Sherbert v. Verner

Citation240 S.C. 286,125 S.E.2d 737
Decision Date17 May 1962
Docket NumberNo. 17915,17915
PartiesAdell H. SHERBERT, Appellant, v. Charlie V. VERNER, Ed H. Tatum, Robert S. Galloway, Sr., as members of South Carolina Employment Security Commission, and Spartan Mills, Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Lyles & Lyles, Spartanburg, Dockery, Ruff, Perry Bond & Cobb, Charlotte, N. C., for appellant.

Jas. Julien Bush, Columbia, Benjamin O. Johnson, Butler & Chapman, Spartanburg, for respondents.

MOSS, Justice.

Adell H. Sherbert, the appellant herein, did, on July 29, 1959, file her claim with the South Carolina Employment Security Commission, one of the respondents herein, for unemployment compensation benefits under the 'South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law.' Section 68-1 et seq., 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina.

The appellant, a textile employee, had worked for Spartan Mills, Beaumont Division, a respondent herein, for approximately thirty-five years. Immediately prior to June 5, 1959, she was working as a spool tender Monday through Friday, on the first shift, and her hours were from 7:00 A.M. until 3:00 P.M. On June 5, 1959, she was notified by her employer that, commencing June 6, 1959, she would be required to work on Saturday. This she refused to do, although the employer's plant, and other textile plants in the area, were operating on a six day basis, which included Saturday. Prior to June 5, 1959, Saturday work in Spartan Mills was on a voluntary basis and the appellant had not worked at any time between sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday after she became a member, on August 5, 1957, of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. The appellant failed to report for work on six successive Saturdays and she was discharged on July 27, 1959, because of her refusal to work on Saturdays. The reason given by the appellant for refusing to work on Saturdays was that for nearly two years prior to her discharge she had been a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church and it was the teaching of her Church that the Sabbath begins at sundown Friday and ends at sundown Saturday, during which time she should not perform work or labor of any kind. The appellant applied for work at three other textile plants in the Spartanburg area but had been unable to find employment since these plants and practically all of the other textile plants in the area operated six days a week, including Saturday. The first, second and third shifts of Spartan Mills included work on Saturday.

It appears that on September 4, 1959, a claims examiner of the Commission, pursuant to Sections 68-152 to 68-154 of the 1952 Code, issued a determination holding that the appellant had been separated from her employment because she was unavailable for work as of July 28, 1959, and imposed a disqualification of five weeks, thereby preventing her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for said period. He further held that the appellant was not available for the regular work week observed by Spartan Mills and by the textile industry in the area in which she worked.

The claimant appealed from the initial determintion of the claims examiner to the Appeal Tribunal of the Commission, and a hearing was held by an Appeals Referee pursuant to Section 68-160 of the Code, at which the testimony of the appellant and her witness was taken. On October 12, 1959, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the determination of the claims examiner and held that the appellant had been discharged under disqualifying circumstances because she was not available for work as of July 28, 1959.

Pursuant to Section 68-161 of the Code, and within the time allowed by law, the claimant appealed from the decision of the Appeal Tribunal to the Full Commission. This appeal was heard by said Commission on December 16, 1959 and, thereafter, on December 18, 1959, the Commission rendered its decision in which it made findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming the decision of the Appeal Tribunal.

The appellant commenced an action on January 5, 1960, in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County, for the purpose of obtaining a judicial review of the decision of the Commission. Section 68-165 of the Code. The case was heard by The Honorable J. Woodrow Lewis, Presiding Judge of the Seventh Circuit. Thereafter, by a decree dated June 27, 1960, Judge Lewis affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding that a disqualification had been properly imposed upon the appellant and that, because of the restrictions which she had placed upon her availability for employment, she was unavailable for work within the meaning of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law. Timely notice of intention to appeal to this Court was given by the appellant.

The first question for determination is whether the appellant was able and available for work, under the facts here involved, within the contemplation of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law, or was she discharged for misconduct connected with her work. The determination of this question involves consideration of the two sections of the Unemployment Compensation Law which prescribe the general rules of eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. These are Sections 68-113, which provides for basic conditions which have to be met in order to qualify; and Section 68-114 enumerates a series of disqualifications.

