People v. McElvaine

• Decision Date: 24 February 1891
• Citation: 125 N.Y. 596,26 N.E. 929
• Parties: PEOPLE v. McELVAINE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

125 N.Y. 596

26 N.E. 929

PEOPLE

v.McELVAINE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 24, 1891.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, Kings county.

George M. Curtis, for appellant.

John F. Clarke, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the People.

RUGER, C. J.

Upon a former appeal by the defendant in this case from a conviction of murder in the first degree this court ordered a new trial upon the ground that an error had been committed in allowing an expert witness for the people to answer an improperly framed hypothetical question relating to the sanity of the defendant. People v. McElvaine, 121 N. Y. 250, 24 N. E. Rep. 465. The defendant has again been tried upon the indictment, and the jury have again found him guilty of the crime charged, and from the judgment rendered upon that conviction this appeal is taken. No question is made but that the defendant killed one Luca, by repeatedly stabbing him with a knife in his back, breast, and arms, while he was in the act of resisting the attempts of the defendant to escape from the house, which he had burglariously entered. The undisputed evidence showed that Luca was a grocer, living at the corner of Jay and High streets in the city of Brooklyn, and occupied the first floor of the building as a grocery store and the upper rooms for a dwelling-house for himself and family, consisting of a wife, three children, a servant girl, and two clerks. There is no direct evidence that any one was associated with defendant in the commission of the crime, and the proof shows him, when first discovered, engaged in a struggle with Luca, about 3 o'clock in the morning of August 22, 1889, in the back room of the second story of Luca's house. This discovery was made by Mrs. Luca and the servant, and upon their seizing him he said: ‘I have stabbed him, and if you don't let go of me I will stab you.’ Thereupon they let him go. Luca was then sinking to the floor from his wounds, four of which were mortal; and soon after expired. When released the defendant passed through the window to a ladder extending to the ground, and descended to the back yard, and from there escaped over a fence into High street. When in the act of putting on his shoes, which he had removed from his feet in preparation for the burglary, he was arrested by the police. Being taken thus red-handed he appeared conscious of the uselessness of an attempt to deny his guilt, and, being asked why he did it, said: ‘He was a big blokie, and I had to do something to get the best of him.’ It was obvious that the defendant entered the house by getting over the fence into the back yard, and these, removing his shoes, took a ladder found on the premises, and which was customarily kept hanging against the side of the house, placed it against the second-story window, and by ascending it, and removing a wire screen from the window, obtained easy access to the room where the homicide was committed. He had evidently been interrupted in his design of robbing the house by the intervention of Luca, and, upon being discovered, was attempting to escape from the premises.

No defense to this array of proof afforded any reasonable prospect of success, except that growing out of the alleged irresponsibility of the defendant by reason of insanity, and this was set up on the trial as the sole ground of defense. It is now a fundamental principle in all civilized countries that this defense, when established, shall furnish to the accused not only a protection against conviction for crime, but a sufficient reason why he should not be tried or sentenced, or, if tried and convicted, why the judgment of the court should not be executed; and this rule has for a long time been a part of the statutory law of this state. Section 20, Pen. Code; 2 Rev. St. p. 697, § 2. These statutes express a humane principle, and the law-makers of the state have, by numerous provisions, so guarded the rights of such persons that they cannot be lawfully punished for an act which was committed by them while in a state of insanity, or when they have become insane during or after a trial or conviction. Sections 336, 481, 658, Code Crim. Proc. It is the duty, as it should always be the inclination, of courts to give effect to these provisions of law, and, so far as human judgment and intelligence can determine, to see to it that no person is punished for an act done while he was mentally incapable of distinguishing the character of such act, or is incompetent to understand and appreciate the cause and object of his punishment. Feeling the obligation of this duty, and impressed by the learning and zeal of the defendant's counsel with the disposition to take the most favorable view of the case for the appellant that the evidence would authorize, we have carefully read and reviewed the case with the hope of finding some evidence which would support the conclusion that there was doubt as to the correctness of the verdict of the jury; but we have been unable to find any sufficient confirmation of the theory, so strongly asserted by his counsel, that the jury erred in their findings upon the questions presented to them. The points most strenuously urged upon us for a reversal of the judgment are the refusal of the trial court to institute a preliminary inquiry relative to the defendant's present sanity, and the claim that the undisputed evidence established the fact of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense so conclusively that the court should reverse the judgment as matter of law. The case does not, in its material features, differ from that which it presented on the former appeal, except in respect to the omission of the errors then appearing in the record, and the absence of expert evidence on the part of the people on the subject of the defendant's sanity when the crime was committed. Upon the last trial no medical experts were called on the question of sanity on behalf of the people; but, by the consent of the people's counsel, the evidence of two experts called on behalf of the defendant was, on account of their non-attendance, permitted to be read from the minutes of the former trial. A careful consideration of the evidence of these experts must lead any impartial mind, we think, to the conclusion that they were both of the opinion that the defendant did, when he stabbed Luca, know the nature and quality of the act he was committing, and did know that it was wrong. The general effect of their evidence was to impress the mind with the convictionthat, according to the statutory definition of sanity, the defendant was guilty of knowingly committing the crime with which he was charged. The witnesses expressed or suggested their dissatisfaction with the statutory definition of sanity, and seemed to think that it would be better to substitute therefor what was called the ‘medical opinion of his mental condition.’ But it seems to us quite unnecessary, under the circumstances of this case, to go into a critical examination or discussion of the various phases of insanity, as exhibited and illustrated in the discussions of legal and scientific writers; as on the whole case it seems quite clear to us that the defendant had sufficient intelligence and self-control to understand the nature and character of the act committed by him, and to refrain from its commission if found to be inconsistent with a due regard for his own safety or interest. The evidence showed that previous to his fourteenth year he had been to school, and, although a dull and slow scholar, had acquired the ability to read and write and do sums in arithmetic. After that time, his family being in humble circumstances, he was accustomed to labor for a livelihood in such menial employment in his neighborhood as he could obtain and was capable of pursuing. He was 19 years of age when the crime was committed, and for several years previous to that time had been engaged in the delivery of ice to customers for some dealer in that article in Brooklyn, and other similar employments. He was not a person of much intelligence or a high grade of morals, and was unsteady and irregular in his habits. He had never, apparently, been treated by his family as of unsound mind, or confined as a lunatic, but had been brought up and dealt with like other boys of his age and condition in life. A few months before this homicide he had been prosecuted by his sister for stealing money from her, and was condemned to imprisonment as a punishment for that crime. This prosecution had been undertaken with the apparent acquiescence and consent of his relatives. His mental condition did not then seem, in their judgment, to be a sufficient reason for relieving him from responsibility for his acts. He was married about 11 days before he killed Luca, and was then living with his wife, within a block and a half of Luca's house. He stated, in reference to the crime, that the day before it was committed he was going by Luca's house with a comrade, who suggested to him that ‘that would be a good house to do;’ to which the defendant replied, ‘All right.’ The evidence tends to show a deliberate adoption by the defendant of a plan to rob Luca's house, and the acquisition of sufficient knowledge of the premises and their surroundings to enable him to commit the crime. The exhibition of presence of mind when discovered in the perpetration of the burglary, and the prompt adoption of the means thought necessary by him to insure his safety, a coolness and deliberation in making use of them and freeing himself from the interference of those who came to Luca's aid, are utterly inconsistent with the idea that he was not acting under the influence of intelligence, reason, judgment, and a full appreciation of the hazard, character, and consequences of the act he was engaged in performing. When seized by Luca there was no hesitation in the employment of the means he had prepared to overcome resistance, and, when interfered with by Luca's wife and...