was part of the offense as "relevant conduct"; thus, the court could not apply the two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4). Because Plunkett had no prior criminal record, the sentencing range was between 168 and 210 months, and the court chose a sentence at the midpoint of that range.
On appeal, Plunkett contends that the provision in the safety valve barring eligibility as a result of firearm possession "in connection...
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