Section 68-113 provides that:

'An unemployed insured worker shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that:

'(1) He has made a claim for benefits with respect to such week in accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe;

'(2) He has registered for work * * *

'(3) He is able to work and is available for work * * *.'

Section 68-114 provides:

'Any insured worker shall be ineligible for benefits:

'(1) 'Leaving work voluntarily.' If the Commission finds that he has left voluntarily without good cause his most recent work prior to filing a request for determination of insured status * * *

'(2) 'Discharge for misconduct.' If the Commission finds that he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his most recent work prior to filing a request for determination of insured status or a request for initiation of a claim series within an established benefit year * * *.

'(3) 'Failure to accept work.' If the Commission finds that he has failed, without good cause, (a) either to apply for available suitable work, when so directed by the employment office or the Commission, (b) to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer * * *.'

At the 1955 session of the General Assembly of South Carolina, Section 68-114 was amended by adding to subdivision (3) thereof a subsection (a) (49 Stats. 490), the following:

'In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals, * * *'

It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes must be construed in the light of the evil they seek to remedy and in the light of the conditions obtaining at the time of their enactment. Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission, et al., 204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E.2d 535.

The public policy and the purpose of the enactment of the Unemployment Compensation Law of this State is fully set forth in Section 68-36 of the 1952 Code and is declared to be as follows:

'* * * economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious maence to health, morals and welfare of the people of this State; involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the General Assembly to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family; the achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life; this can be provided by encouraging the employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. * * *' In the case of Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission, et al., supra, this Court adopted the decree of the lower Court, where with reference to the Unemployment Compensation Act, it was said:

'This statute was passed in 1936, at a time when this State, in common with the entire nation, was suffering from a prolonged depression which had resulted in industry laying off many workers, many of whom were left without the means of obtaining even the barest necessities of life. This unquestionably was the evil which the legislature was seeking to remedy. Unemployment due to changes in personal conditions of the employee, making it impossible for him to continue on his job had existed for many years, but there is no reason to believe that the evil resulting therefrom was any more pronounced in 1936 than it had been prior to that time. I find nothing in the act itself or in the circumstances surrounding its passage to indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature to provide benefits for a worker compelled to give up his job solely because of a change in his personal circumstances.

'It will be noted that one of the remedies proposed by the Legislature in its declaration of State policy was the encouragement of industry to provide more stable employment. In furtherance of this objective, the Act imposed upon the employer the entire burden of creating and maintaining a fund for the payment of unemployment benefits. * * *

* * *

* * *

'The primary purpose of this provision would be greatly impaired, if not completely defeated, if benefits were paid to persons who became unemployed, not because the employer could no...

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3 cases
  • Sherbert v. Verner, 526
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1963
    ...of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.' 240 U.S. 286, 303—304, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746.4 We noted probable jurisdiction of appellant's appeal.371 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 321, 9 L.Ed.2d 273. We reverse the judgment of the South Car......
  • State v. Swartzentruber, 11413
    • United States
    • Court of Common Pleas of Ohio
    • December 11, 1989
    ...statute did not prevent her from exercising her religion, it did not violate the First Amendment. Sherbert v. Verner (1962), 240 S.C. 286, 303-304, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746. The United States Supreme Court rejected that argument. It noted that Sherbert was put in the position of following her re......
  • Martin v. Ellisor
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • March 16, 1976
    ...qualified electors was to be excluded from 'any and all precinct lists,' the Legislature would have so provided. See Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962); Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548 Affirmed. LITTLEJOHN and GREGORY, JJ., concur. LEWIS, C.J., and JOSEPH R. MO......
1 books & journal articles
  • ESTABLISHMENT'S POLITICAL PRIORITY TO FREE EXERCISE.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 No. 2, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...to Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 LJ. CHI. L. REV. DlALOGUE 71, 74 n.18 (2013). (113) Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737, 738 (S.C. 1962), reu'd, 374 U.S. 398 (114) Sherbert, 125 S.E.2d at 745. (115) Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenti......

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