Lambert v. State, PCD-2002-974.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. PCD-2002-974.,PCD-2002-974. |
| Citation | 126 P.3d 646,2005 OK CR 26 |
| Parties | Robert Wayne LAMBERT, Appellant v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶ 1 Robert Wayne Lambert was tried by jury, convicted of two counts of first degree murder, and received two death sentences. This Court affirmed Lambert's convictions for murder, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 This Court affirmed the denial of Lambert's first Application for Post-Conviction Relief.2 Lambert's application for federal habeas corpus relief is pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.3 On October 31, 2002, Lambert filed a Successor Application for Post-Conviction Relief in a Death Penalty Case, and a Request for Evidentiary Hearing on the issues of mental retardation and second-stage jury instructions. This Court remanded Lambert's case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental retardation on November 15, 2002.4 On December 13, 2002, we held the evidentiary hearing in abeyance and directed the State to respond to Lambert's Successor Application. The State's response was filed March 10, 2003. On May 29, 2003, this Court remanded the case to the District Court of Creek County for a jury determination of mental retardation.5 That jury hearing was conducted in May 2004, before the Honorable Donald D. Thompson, and concluded with a finding that Lambert is not mentally retarded. The District Court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with this Court on June 23, 2004. Lambert filed a Supplemental Brief in response to those findings and conclusions, raising eighteen propositions of error.6
¶ 2 The Court remanded this case for a jury determination followed by findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court. While the trial court's findings and conclusions assist this Court in its decision, the jury is the finder of fact in this proceeding. Thus, we will review the alleged errors occurring during the proceeding on remand in the same manner as errors raised on direct appeal from a trial on the merits. This Court reviews the jury's factual determination in the light most favorable to the State, to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.7 After a complete review of the record, transcripts, exhibits and pleadings filed in this case, we find that factual and legal errors, as well as the interests of justice in this case, require relief. Rather than remand this case for yet another court proceeding, we modify Lambert's two death sentences to two sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
¶ 3 Lambert committed the crimes in this case in 1987, and the case has been in the criminal justice system since 1988. Lambert's first trial resulted in convictions for murder and capital sentences which were reversed due to a serious legal error at trial. During the pendency of that first direct appeal to this Court, Lambert claimed, in a competency hearing, that his low intelligence prevented him from giving a voluntary confession — he raised the issue of mental retardation. Lambert was retried, convicted, and again sentenced to death. During that retrial Lambert presented evidence of mental retardation in mitigation, in an effort to avoid the death penalty. The State did not contest Lambert's claim that he was mentally retarded; in fact, the State argued that his mental retardation supported a death sentence because Lambert was unable to learn from his crimes and would continue to pose a danger to society. On appeal, Lambert again raised the issue of mental retardation and asked this Court to find that the execution of mentally retarded persons violates the United States Constitution. Based on United States Supreme Court law at that time, we declined.8 In 2002, the United States Supreme Court determined that execution of mentally retarded persons is unconstitutional.9 Lambert subsequently filed this application for post-conviction relief on the issue of mental retardation. It is in this context that we review the jury's determination that Lambert is not mentally retarded, and Lambert's claims of error on appeal.
¶ 4 In Proposition XV, Lambert correctly claims that the jury's verdict, that he is not mentally retarded, is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. In order to prove mental retardation, Lambert must first demonstrate to the court that he had an IQ test under 70. After meeting this threshold requirement, Lambert must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he meets the three prongs of the Murphy test: sub-average intellectual ability, manifestation before age 18, and significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of nine skill areas.10 The jury had to decide whether, more probably than not, Lambert met this test. The overwhelming weight of the evidence shows he did.
¶ 5 This Court has defined mental retardation for Atkins purposes as:
A person is "mentally retarded": (1) If he or she functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others; (2) The mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18); and (3) The mental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care; social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and safety; use of community resources; and work. . . . [N]o person shall be eligible to be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient of seventy or below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized, scientifically approved, and contemporary intelligent quotient test.11
¶ 6 We begin by addressing the burden of proof. The test above requires that a defendant (a) meet the threshold legal requirement of an IQ test under 70, and (b) prove the three prongs of the Murphy test by a preponderance of the evidence: sub-average intellectual ability, manifestation before age 18, and significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of nine skill areas. Only when all of these requirements are met will a defendant meet the definition of mental retardation for capital sentencing purposes.12 The third prong, significant limitations in adaptive functioning, describes deficits common in mentally retarded people.13 These limitations may also be caused by other mental or social conditions. A defendant must show he has significant limitations in adaptive functioning, but is not required to show that mental retardation is the cause of his limitations in these skill areas. In order to counter such a claim, the State must present evidence negating those particular skill limitations. Unless a defendant's evidence of particular limitations is specifically contradicted by evidence that he does not have those limitations, then the defendant's burden is met no matter what evidence the State might offer that he has no deficits in other skill areas. In fact, the State need not present any evidence that a capital defendant can function in areas other than those in which a deficit is claimed. In capital mental retardation proceedings, the State's first response must always be to counter the evidence presented by the defendant.
¶ 7 In addition to being a threshold requirement, evidence of IQ testing may be admitted to the jury to prove whether a defendant functions at a significantly sub-average intellectual level. Lambert presented evidence of several tests for this purpose. All six IQ tests over 21 years of Lambert's life, beginning in childhood, placed him under 70, and thus within the mildly mentally retarded range. This includes the test administered by the State's own expert, Dr. Call, on which Lambert had an IQ of 66. Dr. Call did not testify that Lambert was not mentally retarded. In fact, he explicitly stated he could not say that Lambert was not mentally retarded. In order to counter the overwhelming evidence of "at least one" IQ test under 70, Dr. Call testified that Lambert was malingering, and had done so since childhood, in an effort to be thought mentally retarded. Dr. Call's diagnosis stands alone in Lambert's testing record: although some medical professionals believed Lambert might have faked particular illnesses or mental problems over the years, he was never described as malingering with regard to the consistent mental retardation diagnoses. Other expert witnesses noted that it is difficult to fake mental retardation over a period of years.14 Although Dr. Call testified that some of Lambert's other IQ tests were not reliable because they did not include a test of adaptive functioning, he himself did not administer an adaptive functioning test. Dr. Call administered one IQ test and an achievement test. In order to reach his "malingering" diagnosis, he administered five malingering tests.15 Dr. Call is a forensic psychologist. His practice has not primarily been in the field of mental retardation, and he has not had a mentally retarded patient in a clinical setting for fifteen years.16 However, since 2002 he has made a specialty of examining capital defendants for mental retardation.17 Taking into account Dr. Call's testimony, the record easily shows that Lambert had at least one IQ test under 70. This, along with the expert testimony describing Lambert's intellectual functioning at those IQ levels, showed that he functioned at a significant sub-average intellectual level.
¶ 8 For further proof of the first prong...
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