Craig v. Singletary

Decision Date07 November 1997
Docket NumberNo. 93-5123,93-5123
Parties11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 731 Donald Lee CRAIG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Paul M. Rashkind, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Miami, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Robert Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, FL, Consuelo S. Maingot, Miami, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge *.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

This case involves issues of probable cause and custody for Fourth Amendment purposes. In reversing the district court's denial of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 relief, the panel issued two opinions. Its initial opinion held that the confession of a co-defendant implicating himself and the defendant in a crime does not provide probable cause to arrest the defendant. See Craig v. Singletary, 80 F.3d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir.1996). On rehearing, the panel issued another opinion which did not supersede but instead was designed to "supplement and clarify" its prior holding. See Craig v. Singletary, 97 F.3d 445 (11th Cir.1996) (on rehearing). In that supplemental opinion, the panel held that Donald Craig, the habeas petitioner, had been in custody as soon as he arrived at the police station. See id. But see, 80 F.3d at 1510-13.

We granted rehearing en banc. See Craig v. Singletary, 101 F.3d 98 (1996). For the reasons discussed hereafter, we affirm the district court's denial of relief.

I. THE HISTORICAL FACTS

Craig filed a pretrial motion to suppress the confessions that he made, and the state trial court conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing during which it heard testimony from a number of witnesses, including Craig and all of the law enforcement officers who were involved in questioning him. At the end of the evidentiary hearing the judge made factfindings, one of which was that the law enforcement officers were credible and had testified truthfully while Craig had not. In this habeas proceeding, the United States magistrate judge also made factfindings, which were adopted by the district court. The following recitation of facts is drawn from the record of the motion to suppress hearing, based upon the state trial court's presumptively correct findings, which we have found to be fairly supported by the record, see, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983), and upon the district court's findings, which we have found not to be clearly erroneous, see, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

On the evening of October 25, 1988, while Junior Richards was sitting in his automobile with his girlfriend, Laverne Bailey, two men approached and began to rob him. Richards resisted. One of the men shot Richards in the abdomen, killing him. The crime took place in Gwen Cherry Park in Miami, Florida on October 25, 1988.

On November 9, 1988, Detective Nelson of the Metro-Dade County Police Department received an anonymous phone call. The caller said he knew Detective Nelson had been around the neighborhood asking questions about crimes in that area, and he wanted Nelson to know that Donald Craig and Henry Lee Newsome were the two men involved in the robbery-murder at Gwen Cherry Park a week or two before. That day, Detectives Nelson and Singer went to find Craig. Around noon, they found him at the residence of the Newsome family. However, when they asked who he was, Craig told them his name was Maurice Oliver. After they showed Craig a photograph of himself, he admitted his true identity. Craig told the two detectives he had given them a phony name because he had been deeply involved with some long-term narcotics investigations, working with their colleague Detective Fandrey.

The detectives told Craig they were investigating a homicide that had occurred at Gwen Cherry Park and thought that he may either have participated or have some pertinent information about it. Craig replied: "You know, I deal with cops all the time, whatever you need, I'll help you with, I didn't see anybody, but I'll tell you what I do know." Detective Singer replied that the street was not a good place to talk, that his file was at the office, and he asked Craig if he would come down to the police station with the detectives. Craig said he would. He was not handcuffed, restrained in any way, or told anything that would lead him to believe he was under arrest. The detectives specifically told Craig that he was not under arrest. They were in plain clothes driving in an unmarked police car. They got in the front seat of the car, and Craig got in the back seat. Craig voluntarily got into the car. The car did not have a cage in the back, or any other device to prevent the person in the back of the car from getting out. If Craig had gotten out of the car and left, the officers would not have arrested him.

Once they got into the car, the detectives told Craig that although he was not under arrest they wanted to read him his rights. Detective Nelson gave Craig his rights from memory, and later in the trip Detective Singer read Craig his Miranda rights from a card. Craig said that he understood his rights and that he was willing to talk to the detectives without having a lawyer present. There was no coercion or promises involved in the waiver, and Craig never invoked his right to counsel or said that he did not want to talk to the detectives.

During the ride to the police station, after he had been read his Miranda rights twice, Craig expressed curiosity about what it was all about. Detective Singer told him (falsely) that his fingerprints had been found in the victim's car and asked Craig how he could explain that. Craig responded that the murder victim was a friend of his, that he had seen the victim just prior to the killing, and that he had been in the victim's vehicle just before he was killed. According to Craig that was when he would have touched the car and opened the car door, leaving his fingerprints. There followed some conversation about how Craig knew the victim, where they had met, and so forth. Craig also said that he had some other information but suggested they wait until they got to the police station.

On the way to the police station, they stopped and got something to eat at the drive-through window of a McDonald's restaurant. Craig was offered something to eat and drink at the drive-through window, and he may have actually gotten something. In any event, Craig was free to get out of the car and go at any time.

At the police station, they went to the robbery office where they again read Craig his Miranda rights, this time from a form. Craig did not hesitate to sign the form, he did not ask for an attorney or invoke his right to remain silent, and "as a matter of fact he was very relaxed." After Craig signed that Miranda rights form at 12:31 p.m., the detectives took a photograph of him, and then they all went down to the homicide office, which is in the same building.

At the homicide office, Detective Singer and Craig talked. Craig told Detective Singer that he was very familiar with the system, wanted to help, and was going to tell them everything he could. Detective Singer asked Craig to tell him what he knew about the crime. Craig replied that he had known the victim for three or four months and that on the night of the shooting, before it occurred, the victim had driven up to Craig, who was standing on a corner. They had had a conversation. Craig had gotten in the driver's seat of the car, which would explain his fingerprints. They smoked some marijuana together, and the victim told Craig he was going to pick up his girlfriend. Craig also told Detective Singer that later that night he had heard a gunshot and had seen Henry Lee Newsome along with Rodney Newsome running from the area where the shot had been fired, near Gwen Cherry Park, and Rodney Newsome appeared to be carrying a sawed-off shotgun.

Detective Singer told Craig that his story just did not jive. Craig responded by saying that if the detective had any problem with what Craig was saying, "[L]et me take a polygraph test." Even though Detective Singer did not believe Craig's story, Craig was not told he was under arrest; he was not told he couldn't leave; and he was not handcuffed or restrained in any way. Craig was free to leave, and if he had said he wanted to go, he would have been allowed to do so. Craig never said he wanted to leave.

After Craig volunteered to take a polygraph examination, Detective Singer went and spoke with Detective Mote about giving one to Craig. Detective Singer filled in Detective Mote about what had happened, including what Craig had told him. Detective Singer wanted Mote to see if the information which Craig had given him was truthful. After Detective Singer had talked with Mote, Singer showed Craig where the polygraph examination room was. It, like the homicide office, is on the second floor of the building.

Detective Mote is the one who gave Craig the polygraph examinations, and Craig came into his office around 3:00 p.m. Detective Mote treats people differently if they are under arrest: he does not let them leave his office without being with him or with some other detective. However, when Craig came to Detective Mote's office, Mote understood that Craig was free to leave at any time. He was not in handcuffs or restrained in any way. In Detective Mote's office, Craig signed two forms. One was a Miranda warning form, which Craig signed in Detective Mote's presence at 3:10 p.m. Craig did not ask for an attorney. The other...

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